•H  below 


SOUTHERN   BRANCH 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
LIBRARY 

LOS  ANGELES,  CALIF. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  PUBLICATIONS 

IN 

HISTORY 

Vol.  4  No.  3 


PROLEGOMENA  TQ  HISTORY 

THE  RELATION  OF  HISTORY  TO  LITERATURE, 
PHILOSOPHY,  AND  SCIENCE 


BY 
FREDERICK  J.  TEGGABT 

Associate  Professor  of  History  and  Curator  of  the  Bancroft  Library 
in  the  University  of  California 


BERKELEY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  PRESS 
1916 


30254 

08 


r 


PROLEGOMENA  TO  HISTORY 

THE  RELATION  OF  HISTORY  TO  LITERATURE, 
PHILOSOPHY,  AND  SCIENCE 

FREDERICK  J.  TEGGART 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I.  Introduction  155 

II.  The  Method  of  Science 159 

III.  Historical  Investigation  and  Historiography  169 

IV.  History  and  Philosophy  213 

V.  History  and  Evolution  239 

Bibliographical  Appendix  . 278 


I 

INTRODUCTION 

In  an  address  on  "The  Study  of  History,"  delivered  at  the 
University  of  Glasgow  in  1884,  Principal  Caird  set  in  a  clear 
light  the  problem  that  lies  before  History  as  a  university  study. 
' '  The  expediency, ' '  he  said,  ' '  of  introducing  the  study  of  history 
into  a  university  curriculum  turns  upon  the  question  whether 
history  is  capable  of  scientific  treatment.  Knowledge  which  has 
not  yet  been  elevated  out  of  the  domain  of  facts  and_  details, 
which  has  not  submitted  itself  to  the  grasp  of  principles,  or 
become  in  some  measure  illuminated  and  harmonized  by  the 
presence  of  law,  cannot,  I  suppose,  be  regarded  as  a  fit  instru- 
ment of  the  higher  education. ' n 

To  this  challenge  there  has  been  no  adequate  response  on  the 
part  of  those  who  are  professionally  engaged  in  the  study  and 
teaching  of  history.  In  England  and  America  it  is  only  on  rare 


John  Caird,  University  Addresses  (Glasgow,  1899),  pp.  225-26. 


156          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

occasions  that  the  professor  of  history  seems  disposed  to  lay 
aside  the  presentation  of  assured  fact  in  order  to  consider  the 
nature  of  the  foundation  upon  which  his  constructions  rest. 
Hence  it  is  that  most  of  our  contributions  to  historical  theory 
are  to  be  found  in  the  inaugural  lectures  of  university  pro- 
fessorships and  the  presidential  addresses  of  historical  societies 
and  associations.  Possibly  the  subjects  of  these  communications, 
which  have  much  in  common,  are  considered  too  general  and 
debatable  to  be  offered  in  regular  courses  of  instruction ;  possibly 
it  is  only  upon  such  important  occasions  that  the  scholar  may  look 
for  an  audience  sufficiently  expert  to  justify  him  in  taking  up 
problems  of  admitted  complexity,  and  it  may  be  that  the  speaker 
welcomes  the  opportunity  to  express  his  matured  convictions. 
It  is  evident,  indeed,  that  these  are  not  perfunctory  speeches ;  they 
are,  without  exception,  informed  by  a  spirit  of  earnestness,  which, 
however,  not  infrequently  cloaks  hesitating  thought.  In  a 
measure  all  these  pronouncements,  it  must  be  admitted,  are 
excursions  into  unfamiliar  territory,  and  betray  an  air  of  having 
been  written  under  pressure,  rather  than  of  being  the  spontaneous 
expression  of  familiar  ideas.  However  this  may  be.  the  fact 
remains  that  the  English-speaking  representatives  of  historical 
scholarship,  when  called  upon  to  stand  out  for  a  moment  from 
among  their  fellows,  find  that  the  particulars  which  they  them- 
selves have  been  investigating  can  not  be  relied  upon  to  make 
a  general  appeal,  and  so  it  comes  that  cherished  researches  are 
temporarily  neglected  for  the  brief  advocacy  of  some  view  of  the 
nature  and  utility  of  history.  Restricted  to  such  situations,  it  is 
not  remarkable  that  the  consideration  of  the  fundamental  prob- 
lems of  historical  study  has  shown  but  little  vitality  during  the 
last  fifty  years.  Assertion  evokes  rejoinder — Freeman  will  have 
none  of  Stubbs,  and  Firth  improves  upon  Bury — and  each  latest 
speaker  is  sensitive  to  the  lapses  of  his  immediate  predecessors. 
Thus  the  problems,  lightly  touched,  remain,  like  politics  and 
religion,  subjects  on  which  every  man  is  presumed  to  have  an 
opinion,  but  which  the  taste  of  the  moment  places  outside  the 
pale  of  direct  and  sustained  discussion. 


Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  157 

Among  historical  scholars  there  still  is  disagreement  as  to 
whether  history  is  or  may  become  a  science,  though  there  seems 
to  be  unanimity  of  opinion  that  some  part,  at  least,  of  historical 
work  is  "scientific."  "Whether,"  said  Stubbs^  "we  look  at  the 
dignity  of  the  subject-matter,  or  at  the  nature  of  the  mental 
exercise  which  it  requires,  or  at  the  inexhaustible  field  over 
which  the  pursuit  ranges,  History,  the  knowledge  of  the 


tares,  thjejjevelQpjw^nt,  thn  ^mngefuj^careerj  the  varied  growths, 
the  ambitions,  aspirations,  and,  if  you  like.th^_approximating  __ 
destinies  of  mankind,  claims  a  place  second  to  none  in  the  roll  of 

_  '  ______  •-  —     •      -          i   -*-_..  ------------  "  —  t~i     "  •  ••  '  '  •    •    '- 

sciences.    -    Bury._would  have  us  remember  always  that  though 


history  "may  supply  material  for  literary  art  or  philosophical 
speculation,  she  is  herself  simply  a  science,  no  less  and  no 
more."3  Yillari,  after  passing  in  review  the  opinions  held  on 
the  question,  reaches  the  conclusion  that  "History  can  never  be 
converted  into  a  philosophical  system  nor  into  a  natural  or 
mathematical  science.  Nor  would  it  even  be  possible  to  attain 
that  purpose  by  forcing  it  to  use  methods  appertaining  to  other 
studies. '  '4 

Among  philosophers  and  men  of  science  opinion  on  the  subject 
is  equally  varied.  "A  science  of  history  in  the  true  sense  of  the 
term, ' '  Jevons  said,  "is  an  absurd  notion.  ...  In  human  affairs, 
the  smallest  causes  may  produce  the  greatest  effects,  and  the  real 
application  of  scientific  method  is  out  of  the  question. ' >5  Sidgwick 
did  not  "consider  History  a  Science,  so  far  as  it_is  merelycon- 
cerned  with  presenting  particular  events  in  chronological  order.''6 

The  uncertainty  of  the  situation  is  shown  further  by  the 
criticisms  which,  while  condemning  the  present  methods  of 
historical  scholars,  express  confidence  in  the  possibility  of  a 


2  William  Stubbs,   Seventeen  Lectures  on  the  Study  of  Medieval  and 
Modern  History  (Oxford,  1887),  p.  85. 

3  J.  B.  Bury,  An  Inaugural  Lecture  (Cambridge,  1903),  p.  42. 

*  Pasquale  Villari,  Studies,  Historical  and  Critical   (New  York,  1907), 
p.  108. 

5  W.  S.  Jevons,  The  Principles  of  Science  (London,  1883),  p.  761. 

6  Henry  Sidgwick,  Philosophy,  its  Scope  and  Belations  (London,  1902), 
p.  4,  note. 


158          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

science  of  history.  Karl  Pearson  remarks  that  "historians  have 
assumed  .  .  .  that  history  is  all  facts  and  no  factors."  He  him- 
self thinks  that ' '  natural  history,  the  evolution  of  organic  nature, 
Js  at  the  basis  of  human  history,.! *  and  that  "only  when  history 
is  interpreted  in  this  sense  of  natural  history  does  it  pass  from 
the  sphere  of  narrative  and  become  science."7  Hobhouse,  look- 
ing beyond  existing  limitations,  believes  that  "we  can  conceive 
as  not  indefinitely  remote  a  stage  of  knowledge  in  which  the 
human  species  should  come  to  understand  its  own  development, 
its  history,  conditions,  and  possibilities,  and  on  the  basis  of  such 
an  understanding  should  direct  its  own  future."8 

It  will  be  evident  from  the  conflict  of  opinion  thus  exhibited 
that  we  are  here  confronted  with  a  problem  at  once  of  difficulty 
and  importance.  Mere  expression  of  opinion  cannot,  however, 
advance  the  discussion  further — the  only  way  open  is  to  insti- 
tute an  inquiry  into  the  nature  and  characteristics,  on  the  one 
hand,  of  Science,  and,  on  the  other,  of  History. 


7  Karl  Pearson,  The  Grammar  of  Science  (2d  ed.,  London,  1900),  pp. 
358-59. 

s  L.  T.  Hobhouse,  Mind  in  Evolution  (London,  1901),  p.  336. 


Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  159 


II 

THE  METHOD  OF  SCIENCE 

What  distinguishes  the  work  of  contemporary  physicists  or 
biologists  from  that  of  historical  scholars  is  the  critical  self- 
consciousness  of  the  former  in  regard  to  the  mental  processes 
involved  in  research  and  discovery.  Scientific  methodology  deals 
primarily  with  the  psychological  analysis  of  the  investigator's 
mode  of  thought.  The  purpose  of  this  analysis,  as  Stallo  re- 
marked, is  to  eliminate  from  science  its  latent  metaphysical 
elements,  to  foster  the  spirit  of  experimental  investigation,  and 
to  accredit  the  great  endeavor  of  scientific  research  to  gain  a 
sure  foothold  on  solid  empirical  ground.1  Science  recognizes  that 
all  investigation  proceeds  in  the  human  mind;  it  takes  account 
"of  the  fact  that  the  order  in  which  ideas  associate  themselves 
differs  radically  from  the  order  manifested  by  phenomena  in 
external  nature;  and  it  acts  upon  the  principle  that  only  by 
maintaining  a  constant  surveillance  over  what  goes  on  in  our 
minds  is  it  possible  to  determine  what  goes  on- outside. 

' '  Natural  laws  are  formulae  which  express  the  constant  relations  ex- 
isting between  phenomena,  as  distinguished  from  association  of  ideas  in 
the  subjective  consciousness. '  '2 

' '  Now  the  principle  of  arrangement  in  the  actual  world,  i.e.,  in  nature, 
is  not  logical,  but  it  is  a  kind  of  divine  confusion,  and  whenever  we 
destroy  this  we  step  out  of  the  region  of  the  natural  into  that  of  the 
artificial. '  '3 

Historical  investigators,  on  the  other  hand,  have  made  a  policy 
of  ignoring  these  preliminaries  in  favor  of  getting  at  once  to  the 


1  J.  B.  Stallo,  The  Concepts  and  Theories  of  Modern  Physics  (New  York, 
1882),  p.  8. 

2  Friedrich   Paulsen,  Introduction   to  Philosophy,   tr.   by   Frank   Thilly 
(2d  ed.,  New  York,  1906),  p.  376. 

3  J.  T.  Merz,  ' '  On  a  General  Tendency  of  Thought  during  the  Second 
Half  of  the  Nineteenth  Century,"  University  of  Durham   Philosophical 
Society,  Proceedings,  3  (1910),  316. 


160          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

"facts"  themselves.  There  are,  however,  no  shortcuts  to  know- 
ledge, and  historical  inquiry,  which  may  prove  more  arduous  in 
the  long  run  than  its  obvious  interest  would  suggest,  has  suffered 
from  the  neglect  of  inquiries  that  have  been  found  necessary  in 
other  fields.  How  far  History  is  from  making  use  of  the  recog- 
nized methods  of  scientific  investigation  may  be  inferred  from  its 
current  dictum  that  historical  scholarship  must  confine  itself  at 
present  to  the  collection  of  facts,  so  that  from  these,  in  an 
undefined  future,  the  "laws"  of  history  may  be  formulated. 
It  may  be  true  that  every  science  starts  from  a  basis  of  ascertained 
fact  and  looks  to  the  discovery  of  "laws"  as  the  goal  of  its 
endeavors,  but  it  is  a  commonplace  of  modern  science  that  the 
collection  of  facts  does  not  of  itself  lead  to  the  discovery  of 
"laws." 

' '  Malgre  tous  les  progres  accomplis,  nous  sommes  done  encore  dans  une 
periode  de  preparation,  d 'elaboration  des  materiaux  qui  serviront  plus 
tarde  a  construire  des  edifices  historiques  plus  vastes.  "* 

' '  Still  in  our  little  day  we  can  do  something.  We  can  at  least  make 
ready  the  way  for  those  who  are  to  supplant  us,  and  we  may  even  do 
somewhat  towards  the  more  pious  work  of  prolonging  for  some  small 
space  the  posthumous  lives  of  those  who  went  before  us."5 

' '  What  we  ask  of  the  historian,  it  is  said,  is,  by  careful  investigation 
and  impartial  weighing  of  contemporary  and  other  evidence,  to  put  us  in 
possession  of  the  facts  as  they  actually  occurred  at  any  given  time  and 
place.  The  future  may  be  the  field  for  conjecture  and  speculation  as  to 
the  course  of  events,  .  .  .  but  history,  as  has  been  recently  said,  'can  have 
no  presuppositions,  her  province  is  to  recall  and  not  to  construct  .  .  .  and 
she  demands  from  the  historian  to  make  his  mind  simply  the  mirror  of 
reality,  the  surrender  of  his  judgment  to  the  decree  of  the  ages,  not  the 
projection  of  his  fancies  into  a  region  that  has  forever  passed  from  the 
limit  of  creation.'  "« 

' '  This  work,  the  hewing  of  wood  and  the  drawing  of  water,  has  to  be 
done  in  faith: — in  the  faith  that  a  complete  assemblage  of  the  smallest 
facts  of  human  history  will  tell  in  the  end.  The  labour  is  performed  for 
posterity — for  remote  posterity."7 

"At  the  very  beginning  of  all  conquest  of  the  unknown  lies  the  fact, 
established  and  classified  to  the  fullest  extent  possible  at  the  moment. 


*  Gabriel  Monod,  "Introduction,"  Bevue  historique,  1  (1876),  34. 

s  E.   A.   Freeman,    The  Methods   of  Historical   Study    (London,   1886), 
p.  267. 

s  John  Caird,  as  cited,  pp.  240-41. 
I      7  J.  B.  Bury,  as  cited,  p.  31. 


1916J  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  161 

To  lay  such  foundations,  to  furnish  such  materials  for  later  builders,  may 
be  a  modest  ambition  .  .  .  etc."8 

' '  Imperfect  as  our  vision  into  the  future  is  and  must  be,  by  using  it 
as  well  as  we  can  we  shall  be  enabled  better  to  serve  the  needs  of  the 
historians  who  shall  come  after  us  and  enter  into  our  labors.  Comforted 
by  this  reflection  we  may  retire  once  more  into  our  subterranean  caverns. '  '9 

This  point  of  view  is  a  well-understood  symptom.  "And  whenever," 
Paulsen  says,  "like  Faust,  [Science]  begins  to  feel  that  there  is  something 
wrong  with  its  critical  endeavors  or  its  encheiresis  naturae,  it  straightway 
consoles  itself  with  general  phrases:  Nothing  is  too  insignificant  for  the 
true  scientist;  or,  We  are  not  yet  ready  for  generalisations;  the  detail 
work  must  first  be  brought  to  a  close.  "10 

The  procedure  now  advocated  by  historians — namely,  that  we 
should  investigate  the  past  with  our  minds  a  perfect  blank  as  to 
what  we  wish  to  know  or  what  we  may  expect  to  find — was 
formulated  by  Francis  Bacon.  "Men,"  he  said,  "should  bid 
themselves  for  a  while  renounce  conceptions,  and  begin  to  make 
acquaintance  with  things  themselves."11  Bacon  himself,  however, 
failed  absolutely  in  attempting  to  apply  his  own  method,12  the 
value  of  which  may  be  estimated  historically  by  the  fact  that  it 
has  not  been  followed  by  any  one  of  the  great  masters  of  science.13 

The  actual  method  of  science  is  based  on  recognition  of  the 
fact  that  "it  is  only  when  we  approach  Nature  with  a  question 
that  we  can  expect  to  get  an  answer.  Only  those  who  seek  find. 
And  seeking,  as  opposed  to  rummaging,  consists  of  a  series  of 
guesses."14  "Nature  gives  no  reply  to  a  general  inquiry — she 
must  be  interrogated  by  questions  which  already  contain  the 
answer  she  is  to  give ;  in  other  words,  the  observer  can  only 
observe  that  which  he  is  led  by  hypothesis  to  look  for :  the  experi- 
menter can  only  obtain  the  result  which  his  experiment  is 


s  G.  B.  Adams,  ' '  History  and  the  Philosophy  of  History, ' '  American 
Historical  Review,  14  (1909),  236. 

s  J.   F.   Jameson,   "The  Future  Uses   of  History,"  History   Teacher's 
Magazine,  4  (1913),  40. 

10  Friedrich  Paulsen,  as  cited,  p.  43. 

11  Novum  organum,  i,  36. 

12  James  Welton,  Manual  of  Logic  (London,  1907),  II,  38. 
is  W.  S.  Jevons,  as  cited,  p.  507. 

i*  J.  H.  Muirhead,  Philosophy  and  Life  (London,  1902),  p.  237. 


162          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

designed  to  obtain."15  Of  special  interest  in  the  present  con- 
nection is  a  statement  made  by  Charles  Darwin  in  1861.  "About 
thirty  years  ago,"  he  wrote,  "there  was  much  talk  that  geologists 
ought  only  to  observe  and  not  theorize;  and  I  well  remember 
some  one  saying  that  at  this  rate  a  man  might  as  well  go  into 
a  gravel-pit  and  count  the  pebbles  and  describe  the  colors.  How 
odd  it  is  that  anyone  should  not  see  that  all  observation  must  be 
for  or  against  some  view  if  it  is  to  be  of  any  service!"10 

"I  think,"  Komanes  says,  "it  ought  now  to  be  manifest  to  everyone 
who  studies  it,  that  up  to  the  commencement  of  the  present  century  the 
progress  of  science  in  general,  and  of  natural  history  in  particular,  was 
seriously  retarded  by  what  may  be  termed  the  Bugbear  of  Speculation. 
Fully  awakened  to  the  dangers  of  webspinning  from  the  ever-fertile 
resources  of  their  own  inner  consciousness,  naturalists  became  more  and 
more  abandoned  to  the  idea  that  their  science  ought  to  consist  in  a  mere 
observation  of  facts,  or  tabulation  of  phenomena,  without  attempt  at 
theorizing  upon  their  philosophical  import.  .  .  .  Looking  to  the  enormous 
results  which  followed  from  a  deliberate  disregard  of  such  traditional 
canons  by  Darwin,  it  has  long  since  become  impossible  for  naturalists, 
even  of  the  strictest  sect,  not  to  perceive  that  their  previous  bondage  to 
the  law  of  a  mere  ritual  has  been  forever  superseded  by  what  verily 
deserves  to  be  regarded  as  a  new  dispensation,  "i? 

The  insistence  of  historical  scholars  on  restricting  their  efforts 
to  the  collection  of  facts  appears  to  be  an  expression  of  the 
desire  for  certainty  in  the  results  obtained.18  Bacon  also  enter- 
tained this  notion.  "Our  method  of  discovering  the  sciences." 
he  said,  "is  one  which  leaves  not  much  to  acumen  and  strength  of 


is  Sir  E.  E.  Lankester,  The  Advancement  of  Science  (London,  1890),  p.  9. 

!«  Charles  Darwin,  More  Letters,  ed.  by  Francis  Darwin  (New  York, 
1903),  I,  195.  Darwin's  attitude  is  well  expressed  in  his  Autobiography, 
where,  discussing  his  own  mental  qualities,  he  says:  "I  have  steadily 
endeavored  to  keep  my  mind  free  so  as  to  give  up  any  hypothesis,  how- 
ever much  beloved  (and  I  cannot  resist  forming  one  on  every  subject),  as 
soon  as  facts  are  shown  to  be  opposed  to  it."  Life  and  Letters  (New  York, 
1889),  I,  83. 

17  G.  J.  Romanes,  Darwin,  and  after  Darwin:  I.  The  Danciniaii  Theory 
(Chicago,  1892),  pp.  2-4. 

J8"La  critique  historique  et  les  sciences  auxiliaires  qui  s'y  rattachent 
offrent  ceci  de  satisfaisant  a  ceux  qui  s'y  livrent  qu'elles  peuvent  .  .  . 
arriver  a  des  r^sultats  positifs  et  certains."  Gabriel  Monod,  in  De  la 
methode  dans  les  sciences  (2e  ed.,  Paris,  1910),  p.  388. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  163 

wit,  but  nearly  levels  all  wits  and  intellects."10  Science,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  adventurous  and  accepts  risk.  The  scientist  recog- 
nizes an  element  of  uncertainty  in  his  undertakings,  and  is  well 
aware  that  he  will  be  fortunate  indeed  if  his  results  serve  as 
stepping-stones  for  the  advancement  of  knowledge.  ''Certainty 
is  mediate,  and  the  specific  characteristic  of  scientific  hypothesis 
is  just  that  it  emphasises  this  mediacy  by  bringing  it  clearly  into 
consciousness."  20  The  hypothesis  accepted  by  the  scientific 
investigator  is  that  which  seems  most  in  keeping  with  the  facts 
in  his  possession  at  the  moment,  and  the  test  of  its  validity  is 
the  extent  to  which  it  reduces  phenomena  to  order  and  system. 
A  new  hypothesis  is  admitted  when  it  is  found  to  accord  more 
closely  with  observed  facts  or  when  it  brings  a  greater  body  of 
facts  into  relation  with  each  other  than  had  been  done  by  a 
previous  hypothesis.21  ' '  As  the  sciences  have  developed, ' '  William 
James  says,  "the  notion  has  gained  ground  that  most,  perhaps 
all,  of  our  laws  are  only  approximations."  "Investigators  have 
become  accustomed  to  the  notion  that  no  theory  is  absolutely  a 
transcript  of  reality,  but  that  any  one  of  them  may  from  some 
point  of  view  be  useful.  Their  great  use  is  to  summarize  old 
facts  and  to  lead  to  new  ones."22  Obviously,  then,  it  is  not  the 
function  of  science  to  gratify  the  desire  of  men  for  certainty. 
No  scientific  ' '  law "  is  to  be  regarded  otherwise  than  as  a  "  work- 
ing hypothesis"  which  has  proved  of  value  in  organizing  some 
phase  of  experience.  "The  conception,"  Bertrand  Russell  says, 
"of  the  'working  hypothesis,'  provisional,  approximate,  and 
merely  useful,  has  more  and  more  pushed  aside  the  comfortable 
eighteenth  century  conception  of  'laws  of  nature/  "23 


is  Novum  organum,  i,  61. 

20  Muirhead,  as  cited,  p.  235. 

21  Cf.  George  Shann,  The  Criterion  of  Scientific  Truth  (London,  1902), 
passim. 

22  William  James,  Pragmatism   (New  York,   1907),  pp.   56-57.     Prag- 
matism, it  may  be  pointed  out  in  passing,  is  the  extension  of  the  scientific 
conception  of  validity  to  "what  truth  everywhere  signifies.     Everywhere 
.  .  .  'truth'  in  our  ideas  and  beliefs  means  the  same  thing  that  it  means 
in  science"  (p.  58). 

23  Bertrand  Russell,  "Preface,"  in  Henri  Poincare,  Science  and  Method, 
tr.  by  Francis  Maitland  (London,  [1914]),  pp.  6-7. 


164          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

' '  For  logical  purposes  a  Law  of  Nature  is  a  compendious  formula  which 
is  intended  to  describe  the  actual  behaviour  of  some  selected  series  of 
events,  and  is  not  known  to  be  merely  a  convenient  fiction.  "2* -^ 

"  'Law'  is  a  term  which  is  applied  to  a  sequence  or  a  grouping  of 
phenomena  only  in  a  metaphorical  sense.  Tt  is  a  convenient  term  which 
men  of  science  use  in  classifying  their  observations,  often  as  a  synonym 
for  hypothesis.  "25 

"How  idle  is  it  to  speak  of  the  law  of  gravitation,  or  indeed  of  any 
scientific  law,  as  ruling  nature.  Such  laws  simply  describe,  they  never 
explain  the  routine  of  our  perceptions,  the  sense-impressions  we  project 
into  an  'outside  world.'  "2C 

The  method  of  science  is,  then,  something  other  than  the 
cataloguing  of  facts.  "Cognitions  of  particular  facts,  however 
accurately  observed,  do  not  constitute  a  science  so  long  as  they 
remain  loose  and  unconnected."27  "A  mere  after-one-another 
in  time  is  of  no  philosophical  or  scientific  interest ;  thus,  e.g.,  the 
scientific  historian  will  not  write  mere  annals.  Annals  are  the 
materials  for  history,  and  are  not  yet  history.  "28  "  The  task  of 
historical  science  is  just  as  little  exhausted  .  .  .  with  the  fixing 
of  former  events  as,  for  instance,  the  task  of  physics  with  the 
establishment  of  a  single  fact,  as  the  temperature  of  a  given 
place  at  a  given  time."29  The  facts  of  history,  like  those  of  our 
personal  experience,  are  particulars,  they  constitute  a  sequence 
of  different  happenings.  Now,  "while  the  apprehension  of 
phenomenal  difference  ...  is  the  basis  or  prerequisite  of  thought, 
thought  proper,  i.e.,  discursive  thought,  begins  with  the  appre- 
hension of  identity  amid  phenomenal  difference.  Objects  are 
perceived  as  different;  they  are  conceived  as  identical  by  an 
attention  of  the  mind  to  their  point  or  points  of  agreement.  They 
are  thus  classified,  the  points  of  agreement,  i.e.,  those  properties 


24  F.  C.  S.  Schiller,  Formal  Logic  (London,  1912),  p.  314. 

25  Alexander  Hill,  Introduction  to  Science  (London,  1900),  p.  19. 

26  Karl  Pearson,  The  Grammar  of  Science  (3d  ed.,  London,  1911),  p.  99. 

27  Henry  Sidgwick,  Philosophy,  its  Scope  and  Eelations  (London,  1902), 
p.  7. 

28  D.  G.  Eitchie,  Darwin  and  Hegel  (London,  1893),  p.  51. 

2»  Wilhelm  Ostwald,  "On  the  Theory  of  Science,"  Congress  of  Arts  and 
Science,  St.  Louis,  1904  (Boston,  1905),  I,  351. 


Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  165 

of  the  objects  of  cognition  which  belong  to  them  in  common, 
serving  as  the  basis  of  classification. '  '30 

For  purposes  of  thought  and  communication  the  particularity 
of  experience  is  reduced  by  giving  names  to  classes  of  objects. 
Science  is  the  systematic  extension  of  this  process  beyond  the 
limits  of  what  is  immediately  obvious.  Its  fundamental  postulate 
is  a  formulation  of  the  assumption  on  which  men  have  always 
acted  in  "naming"  things — which  is,  that  the  phenomena  of 
nature,  notwithstanding  their  infinite  variety,  may  be  grouped 
in  classes.  While  "naming"  classifies  like  objects  together,  it 
does  not  necessarily  indicate  relations  between  the  classes.  Thus, 
in  ordinary  language,  we  speak  of  "cat,"  "tiger,"  "leopard," 
without  verbal  suggestion  of  connection.  Science,  on  the  other 
hand,  creates  a  name-system  in  which  relationship  is  shown,  as, 
for  example,  felis  domestica,  felis  tigris,  felis  pardus.  Further- 
more, in  addition  to  nouns  there  are  verbs ;  actions  and  processes 
are  named  as  well  as  objects.  Here  again  Science  assumes  a 
regularity  in  nature  that  makes  "naming"  possible,  and  one  of 
its  great  objects  is  to  disengage  processes  from  the  complex  of 
phenomena  and  describe  them  in  convenient  formulae.  Science 
may  thus  be  said  to  reverse  the  operation  involved  in  the  com- 
pilation of  a  dictionary,  for  while  the  latter  undertaking  begins 
with  "names,"  Science  arrives  at  names — like  "natural  selec- 
tion," and  "conservation  of  energy" — when  its  formulae  come 
to  be  generally  accepted. 

Any  individual  fact  is  the  focal  point  of  an  indeterminate 
number  of  natural  processes.  The  perplexing  thing  in  nature, 
and,  one  might  say,  the  very  reason  for  the  existence  of  Science, 
is  that  processes  do  not  exhibit  themselves  in  isolation — such  as 
is  artificially  set  up  in  laboratory  experiments — but  are  hidden 
in  intricate  combinations.  Appearances  vary  owing  to  the  inter- 
ference of  processes  with  each  other;  if  there  were  no  "com- 
plications" in  medical  cases  it  would  be  possible  to  state  precisely 
the  course  of  any  malady;  antiseptics  are  used  to  prevent  the 


so  Stallo,  as  cited,  p.  130. 


166          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

intrusion  of  undesirable  "natural"  processes.  In  face  of  this 
situation  scientific  investigators  have  found  that  knowledge  is  to 
be  obtained,  not  by  massing  facts  indiscriminately  together,  but 
by  following  up  one  specific  inquiry  at  a  time.  Science  proceeds 
by  breaking  up  the  totality  of  the  universe  into  parts,  and  by 
experiment  and  observation  isolates  phenomena  from  their  sur- 
roundings. Science  "is  before  all  a  classification,  a  manner  of 
bringing  together  facts  which  appearances  separate."31  "In 
mentally  separating  a  body  from  the  changeable  environment  in 
which  it  moves,  what  we  really  do  is  to  extricate  a  group  of 
sensations  on  which  our  thoughts  are  fastened  and  which  is  of 
relatively  greater  stability  than  the  others,  from  the  stream  of  all 
our  sensations. '  '82  In  thus  isolating  or  dissecting  strands  it  must 
be  understood  that  science  does  not  exhaust  experience,  nor  does 
any  given  investigation  assume  to  exhaust  the  content  of  the 
phenomena  with  which  it  deals.  "Physical  science,"  Mach  says, 
' '  does  not  pretend  to  be  a  complete  view  of  the  world ;  it  simply 
claims  that  it  is  working  toward  such  a  complete  view  in  the 
future.  The  highest  philosophy  of  the  scientific  investigator  is 
precisely  this  toleration  of  an  incomplete  conception  of  the  world 
and  the  preference  for  it  rather  than  an  apparently  perfect,  but 
inadequate  conception."33  It  follows  that  there  will  always  be 
elements  in  the  phenomena  which,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
particular  investigation,  are  irrelevant — in  other  words,  "acci- 
dental." While,  however,  science  recognizes  this  characteristic 
in  phenomena,  it  assumes  that  the  "accidental"  aspect  springs 
from  the  limited  scope  of  the  inquiry  which  is  being  pursued. 
"Accident"  is  thus  seen  to  be  natural  process  out  of  focus  for 
an  individual  investigator  at  a  given  time. 

Science,  then,  sorts  phenomena  in  order  to  identify  processes. 
In  doing  this  there  is  but  one  possible  method  it  can  employ,  and 


31  Henri  Poincare,  The  Foundations  of  Science,  tr.  by  G.  B.  Halsted 
(New  York,  1913),  p.  349. 

32  Ernst  Mach,  Popular  Scientific  Lectures,  tr.  by  T.  J.  McCormack  (3d 
ed.,  Chicago,  1898),  p.  200. 

ss  Ernst  Mach,  The  Science  of  Mechanics,  tr.  by  T.  J.  McCormack  (2d 
ed.,  Chicago,  1902),  p.  464. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  167 

"hypotheses  must  guide  all  attempts  to  attain  knowledge."  The 
result  being  given,  and  the  problem  being  to  discover  how  this 
result  has  been  arrived  at,  science  is  forced  to  adopt  the  method 
of  trial-solution.  "In  selecting  a  working  hypothesis,"  Lodge 
says,  "we  must  proceed  by  trial  and  error."  "To  try  several 
clues,  and  at  last  to  perceive  the  probabilities  in  favor  of  one  of 
them,  to  pursue  that  one  into  all  its  consequences  and  ramifica- 
tions till  it  is  either  verified  or  discredited — that  is  scientific 
procedure. '  '34  The  method  pursued  is  to  suppose  such  a  process 
as  would  seem  to  account  for  the  results  given  in  experience, 
and  to  test  this  supposition  or  hypothesis  by  reference  to  the 
facts. 

' '  Modern  discoveries  have  not  been  made  by  large  collections  of  facts, 
with  subsequent  discussion,  separation,  and  resulting  deduction  of  a  truth 
thus  rendered  perceptible.  A  few  facts  have  suggested  an  hypothesis, 
which  means  a  supposition,  proper  to  explain  them.  The  necessary  results 
of  this  supposition  are  worked  out,  and  then,  and  not  till  then,  other  facts 
are  examined  to  see  if  these  ulterior  results  are  found  in  nature,  "ss 

' '  Everyone, ' '  Venn  remarks,  ' '  who  has  ever  had  to  work  out  the 
solution  of  any  little  matter  in  daily  life  which  has  puzzled  him,  knows 
how  many  and  how  wild  were  the  guesses  that  flitted  through  his  mind 
before  he  paused  at  one  which  seemed  more  hopeful.  The  larger  the  stock 
from  which  he  has  to  draw,  the  better,  other  things  being  equal,  is  his 
chance  of  finding  a  good  one  amongst  them.  And  the  same  holds  good  of 
the  more  serious  speculations  of  the  scientific  man.  "36 

' '  All  intellectual  processes  are  based  on  abstraction — that  is,  on  con- 
centrated attention  directed  to  a  selected  portion,  with  limitation  of 
scope,  and  elimination  of  whatever  may  be  regarded  as  unessential  or 
irrelevant.  .  .  .  Anatomists  dissect  out  the  nervous  system,  the  blood- 
vessels, and  the  muscles,  and  depict  them  separately — there  must  be  dis- 
crimination for  intellectual  grasp — but  in  life  they  are  all  merged  and 
co-operating  together;  they  do  not  really  work  separately,  though  they 
may  be  studied  separately.  .  .  .  The  laws  of  nature  are  a  diagrammatic 
framework,  analysed  or  abstracted  out  of  the  full  comprehensiveness  of 
reality. '  '37 

Scientific  investigators  are  fully  aware  that  this  method 
involves  grave  dangers.  "With  the  valuable  parts  of  physical 


34  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  Reason  and  Belief  (New  York,  1910),  pp.  140-141. 

35  Augustus  De  Morgan,  A  Budget  of  Paradoxes  (London,  1872),  p.  55. 

36  John  Venn,  The  Principles  of  Empirical  or  Inductive  Logic  (London, 
1889),  p.  399. 

37  Sir  Oliver  Lodge,  Continuity  (New  York,  1914),  p.  71. 


168          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

theories,"  Mach  says,  "we  necessarily  absorb  a  good  dose  of  false 
metaphysics,  which  it  is  very  difficult  to  sift  out  from  what 
deserves  to  be  preserved,  especially  when  those  theories  have 
become  very  familiar  to  us. '  '38  Hence  it  is  that  Science  requires, 
for  its  protection  no  less  than  for  its  guaranty,  the  labor  of  verifi- 
cation. "The  progress  of  physical  science  since  the  revival  of 
learning,"  Huxley  stated,  "is  largely  due  to  the  fact  that  men 
have  gradually  learned  to  lay  aside  the  consideration  of  unveri- 
fiable  hypotheses;  to  guide  observation  and  experiment  by  veri- 
fiable hypotheses;  and  to  consider  the  latter,  not  as  ideal  truths, 
the  real  entities  of  an  intelligible  world  behind  phenomena,  but 
as  a  symbolical  language,  by  the  aid  of  which  Nature  can  be 
interpreted  in  terms  apprehensible  by  our  intellects."39  Veri- 
fication, Lewes  pointed  out,  "was  so  little  understood  by  the 
ancients,  that  it  found  neither  employment  in  their  practice,  nor 
recognition  in  their  philosophy."  "To  this  source  every  one 
of  their  errors  may  be  traced.  Every  error  may  be  shown  to 
have  arisen  from  reliance  upon  unproved  facts,  precipitate 
inductions,  or  mere  phrases  reasoned  from  as  if  they  were 
demonstrated  truths.  And  to  this  source,  likewise,  may  all  the 
errors  of  moderns  be  traced. '  '40 

Science,  then,  is  aggressive,  and  aims  at  overcoming  the 
particularity  that  distinguishes  the  universe.  To  this  end  it 
attacks  the  world  piecemeal,  and  dissects  and  isolates  strand  after 
strand  from  the  totality  of  things,  on  the  assumption  that  the 
whole  is  like  a  cable — but  what  the  cable  is  for,  how  it  comes  to 
be  made  up  of  fibres  and  strands,  and  between  what  points  it 
stretches,  are  questions  that  Science  regards  as  outside  its 
province  and  beyond  its  ken. 


ss  Ernst  Mach,  Contributions  to  the  Analysis  of  the  Sensations,  tr.  by  C. 
M.  Williams  (Chicago,  1897),  p.  23,  note. 

3»  T.  H.  Huxley,  Method  and  Results  (New  York,  1896),  p.  65. 
«>  G.  H.  Lewes,  Aristotle  (London,  1864),  pp.  59,  61. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  169 


III 
HISTORICAL  INVESTIGATION  AND  HISTORIOGRAPHY 

1 

The  word  histgry^js.  commonly  used  in  a  variety  of  senses ; 
thus  in  speaking  of  the  "history"  of  a  state  we  may  mean  either 
a  narrative  or.the.-eourse_of  events  in  the  past,  just  as  in  speaking 
of  a  man's  "Jjfe ' '  we  may  refer  ejither  to  his  biography  or  to  the 
sequence  of  his  personal  experiences.  IrTthe  former  of  these 
senses,  which  the  usage  of  scholars  sets  in  the  foreground,  the 
word  retains  the  double  meaning  attached  to  it  by  the  Greeks, 
and  implies  both  investigation  and  composition.  „ 

"We  are  apt,"  Gilbert  Murray  says,  "to  apply  to  the  sixth  century 
the  terminology  of  the  fourth,  and  to  distinguish  philosophy  from  history. 
But  when  Solon  the  philosopher  'went  over  much  land  in  search  of  knowl- 
edge,' he  was  doing  exactly  the  same  thing  as  the  historians  Herodotus 
and  Hecataeus.  .  .  .  'Historic'  is  inquiry,  and  ' Philosophia '  is  love  of 
knowledge.  The  two  cover  to  a  great  extent  the  same  field  .  .  .  [but] 
the  '  Historikos '  is  mostly  a  traveller  and  reciter  of  stories. ' Jl 

The  critical  spirit  of  the  Ionian  awakened  to  the  realization 
that,  as  Hecataeus  said,  the  stories  of  the  Greeks  were  diverse 
and  incredible,  and  proceeded  forthwith  to  revise  the  narratives 
that  formerly  had  been  unquestioningly  accepted.  Though  new, 
historical  investigation  did  not  supplant  composition,  for  it  was 
regarded  as  ancillary  to  historiography.  Throughout  the  classical 
period  the  older  element  retained  its  primacy,  and,  owing  to  the 
cultivation  of  rhetoric,  which  was  taught,  even  tended  to  exercise 
an  undue  influence  on  research,  which  was  not  taught.  In  the 


i  History  of  Ancient  Greek  Literature  (New  York,  1897),  p.  123.  Cf. 
Alfred  &  Maurice  Croiset,  Histoire  de  la  litterature  grecque  (Paris,  1890), 
II,  535;  J.  B.  Bury,  The  Ancient  Greek  Historians  (New  York,  1909),  p.  16. 
The  double  significance  may  perhaps  be  felt  in  Burke 's  phrase  "to  rake 
into  the  histories  of  former  ages  .  .  ., "  since  the  word  "rake"  is  here 
the  modern  representative  of  the  Old  English  racu  or  raca,  history.  The 
German  word  Geschichte  involves  a  reference  to  that  which  has  come  to 
pass,  das  Geschehene,  and  has  therefore  primarily  the  objective  significa- 
tion. Cf.  P.  E.  Geiger,  -Das  Wort  "  Geschichte"  und  seine  Zusammensetz- 
ungen  (Freiburg,  i.B.,  1908.). 


170          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

nineteenth  century  the  situation  is  different,  for  scholarship, 
reverting,  one  might  say,  to  the  primary  meaning  of  the  word 
history,  makes  a  sharp  distinction  between  historical  investi- 
gation, which,  it  asserts,  is  a  science,  and  historical  composition, 
which  it  regards  as  an  art.  Today,  among  scholars,  "history" 
is  identified  in  a  special  manner  with  the  new  element  of  inquiry 
that  distinguished  the  work  of  Hecataeus  from  the  compositions 
of  the  epic  poets ;  and  it  is  stated  with  authority  that  ' '  to  clothe 
the  story  of  a  human  society  in  a  literary  dress  is  no  more  the 
part  of  a  historian  as  a  historian  [meaning  investigator] ,  than 
it  is  the  part  of  an  astronomer  to  present  in  artistic  shape  the 
story  of  the  stars."2  Indeed,  the  separation  has  become  so  pro- 
nounced that  it  has  been  found  necessary  to  reclaim  for  the  word 
history  its  classical  dualism  of  meaning.  ' '  Is  history  a  science  or 
an  art  ? "  "  Men, ' '  Firth  says,  ' '  give  opposite  answers  according 
to  their  conception  of  the  methods  and  objects  of  the  historian. ' ' 
"To  me,"  he  continues,  "truth  seems  to  lie  between  these  two 
extremes.  History  is  neither,  but  partakes  of  the  nature  of  both. 
A  two-fold  task  lies  before  the  historian.  One  half  of  his  business 
is  the  discovery  of  the  truth,  and  the  other  half  its  represen- 
tation."3 So,  by  way  of  a  twentieth-century  compromise,  the 
position  of  Hecataeus  is  regained. 

The  view  expressed  by  Firth  is  widely  held;  thus  Albert  Sorel  says: 
"L 'histoire  tend  a  devenir  une  science,  la  science  des  societes;  elle  a  tou- 
jours  4te,  elle  sera  toujours  un  art,  Part  de  demeler  les  passions  des 
hommes  et  de  les  peindre.  "4 

"L 'histoire  est  un  art,"  Camille  Jullian  thinks,  "a  la  condition  d'etre 
d  'abord  une  science. '  '5 

Gabriel  Monod  is  of  opinion  "que  1 'investigation  et  la  construction 
historiques  constituent  une  science  qui  fournit  ses  materiaux  a  1  'art  de 
1  'histoire.  En  un  mot,  c  'est  dans  la  methode  et  la  critique  historiques  et 
dans  les  resultats  de  leurs  operations  que  consiste  la  science  de  1 'histoire. 
Tout  ce  qui  est  raise  en  oeuvre,  exposition,  est  1'art  de  1 'histoire.  "G 


2  J.  B.  Bury,  An  Inaugural  Lecture  (Cambridge,  1903),  p.  17. 

3  C.  H.  Firth,  A  Plea  for  the  Historical  Teaching  of  History  (2d  ed., 
Oxford,  1905),  p.  8. 

*  Nouveaux  essais  d'histoire  et  de  critique  (Paris,  1898),  p.  11. 
5  Extraits  des  historiens  frangais  du  xixe  siecle   (6e  6d.,  Paris,   1910), 
p.  cxxviii. 

oln  De  la  methode  dans  les  sciences  (2e  ed.,  Paris,  1910),  pp.  371-372. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  171 

"On  a  longtemps  discute, "  it  has  been  said,  "la  question  de  savoir 
si  1  'histoire  est  une  science  ou  un  art.  La  question  est  vraiment  oiseuse, 
1 'histoire  est  a  la  fois  une  science  et  un  art."  "L 'histoire  n'est  done  pas 
une  curiosite,  un  dilettantisme  sans  portee,  c  'est  une  science  rigoureuse, 
c'est  un  art  exquis,  c'est  1 'inepuisable  repertoire  de  1 'experience  acquise 
par  I'humanite,  depuis  qu'elle  a  commence  de  se  connaitre.  "7 

"In  this  vexed  question  whether  history  is  an  art  or  a  science,  let  us 
call  it  both  or  call  it  neither.  For  it  has  an  element  of  both.  It  is  not  in 
guessing  at  historical  'cause  and  effect'  that  science  comes  in;  but  in 
collecting  and  weighing  evidence  as  to  facts,  something  of  the  scientific 
spirit  is  required  for  an  historian,  just  as  it  is  for  a  detective  or  a 
politician,  "s 

' '  I  am  therefore  unable  to  agree  with  those  who  think  that  history  must 
be  either  exclusively  a  science  or  an  art.  It  is  a  science  to  the  extent  to 
which  what  are  commonly  known  as  scientific  methods  are  requisite  for 
accuracy  and  proper  proportion  in  the  details  used  in  the  presentation. 
But  the  presentation  must  always  be  largely  that  of  an  artist  in  whose 
mind  it  is  endowed  with  form  and  life."9 

To  the  earlier  Greeks,  the  writer  of  prose  narrative  was  a 
logographer,  and  the  historian  an  investigator.  Unfortunately, 
the  disuse  of  the  former  term  has  led  to  much  confusion  of 
thought.  This  may  be  observed  in  the  character  of  the  sugges- 
tions that  have  been  put  forward  for  a  beginning-point  of 
''history."  Thus,  while  admitting  that  "long  before  history,  in 
the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  came  to  be  written,  the  early 
Greeks  possessed  a  literature  which  was  equivalent  to  history  for 
them  and  was  accepted  with  unreserved  credence — their  epic 
poems,"  Bury  is  of  opinion  that  the  Greeks  originated  history 
because  they  were  the  first  to  apply  criticism  to  historical 
materials.10  If,  however,  the  specialist  of  a  later  period  be  con- 
sulted, he  will-  be  found  to  say,  with  Lord  Acton,  that  "in  the 
Renaissance,  the  art  of  exposing  falsehood  dawned  upon  keen 
Italian  minds,  [and]  it  was  then  that  history  as  we  understand 
it  began  to  be  understood,  and  the  illustrious  dynasty  of  scholars 
arose  to  whom  we  still  look  both  for  method  and  material."11 


7  G.  Desdevises  du  Dezert  &  L.  Brehier,  Le  travail  historique   (Paris, 
1913),  pp.  5,  17. 

s  G.  M.  Trevelyan,  Clio,  a  Muse;  and  other  Essays  (London,  1913),  p.  30. 

9  Viscount  Haldane,  The  Meaning  of  Truth  in  History  (London,  1914), 
p.  34. 

10  J.  B.  Bury,  The  Ancient  Greek  Historians  (New  York,  1909),  pp.  1-2. 

11  Lord  Acton,  A  Lecture  on  the  Study  of  History  (London,  1896;,  p.  11. 


172          University  of  Calif ornia  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

So,  likewise,  the  student  of  modern  history  would  have  "history" 
begin  in  his  period.  "The  Middle  Ages,"  Gooch  says,  "produced 
historical  writers  of  high  literary  merit — Matthew  Paris  and 
Lambert  of  Herzfeld,  Joinville  and  Froissart — whose  testimony 
to  events  of  their  own  time  was  fairly  trustworthy;  but  the 
essential  conditions  of  study  did  not  exist."  "For  the  liberty 
of  thought  and  expression,  the  insight  into  different  ages  and 
the  judicial  temper  on  which  historical  science  depends,  the  world 
had  to  wait  till  the  nineteenth  century,  the  age  of  the  Second 
Eenaissance. '  '12 

' '  L  'histoire,  qu  'on  la  considere  comme  une  branche  de  la  litterature  ou 
comme  une  science,  date  pour  nous  de  la  Eenaissance.  Sans  doute  le 
moyen-age  avait  eu  parmi  ses  chroniqueurs  des  ecrivains  remarquables  tels 
que  Joinville,  Villani  ou  Froissart,  mais  ils  ne  sont  pas  a  proprement 
parler  des  historians;  ils  ont  en  vue  plutot  le  present  que  le  passe;  ils 
veulent  conserver  pour  la  posterite  le  souvenir  des  evenements  qu'ils  ont 
vus  et  auxquels  ils  ont  pris  part,  plutot  que  retracer  a  leurs  contemporains 
une  image  fidele  des  temps  anterieurs.  "is 

The  series  of  illustrations  might,  of  course,  be  carried  much  further; 
thus  Bound  says  of  Freeman:  "But  then  I  should  hasten  to  add  that  he 
belonged  to  a  by-gone  school,  that  he  had  not  the  modern  scientific  spirit 
or  the  modern  ardour  for  discovery — that,  in  a  word,  ...  he  was  'a 
superseded  fossil.'  "14 

Arbois  de  Jubainville  has  devoted  a  book  to  an  exposure  of  the  faults 
of  Fustel  de  Coulanges.  The  fundamental  idea  of  Fustel,  he  says,  is  false; 
it  was  not  religion  that  was  ' '  1  'unique  base  de  la  societe  primitive ' ' — but 
war!  "Les  O3uvres  historiques  ecrites  a  priori  sous  1 'empire  de  ce  prejuge 
antimilitaire  ont  ete  le  flgau  de  notre  pays,  "is 

"The  tone  of  contemptuous  superiority  is  never  absent" — this  remark, 
singularly  enough,  was  not  made  with  any  reference  to  modern  historians; 
Bernadotte  Perrin  thus  describes  the  characteristic  attitude  of  classical 
historians  towards  their  predecessors.16 


12  G.  P.  Gooch,  History  and  Historians  in  the  Nineteenth  Century  (Lon- 
don, 1913),  pp.  1,  13. 

"The  writing  of  history  in  the  sense  in  which  we  now  use  the  word, 
began  in  England  with  the  eighteenth  century."  A.  J.  Grant,  English 
Historians  (London,  1906),  p.  xxiv. 

!3  Gabriel  Monod,  "Introduction,"  "Revue  Historique,  1  (1876),  5. 

i*  J.  H.  Round,  "Historical  Research,"  Nineteenth  Century,  44  (1898), 
1007. 

is  Deux  manieres  d'ecrire  I 'histoire  (Paris,  1896),  p.  259. 

i«  Cf .  his  address  ' '  The  Ethics  and  Amenities  of  Greek  Historiography, ' ' 
American  Journal  of  Philology,  18  (1897),  255-274. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  173 

Thus  "history"  is  made  to  begin  anew  with  every  reawaken- 
ing of  the  critical  spirit.  Obviously,  these  discoveries  of  "begin- 
nings" are  made  by  scholars  who  identify  history  with  critical 
inquiry.  On  the  other  hand,  those  who  identify  it  primarily 
with  composition  press  the  beginning  ever  further  back,  not  only 
to  epic  poems  and  ballads,  but  to  the  simplest  recital  of  some 
unwonted  occurrence  or  adventure. 

It  is  true  that  the  historical  scholars  of  the  nineteenth  century 
undertook  the  reform  of  historical  method  with  high  ideals  of 
objectivity  and  truthfulness.  Having  made  the  discovery  that 
there  existed  materials — like  the  Venetian  Relazioni —  for  testing 
the  accuracy  of  the  older  narratives  in  the  discarded  relics  and 
forgotten  mementoes  preserved  in  the  lumber-rooms  and  waste- 
heaps  of  civilization,  scholars  devoted  themselves  to  the  work  of 
criticism  and  revision.  And,  indeed,  just  as  old  personal  letters 
re-read  will  revivify  circumstances  which  have  faded  with  time, 
and  correct  the  impressions  retained  of  even  memorable  happen- 
ings, so  the  community  memory  has  been  reawakened  and  restored 
by  the  exploitation  of  archives,  the  excavation  of  ruins,  and  the 
elucidation  of  customs  and  observances  by  comparative  study. 
The  result  of  the  discovery  of  verificatory  materials  was  that 
scholars  proceeded — like  Hecataeus — to  call  in  question  the 
reliability  of  the  great  series  of  writings  which  embody  the 
memory  of  European  peoples  in  regard  to  their  past.  At  the 
same  time,  however,  the  new  results  continue  to  be  stated  in  the 
old  form. 

History,  as  Gaston  Boissier  remarks,  "has  perfected  its 
methods,  it  has  not  changed  it  nature."17  The  Greeks  consciously 
regarded  composition  as  the  aim  of  the  historian,  and  required 
that  the  statements  incorporated  should  be  subjected  to  criticism.18 


*7  Gaston  Boissier,  Tacitus,  and  other  'Roman  Studies,  tr.  by  W.  G. 
Hutchison  (London,  1906),  p.  82.  J.  F.  Ehodes  says:  "The  scientific  his- 
torians have  not  revolutionized  historical  methods,  but  they  have  added 
much."  Historical  Essays  (New  York,  1909),  p.  45. 

' '  To  tell  the  story  with  Herodotus  is  what  we  have  come  to,  after  all 
experimenting."  Justin  Winsor,  "The  Perils  of  Historical  Narrative," 
Atlantic  Monthly,  66  (1890),  293. 

is  That  the  standards  of  criticism  have  varied  with  the  ages  goes  with- 
out sajdng.  On  the  other  hand,  to  judge  ancient  criticism  by  modern 


174          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

In  the  last  analysis,  the  academic  practice  of  the  present  has  not 
modified  this  formula,  even  though  it  ignores  composition  and 
throws  the  weight  of  its  approval  on  the  side  of  investigation. 
In  fact,  it  has  not  been  questioned  that  historiography — the 
presentation  of  events  in  narrative  form — is  the  end  towards 
which  all  inquiry  is  contributory.19  This  is  implied,  for  example, 
in  the  common  acceptance  of  Ranke  as  a  pattern  of  the  modern 
historian.  His  formula — "wie  es  eigentlich  gewesen" — which, 
in  the  discussions  of  the  last  half-century,  has  come  to  have  a 
significance  out  of  all  proportion  to  its  intrinsic  importance,  has 
in  its  own  context  no  greater  significance  than  any  one  of  the 
many  similar  statements  that  had  been  made  and  remade  since 
the  Renaissance.20  Ranke  was  a  man  of  letters,  and  he  restated 
the  contents  of  Venetian  dispatches  with  all  the  assurance  of  a 
Livy  or  a  Dio  Cassius.  He  himself  avoided  any  probing  of  the 
fundamental  problems  of  historical  study21 ;  for  him,  as  for  his 


standards  is  the  abnegation  of  historical  thinking.  Compare,  for  example, 
such  statements  as  that  of  Wilamowitz-Moellendorff :  "The  many  words 
which  Polybius  devotes  to  his  own  method  and  to  the  criticism  of 
Ephorus  and  Timaeus  are  at  bottom  as  banal  as  Lucian  's  essay  on  the 
writing  of  history. ' '  Greek  Historical  Writing,  tr.  by  Gilbert  Murray 
(Oxford,  1908),  p.  15.  Mommsen  had  earlier  said  of  Polybius:  "His  treat- 
ment of  all  questions,  in  which  right,  honour,  religion  are  involved,  is  not 
merely  shallow,  but  radically  false."  History  of  Borne,  tr.  by  W.  P. 
Dickson,  IV,  246. 

i»  "Le  tableau  narratif  des  faits  passes  est  la  forme  la  plus  complete 
de  1'ceuvre  historique. "  C.  &  V.  Mortet,  La  science  de  I'histoire  (Paris, 
1894),  p.  60.  "II  en  resulte  que  1 'exposition  tient  la  place  principale  dans 
le  travail  historique:  la  recherche  des  sources  n'est  qu'une  operation 
accessoire. "  G.  Desdevises  du  Dezert  &  L.  Brehier,  Le  travail  historique 
(Paris,  1913),  p.  8. 

20  Compare,  for  example,  the  following  extract  from  Edmund  Bolton  's 
Hypercritica  (1618?):  "For  all  late  Authors  that  ever  yet  I  could  read 
among  us  convey  with  them,  to  Narrations  of  things  done  fifteen  or  six- 
teen hundred  years  past,  the  Jealousies,  Passions,  and  Affections  of  their 
own  Time.     Our  Historians  must  therefore  avoid  this  dangerous  Syren, 
alluring  us  to  follow  our  own  Prejudices,  unless  he  mean  only  to  serve  a 
Side  and  not  to  serve  Truth  and  Honesty,  and  so  to  remain  but  in  price  while 
his  Party  is  able  to  bear  him  out  with  all  his  Faults,  for  quarrels  sake. 
He  is  simply  therefore  to  set  forth,  without  Prejudices,  Depravations,  or 
sinister  items,  things  as  they  are."     In  J.  E.  Spingarn,  Critical  Essays  of 
the  Seventeenth  Century  (Oxford,  1908),  I,  93. 

21  "Weil   er   sich   nicht   in    die   Irrgange   metaphysischer    Geschichts- 
theorien  verlieren  wollte,  unterzog  er  viele  Grundfragen  der  Geschichte 
iiberhaupt  nie  einer  exakten  Priif ung. "     Eduard  Fueter,  Geschichte  der 
Neueren  Historiographie  (Miinchen,  1911),  p.  485. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  175 

predecessors,  "history"  meant  a  narrative  based  upon  what 
seemed  the  best  testimony  available — and  even  Professor  Bury 
presents  his  scientific  results  in  narrative  form.  "I  know  of  no 
one,"  Mr.  Round  says,  "who  wishes  to  confuse  the  writing  of 
synthetic  history  with  the  work  of  original  research ;  still  less 
does  any  one  demand  that  the  former  shall  be  given  up  and  the 
latter  alone  permitted."  We,  he  continues,  who  are  engaged  in 
the  work  of  research  "are  but  paving  the  way  for  the  'synthetic' 
historian"  of  popular  desire.22. 

It  is  one  of  the  great  obstacles  to  the  promotion  of  a  mutual 
understanding  between  historical  scholars  that  in  any  discussion 
of  the  problems  of  historical  study  the  minds  of  the  participants 
play  fast  and  loose  with  the  different  meanings  of  the  word 
history  itself.  In  the  first  instance,  as  has  been  seen,  the  word 
meant ' '  inquiry ; ' '  but,  whether  in  the  classical  period,  the  Renais- 
sance, or  today,  in  the  common  usage  of  men  it  has  meant  and 
still  means  the  finished  literary  product  to  which  the  results  of 
all  our  investigative  technique  are  merely  tributary.  It  is  another 
matter  that  many  scholars  at  the  present  time  carry  on  their 
researches  without  heed  of  any  relation  between  inquiry  and 
historiography,  and  are  far  from  being  satisfied  with  a  conception 
that  limits  historical  work  to  this  position  of  subordination. 
These  scholars  aim,  as  they  say,  to  pursue  "history,"  meaning 
investigation,  "for  its  own  sake,"  and  find  satisfaction  in  the 
thought  that  their  work  is  scientific.  It  is,  in  fact,  to  these 
scholars,  who  may  or  may  not  be  conscious  of  "le  malaise  dont 
souffre  1'histoire, "  of  which  Louis  Halphen  speaks,  that  the 
present  considerations  touching  the  underlying  problems  of  his- 
torical method  are  primarily  addressed;  but  to  these  men,  in 
particular,  it  is  necessary  to  say  that  "history"  is  the  name  of 
a  literary  form  or  genre  having  pronounced  individual  character- 
istics, and  that  these  characteristics  must  be  observed  and 


22  J.  H.  Round,  "Historical  Research,"  Nineteenth  Century,  44  (1898), 
1005.  The  attitude  of  certain  modern  investigators  seems  to  be  quite 
perfectly  expressed  by  Mr.  Round  in  the  same  context.  ' '  But  all  we 
ask, ' '  he  says,  ' '  is  that  Mr.  Harrison  should  allow  us  to  pursue  our  toilsome 
path,  and  refrain  from  ridiculing  our  method  and  caricaturing  our  results. ' ' 


176          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

described  before  it  is  possible  to  discuss  intelligently  the  possi- 
bilities that  await  historical  investigation  conducted  upon  an 
independent  footing. 

2 

At  any  moment,  it  might  be  considered,  there  are  as  many 
things  happening  as  there  are  human  beings.  In  the  broadest 
sense  these  happenings  are  the  facts  of  history.  On  the  other 
hand,  everyone  will  agree  that  a  few  only  of  all  these  incidents 
are  of  "historical"  importance.  Even  the  most  detailed  of  diaries 
or  of  letters  to  absent  friends  omits  the  common  affairs  of  daily 
life.  So,  in  regard  to  public  affairs,  there  is  a  continual  process 
of  selection  going  on,  by  which  "important"  events  are  singled 
out  and  retained  in  memory.  There  is,  too,  an  ascending  scale 
of  importance  in  events — the  destruction  of  a  city  is  felt  to  be 
less  memorable  than  the  downfall  of  an  empire.  In  a  sense, 
moreover,  happenings  are  not  memorable  intrinsically,  but  in 
proportion  to  the  scope  of  their  consequences ;  whether  the  assas- 
sination of  a  dignitary  or  official  will  be  passed  over  with  a 
momentarj^  expression  of  condemnation  or  will  shake  civilization 
to  its  foundations  depends  upon  what  may  be  described  as  the 
strategic  position  which  he  occupies  at  the  juncture.  History 
narrates  the  specific  acts  of  individuals,  but  always  in  relation 
to  wider  issues;  the  individual  with  whose  acts  it  is  concerned 
stands,  if  but  for  a  moment,  in  a  definite  relation  to  the  life  and 
honor  of  the  group  of  which  he  is  a  part.  Briefly,  the  facts  with 
which  history  is  concerned  are  happenings  that  are  unusual ;  they 
are  events  which  for  one  reason  or  another  compel  the  attention 
of  men.  Consequently,  it  is  inevitable  that  histories  should 
chronicle  wars,  and  ignore  the  routine  life  of  peoples. 

Furthermore,  it  is  evident  that  the  events  chronicled  are  those 
that  appear  unusual  to  men  at  the  time.  Take  the  following 
extracts  from  the  Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle: 

A.D.  793.  This  year  came  dreadful  fore-warnings  over  the  land  of  the 
Northumbrians,  terrifying  the  people  most  woefully:  these  were  immense 
sheets  of  light  rushing  through  the  air,  and  whirlwinds,  and  fiery  dragons 


19161  Teggart :  Prolegomena  to  History  177 

flying  across  the  firmament.  These  tremendous  tokens  were  soon  followed 
by  a  great  famine;  .  .  . 

A.D.  890.  .  .  .  This  year  also  was  Plegmund  chosen  by  God  and  all 
his  saints  to  the  archbishopric  in  Canterbury. 

A.D.  891.  This  year  .  .  .  after  Easter,  about  the  gang-days,  or  before, 
appeared  the  star  that  men  in  book-Latin  call  cometa:  some  say  that  in 
English  it  may  be  termed  "hairy  star";  for  that  there  standeth  off  from 
it  a  long  gleam  of  light,  whilom  on  one  side,  whilom  on  each. 

Similarly,  every  age  has  its  own  criteria  for  distinguishing 
between  the  usual  and  unusual,  between  events  "historically" 
negligible  and  events  "historically"  important.  A  problem  thus 
presents  itself  to  the  investigator,  for,  while  his  purpose  is  to 
determine  what  it  was  that  happened,  he  is  limited  in  making  his 
statements  of  fact  to  what  has  already  been  recorded,  and  this, 
in  turn,  is  a  selection  made  by  men  whose  ideas  and  judgments 
are  different  from  his  own.  Now,  one  may  say  that  "no  guide 
is  so  sure  for  an  historian  as  an  overmastering  sense  of  the 
importance,  of  events  as  they  appeared  to  those  who  took  part 
in  them,"  and  that  "there  can  be  no  other  basis  on  which  to 
found  any  truly  sympathetic  treatment,"23  but  this  does  not  meet 
the  point  that  the  bases  of  judgment  in  regard  to  what  is  unusual, 
exceptional,  or  important  vary  with  time.  In  other  words, 
neither  the  contemporary  chronicler  nor  the  later  historian 
determines  what  is  noteworthy  in  events  by  a  fixed  standard ; 
the  one  like  the  other  follows  unconsciously  the  association  of  his 
own  ideas.  Far  indeed  from  accepting  just  what  he  finds  sub- 
stantiated in  his  authorities,  the  modern  historian  takes  it  as  a 
postulate  that  "no  man,  not  even  the  greatest  and  wisest,  can 
fully  understand  the  significance  of  what  he  is  doing,"  and 
believes  that  it  is  because  we  are  not  contemporaries  of  the  events 
that  we  can  describe  intelligently  what  it  was  that  actually  took 
place.  Briefly,  this  means  that  the  shifting  interests  of  the  ever- 
changing  present  constitute  the  criteria  of  importance  for  the 
irrevocable  happenings  of  the  past.  That  this  subjective  view 
is  regarded  with  approval  is  evident  from  the  frequent  reiteration 


23Mandell  Creighton,  "Introductory  Note,"  Cambridge  Modern  His- 
tory (New  York,  1902),  I,  5. 


178          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

of  Goethe's  saying  that  "History  must  from  time  to  time  be 
rewritten,  not  because  many  new  facts  have  been  discovered,  but 
because  new  aspects  come  into  view,  because  the  participant  in 
the  progress  of  an  age  is  led  to  standpoints  from  which  the  past 
can  be  regarded  and  judged  in  a  novel  manner."  "It  is  not," 
Mark  Pattison  stated,  ' '  because  new  facts  are  continually  accumu- 
lating, because  criticism  is  growing  more  rigid,  or  even  because 
style  varies;  but  because  ideas  change,  the  whole  mode  and 
manner  of  looking  at  things  alters  with  every  age ;  and  so  every 
generation  requires  facts  to  be  recast  in  its  own  mould,  demands 
that  the  history  of  its  forefathers  be  rewritten  from  its  own 
point  of  view."24 

The  historian's  aim  is  the  statement  of  what  has  taken  place 
in  the  past.  In  a  stricter  view  this  is  a  restatement,  made  after 
examination  of  the  available  evidence,  of  what  men  have  said 
took  place.  The  modern  historian,  however,  does  not  accept  the 
judgment  of  the  contemporary  reporter  as  to  what  is  historically 
important ;  on  the  contrary,  he  sets  aside  Plegmund  and  the  comet 
to  piece  together  inadvertent  hints  with  the  object  of  reconstruct- 
ing aspects  of  life  which,  as  usual  and  familiar  to  contemporaries, 
escaped  direct  mention  in  their  writings.  The  original  statement 
is  a  selection  from  the  infinite  number  of  contemporary  happen- 
ings made  in  accordance  with  ideas  current  at  the  time;  the 
modern  restatement  is  a  selection,  dominated  by  ideas  current 
now,  from  the  restricted  content  of  the  original  statements.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  the  basis  of  selection  for  the  facts  of 
history  is  subjective ;  and  that  the  judgments  of  any  present  time 
in  regard  to  the  past  remain,  for  still  later  inquiries,  documents 


24  "Gregory  of  Tours"  [1845],  in  his  Essays  (Oxford,  1889),  I,  2. 
Cf.  F.  H.  Bradley,  The  Presuppositions  of  Critical  History  (Oxford,  1874), 
p.  15.  ' '  The  history  then,  which  is  for  us,  is  matter  of  inference,  and  in 
the  last  resort  has  existence,  as  history,  as  a  record  of  events,  by  means 
of  an  inference  of  our  own.  And  this  inference  furthermore  can  never 
start  from  a  background  of  nothing;  it  is  never  a  fragmentary  isolated 
act  of  our  mind,  but  is  essentially  connected  with,  and  in  entire  depend- 
ence on  the  character  of  our  general  consciousness.  And  so  the  past 
varies  with  the  present,  and  can  never  do  otherwise,  since  it  is  always  the 
present  upon  which  it  rests.  This  present  is  presupposed  by  it,  and  is  its 
necessary  preconception." 


!916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  179 

in  the  history  of  ideas  rather  than  contributions  to  knowledge  of 
the  past. 

' '  Most  of  the  great  historians  whom  our  age  has  produced  will,  centuries 
hence,  probably  be  more  interesting  as  exhibiting  special  methods  of 
research,  special  views  on  political,  social,  and  literary  progress,  than  as 
faithful  and  reliable  chroniclers  of  events;  and  the  objectivity  on  which 
some  of  them  pride  themselves  will  be  looked  upon  not  %s  freedom  from 
but  as  unconsciousness  on  their  part  of  the  preconceived  notions  which 
have  governed  them.  "25 

' '  L  'historien  est  domine  a  son  insu  par  les  idees  religieuses,  philo- 
sophiques,  politiques  qui  circulent  autour  de  lui,  et  il  serait  facile  de 
montrer  par  exemple  que  1'Histoire  universelle  de  Bossuet,  le  Siecle  de 
Louis  XIV  de  Voltaire,  les  ceuvres  de  Guizot,  d'Augustin  Thierry,  de 
Macaulay,  de  Droysen  ou  de  Ranke,  ne  sont  que  des  produits  specifiques 
de  certains  etats  de  civilisation  ou  de  culture  nationale.  Bref,  on  peut 
dater  une  conception  historique  comme  on  date,  en  histoire  de  1'art,  les 
ecoles  et  les  styles. '  '26 

Again,  an  imaginative  element  is  introduced  into  historical 
narrative  by  the  mode  in  which  the  historian  deals  with  the 
materials  he  accepts.  If  the  conventions  of  historical  investiga- 
tion, instead  of  permitting  the  selection  of  such  facts  from  the 
sources  as  are  interesting  to  us,  were  to  require  that  everything 
contained  in  the  documents  should  be  considered,  the  investigator 
would  be  forced  to  question  how  the  facts  we  ignore  came  to  be 
regarded  as  important  by  contemporaries.  At  any  time,  the 
conception  of  what  is  remarkable  or  worthy  of  record  is  a 
function  of  the  whole  body  of  current  ideas,  and  what  the  writer 
sets  down  represents  not  merely  his  private  judgment,  but  that 
of  the  community  of  wyhich  he  forms  a  part.  Hence  we  are  led 
to  see  the  force  of  Maitland's  dictum  that  history  is  not  only 
"what  men  have  said  and  done,"  but  "above  all  what  they  have 
thought."  From  such  a  beginning  important  lines  of  investi- 
gation would  open  out :  thus  we  would  have  to  inquire  how  ideas 
arise,  and  what  is  the  relation  between  ideas  and  conduct;  and 
this  would  form  an  introduction  to  the  strictly  historical  task 
of  tracing  the  actual  emergence  of  ideas  in  the  past,  and  the 
consequent  modifications  of  conduct  that  ensued.  As  it  is  the 


25  J.  T.  Merz,  A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century 
(Edinburgh,  1896),  I,  7. 

26  Henri  Pirenne,  Eevue  historique,  64  (1897),  52. 


180          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

business  of  psychology  to  determine,  by  present  observation  and 
experiment,  "the  processes  whereby  an  individual  becomes  aware 
of  a  world  of  objects  and  adjusts  his  actions  accordingly,"27 
so  history  would  inquire  into  the  results  of  the  same  processes 
throughout  the  course  of  time.  It  may  be  remarked  that  for  such 
an  inquiry  every  statement  preserved  from  an  earlier  period 
would  have  an  objective  value. 

The  modern  historian  has,  however,  adopted  another  approach 
to  psychology,  concentrating  his  attention  upon  the  problem  of 
the  relation  in  which  the  writer  stood  to  the  events  he  described, 
with  the  object  of  detecting  the  bias  in  his  statement  of  what 
took  place.28  The  result  of  this  has  been  the  incorporation  into 
history  of  naive  speculations  as  to  personal  motives.  This  pro- 
cedure is  natural,  for  it  is  followed  by  everyone  in  daily  life. 
Habitually  we  interpret  the  behavior  of  others  by  analogy, 
attributing  to  them  motives  such  as  we  recognize  in  ourselves; 
and  not  only  do  historians  introduce  similar  psychological  spec- 
ulations to  account  for  the  views  of  earlier  writers  and  the  actions 
of  historical  characters,  but  they  regard  this  exercise  of  the 
imagination  as  the  final  proof  of  competent  scholarship. 

Of  Ranke,  Fueter  says:  ".  .  .  an  sich  hat  er  sicherlich  sein  Bedeut- 
endstes  als  historischer  Psychologue  geleistet.  .  .  .  suchte  Eanke  bis  zum 
Innern  der  Personlichkeit  vorzudringen.  ...  So  Hebevolle  Sorgfalt  hatte 
bisher  noch  nie  jemand  der  historischen  Psychologic  zugewandt.  Am 
wenigsten  die  Historiker  selbst.  .  .  .  Er  ruhte  nicht,  bis  er  das  Seelenleben 
historischer  Personlichkeiten  bis  in  seine  feinsten  Verzweigungen  bloss- 
gelegt  hatte.  Er  besass  in  wunderbarem  Masse  die  Fahigkeit,  in  die 
Empfindungen  fremder  Menschen  einzudringen  und  ihre  Gedanken  nach- 
zufiihlen,  zu  penetrieren,  wie  er  es  nannte.  "29 


27  G.  F.  Stout,  Manual  of  Psychology  (2d  ed.,  London,  1904),  p.  4. 

28  Ranke  "versuehte  vor  allem  den  Geschichtschreiber  selbst  und  dessen 
Intentionen    im    Augenblick    der    Niederschrift    genau    psychologisch    zu 
rekonstruieren. "     Eduard  Fueter,  Geschichte  der  Neueren  Historiographie 
(Miinchen,  1911),  p.  479. 

' '  In  order  to  determine  which  statements  are  to  be  suspected,  we  are 
to  ask  what  can  have  been  the  general  aim  of  the  author  in  writing  the 
document  as  a  whole;  and  again,  what  can  have  been  his  particular 
purpose  in  making  each  of  the  separate  statements  which  compose  the 
document."  C.  V.  Langlois  &  C.  Seignobos,  Introduction  to  the  Study  of 
History,  tr.  by  G.  G.  Berry  (New  York,  1903),  p.  166. 

2»  Fueter,  as  cited,  pp.  477-78. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  181 

Of  Stubbs,  it  was  said  by  an  intimate:  "His  historic  instinct  was  such 
as  to  enable  him  not  only  to  judge  of  men  and  of  the  course  of  events, 
but  made  him  capable  of  predicting  with  remarkable  precision  how  a  man 
would  act  in  certain  circumstances,  "so 

Stubbs  himself  wrote:  "It  is  almost  a  matter  of  necessity  for  the 
student  of  history  to  work  out  for  himself  some  definite  idea  of  the 
characters  of  the  great  men  of  the  period  he  is  employed  upon.  History 
cannot  be  well  read  as  a  chess  problem,  and  the  man  who  tries  to  read  it 
so  is  not  worthy  to  read  it  at  all.  Its  scenes  cannot  be  realized,  its  lessons 
cannot  be  learned,  if  the  actors  are  looked  on  merely  as  puppets,  "si 

' '  The  historian, ' '  Henry  Nettleship  said,  ' '  is  not  only  a  lover  of  truth, 
not  only  a  chronicler  of  events.  These,  indeed,  he  must  be  at  his  peril, 
but  how  much  more!  Insight  into  human  nature — and  this  implies  the 
rarest  knowledge  and  finest  sympathy  of  which  man  is  capable;  the  power 
of  tracing  the  delicate  relation  between  deed  and  motive,  and  the  pres- 
sure of  action  upon  circumstance  and  circumstance  upon  action;  knowledge 
of  the  world,  in  short,  in  the  highest  sense  of  that  expression.  "32 

Lord  Acton  thought  that  "the  science  of  character  comes  in  with 
modern  history.  "33 

Elsewhere  he  says:  "The  responsible  writer's  character,  his  position, 
antecedents,  and  probable  motives  have  to  be  examined  into;  and  this  is 
what,  in  a  different  and  adapted  sense  of  the  word,  may  be  called  the 
higher  criticism,  in  comparison  with  the  servile  and  often  mechanical 
work  of  pursuing  statements  to  their  root."3* 

Professor  Firth  is  of  opinion  that  a  contemporary  "who  undertook  to 
write  a  history  of  the  seventeenth  century  could  put  together  a  pretty 
full  account  of  what  happened,  but  it  must  be  necessarily  rather  super- 
ficial and  general.  He  could  not  go  below  the  surface  and  explain  either 
the  causes  of  events  or  the  motives  of  the  actors.  "35 

' '  Captain  Vidal, ' '  an  Oxford  professor  says,  ' '  has  not  only  worked  out 
the  complex  mind  of  Soult  .  .  .  nor  the  moods  of  his  generals  alone,  but 
that  of  the  army,  the  magistrates,  and  the  civil  population  of  southern 
France. '  '36 

After  all  this  it  is  refreshing  to  come  upon  D.  G.  Hogarth's  apologia: 
"The  charm  of  guessing  ancient  motives  from  the  records  of  ancient 


so  W.  H.  Hutton,   William  Stubbs,  Bishop  of  Oxford   (London,   1906), 
p.  169,  quoting  Dr.  J.  L.  Darby,  Dean  of  Chester. 

31  Historical  Introductions  to  the  Rolls  Series,  ed.  by  Arthur  Hassall 
(London,  1902),  p.  89. 

32  Lectures  and  Essays,  2d  series,  ed.  by  F.  Haverfield  (Oxford,  1895), 
p.  245. 

33  History  of  Freedom,  and  other  Essays  (London,  1909),  p.  409. 
3*  A  Lecture  on  the  Study  of  History  (London,  1896),  pp.  41-42. 

ss  ' '  The  Development  of  the  Study  of  Seventeenth-Century  History, ' ' 
Royal  Historical  Society,  Transactions,  3d  ser.,  7  (1913),  28-29. 
36  C.  Oman,  English  Historical  Eeview,  29  (1914),  590. 


182          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

deeds  fascinated  me — there  is  much  in  the  pursuit  to  appeal  to  a  gambler 
— and  I  resolved  to  attempt  a  speculative  biography  of  some  great  man. '  'ST 
Well,  we  are  moderns,  but  Dionysius  of  Halicarnassus  wrote  of 
Theopompus:  "There  remains  his  crowning  and  most  characteristic 
quality,  .  .  .  the  gift  of  seeing  and  stating  in  each  case  not  only  what 
is  obvious  to  the  multitude,  but  of  examining  evea  the  hidden  motives 
of  actions  and  actors  and  the  feelings  of  the  soul  (things  not  easily  dis- 
cerned by  the  crowd),  and  of  laying  bare  all  the  mysteries  of  seeming 
virtue  and  undiscovered  vice.  Indeed,  I  can  well  believe  that  the  fabled 
examination,  before  the  judges  in  the  other  world,  of  souls  in  Hades  when 
separated  from  the  body  is  of  the  same  searching  kind  as  that  which  is 
conducted  by  means  of  the  writings  of  Theopompus. '  'ss 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  we  conduct  our  lives  in  relation 
to  those  around  us  on  inferences  as  to  their  feelings  and  desires. 
it  is  evident  that  no  one  can  observe  directly  what  is  going  on  in 
the  mind  of  another.  The  inferential  process  has  a  certain 
practical  justification  in  its  application  to  those  among  whom 
we  have  been  brought  up,  and  with  whom  we  are  in  familiar 
association.  On  the  other  hand,  "the  besetting  snare  of  the 
psychologist  is  the  tendency  to  assume  that  an  act  or  attitude 
which  in  himself  would  be  the  natural  manifestation  of  a  certain 
mental  process  must,  therefore,  have  the  same  meaning  in  the 
case  of  another."39  Even  with  our  own  contemporaries  we  are 
continually  making  mistakes,  and  "interpretation  becomes  more 
difficult  in  proportion  to  the  difference  between  the  mind  of  the 
psychologist  and  the  mind  which  he  is  investigating."40  Hence, 
in  considering  the  mental  condition  of  persons  "widely  removed 
in  their  general  circumstances  and  conditions  from  our  own,  we 
must  assume  an  attitude  of  critical  suspense  until  we  have  taken 
into  account  everything  which  can  have  a  bearing  on  the  prob- 
lem."41 Nevertheless,  the  historian  boldly  projects  himself  into 
the  past,  and  endeavors  to  make  the  actions  of  Alexanders  and 
Attilas  psychologically  intelligible  to  modern  readers  by  imagin- 
ing himself  in  their  place.  In  so  doing  he  subordinates  the  facts 


37  Accidents  of  an  Antiquary's  Life  (London,  1910),  p.  2. 

38  Tr.  by  W.  E.  Eoberts  in   The  Three  Literary  Letters  of  Dionysius 
(Cambridge,  1901),  p.  125. 

39  G.  F.  Stout,  as  cited,  p.  22. 
•*o  Stout,  as  cited,  p.  21. 

41  Stout,  as  cited,  p.  23. 


Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  183 

to  his  own  personality,  and  heightens  the  interest  of  the  narrative 
by  giving  it  the  color  of  comprehensibility. 

The  ascription  of  motives  is  a  dubious  venture  for  one  who 
professes  to  limit  his  statements  to  known  and  documented 
facts,4-  but  not  only  is  the  practice  questionable  in  itself,  it 
leads  on  to  an  attitude  still  less  in  keeping  with  the  claims  of 
historical  research.  In  fact,  inferences  in  regard  to  the  motives 
of  others  are  almost  necessarily  followed  by  judgments  upon 
their  conduct.  So  Lord  Acton  can  say:  "I  exhort  you  never  to 
debase  the  moral  currency  or  to  lower  the  standard  of  rectitude, 
but  to  try  others  by  the  final  maxim  that  governs  your  own 
lives,  and  to  suffer  no  man  and  no  cause  to  escape  the  undying 
penalty  which  history  has  the  power  to  inflict  on  wrong."43 
It  may  be  well  to  point  out  that  the  masters  of  ethical  theory 
are  the  first  to  utter  warnings  against  the  formulation  of  judg- 
ments such  as  these.  "Histories,"  T.  H.  Green  says,  "no  doubt, 
would  be  much  shortened,  and  would  be  found  much  duller,  if 
speculations  about  the  motives  (as  distinct  from  the  intentions) 
of  the  chief  historical  agents  were  omitted;  nor  shall  we  soon 
cease  to  criticise  the  actions  of  contemporaries  on  the  strength 
of  inferences  from  act  to  motive.  But  in  all  this  we  are  on  very 
uncertain  ground.  ...  It  is  wiser  not  to  make  guesses  where  we 
can  do  no  more  than  guess,  and  to  confine  ourselves  ...  to  measur- 
ing the  value  of  actions  by  their  effects  without  reference  to  the 
character  of  the  agents."44 


,  42  i'  Tne  practice  of  introducing  imaginary  speeches  into  histories  being 
now  generally  abandoned,  the  modern  historian  cannot  be  accused  of 
this  aberration  from  truth.  But,  in  general,  he  indemnifies  himself  amply 
for  this  forbearance.  If  he  does  not  put  imaginary  words  into  the 
mouths  of  his  speakers,  he  suggests  imaginary  motives  for  their  acts." 
Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  A  Treatise  on  the  Methods  of  Observation  and  Seasoning 
in  Politics  (London,  1852),  I,  243. 

43^  Lecture  on  the  Study  of  History  (London,  1896),  p.  63.  Of.  E.  G. 
Latham 's  description  of  the  historian  'a  work,  Man  and  His  Migrations 
(New  York,  1852),  pp.  9-10:  "An  empire  is  consolidated,  a  contest  con- 
cluded, a  principle  asserted,  and  the  civil  historian  records  them.  He 
does  more.  If  he  be  true  to  his  calling,  he  investigates  the  springs  of 
action  in  individual  actors,  measures  the  calibre  of  their  moral  and  in- 
tellectual power,  and  pronounces  a  verdict  of  praise  or  blame  upon  the 
motives  which  determine  their  manifestation. ' ' 

« Prolegomena  to  Ethics,  ed.  by  A.  C.  Bradley  (Oxford,  1883),  pp. 
318-19. 


184          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

The  historian,  then,  "selects"  the  facts  to  be  included  in  his 
work  in  accordance  with  some  personal  localized  view;  and 
"explains"  events  by  the  imaginative  reconstruction  of  the 
character  and  motives  of  the  participants.  The  "selection"  of 
facts  and  the  "realisation  of  character"  are  thus  seen  to  be 
fundamental  elements  of  historiography ;  but  to  appreciate  fully 
the  significance  of  this  fact  a  wider  outlook  must  be  taken.45 


Every  art  involves  the  two  elements  of  expression  and  form. 
The  object  of  the  artist  is  not  to  communicate  information, 
but  to  stimulate  in  others  a  mood  or  feeling  similar  to  his 
own.  The  work  of  art  is  not  a  direct  or  immediate  reaction  to 
experience  (such  as  is  the  cry  of  physical  pain)  or  a  mere  state- 
ment of  fact;  the  impulse  in  which  it  originates  is  the  emotion 
evoked  by  the  memory  of  an  experience.  This  act  of  creation 
which  is  characteristic  of  art  has  its  beginning  when  the  experi- 
ence is  lived  over  in  the  mind  of  the  artist  and  is  remade  by 
contemplation.  "On  the  actual  day  of  battle  naked  truths  may 
be  picked  up  for  the  asking ;  by  the  following  morning  they  have 
already  begun  to  get  into  their  uniforms."  The  work  of  art 
is  not  a  transcript  of  experience,  but  the  experience  seen  through 
the  impression  it  has  produced ;  it  is  not  the  utterance  of  personal 
hope  or  fear,  but  the  expression  of  such  an  emotion  detached 
from  its  immediate  relation  to  the  artist.  The  aim  of  the  artist 
is  not  the  imitation  of  a  fife  and  drum,  but  the  reproduction  of 
what  is  felt  to  have  been  the  mood  or  emotion  evoked  by  hearing 
the  fife  and  drum  in  certain  circumstances.  The  effect  produced 
may  be  illustrated  by  a  description  from  Priscus: 

"When  evening  came  on  torches  were  lighted  and  two  barbarians 
stepped  forth  in  front  of  Attila  and  recited  poems  which  they  had  com- 
posed, recounting  his  victories  and  his  valiant  deeds  in  war.  The  ban- 
queters fixed  their  eyes  upon  them,  some  being  charmed  with  the  poems, 
while  others  were  roused  in  spirit,  as  the  recollection  of  their  wars  came 

«  On  the  subject-matter  of  this  section,  consult  further:  Carl  Becker, 
"Detachment  and  the  Writing  of  History,"  Atlantic  Monthly,  106  (1910), 
524-536. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  185 

back  to  them.  Others  again  burst  into  tears,  because  their  bodies  were 
enfeebled  by  age  and  their  martial  ardour  had  perforce  to  remain  un- 
satisfied. "  46 

Form  is  limitation  imposed  by  the  necessity  of  concentration 
and  relevance  if  the  impression  is  to  be  adequately  conveyed. 
Since  emotion  is  dissipated  by  diffuseness,  and  attention  dis- 
tracted by  the  suggestion  of  alternative  avenues  of  thought, 
"unity"  is  the  first  requisite  of  a  work  of  art.  Artistic  creation 
is  the  vivid  realization  or  apprehension  of  an  "action."  The 
question  of  the  artist's  "selection"  of  facts  for  presentation,  as 
of  his  choice  of  subject  and  the  proportion  and  symmetry  in  his 
treatment,  arise  only  when  the  work  of  art  comes  to  be  the  subject 
of  academic  discussion.  The  problem  of  "beauty"  is  likewise 
secondary,  being  concerned  with  the  effect  produced  by  the  work 
of  art  upon  its  auditors  or  beholders.  "Beauty"  is  not  the  aim 
of  the  artist ;  it  is  a  term  used  to  express  the  sense  of  satisfaction 
in  the  auditor  or  beholder  at  the  adequate  rendering  of  the  sub- 
ject. It  will  thus  be  seen  that  all  art  is,  in  a  sense, ' '  opportunist, ' ' 
that  is,  dependent  upon  fortuitous  stimulation  for  inspiration. 

Now,  historiography,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  relation  of  un- 
usual happenings;  it  is  the  narration  of  matters  that  are  felt  to 
be  momentous  in  a  higher  sense,  and  that  arouse  passion  to  a 
more  emphatic  type  of  expression  than  the  vicissitudes  of  men's 
private  fortunes.  On  the  other  hand,  the  intensity  of  its  expres- 
sion is  matched  by  a  strict  limitation  in  the  width  of  its  appeal, 
for  whereas  men  of  all  times  and  countries  find  in  themselves 
an  aesthetic  response  to  the  dramas  of  Sophocles  and  Shakes- 
peare, histories  are  written  for  men  of  one  time  and  one  people. 
So  it  is  that  "historic  art,"  as  Hirn  says,  "has  everywhere 
reached  its  highest  state  of  development  amongst  nations  who 
have  had  to  hold  their  own  vi  et  armis  against  neighboring  tribes, 
or  in  the  midst  of  which  antagonistic  families  have  fought  for 
supremacy."47  "Most  of  the  old  German  heroic  poetry,"  Ker 


46  Tr.  from  Fragmenta  Historicorum  Graecorum,  IV,  92,  in  H.  M.  Chad- 
wick,  The  Heroic  Age  (Cambridge,  1912),  p.  84.  The  account  refers  to 
the  year  A.  D.  448. 

jo  Hirn,  The  Origins  of  Art  (London,  1900),  p.  179. 


186          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

remarks,  "is  clearly  to  be  traced,  as  far  as  its  subjects  are  con- 
cerned, to  the  most  exciting  periods  in  early  German  history, 
between  the  fourth  and  sixth  centuries.  "48  "  Speaking  broadly, ' ' 
Bernadotte  Perrin  observes,  "it  always  required  some  great 
spectacular  struggle — the  Trojan  "War,  the  Persian  Wars,  the 
Peloponnesian  War,  the  duel  between  Sparta  and  Thebes,  the 
Hellenic  conquest  of  Asia — to  elicit,  as  it  were,  a  great  his- 
torian."49 

One  is  reminded  of  Lucian  's  caustic  introduction  to  his  essay  on 
The  Way  to  Write  History:  "Well,  to  compare  like  with  like,  the 
majority  of  our  educated  class  is  now  suffering  from  an  Abderite  epidemic. 
.  .  .  From  the  beginning  of  the  present  excitements — the  barbarian  war, 
the  Armenian  disaster,  the  succession  of  victories — you  cannot  find  a 
man  but  is  writing  history;  nay,  everyone  you  meet  is  a  Thucydides, 
a  Herodotus,  a  Xenophon.  The  old  saying  must  be  true,  and  war  be 
the  father  of  all  things,  seeing  what  a  litter  of  historians  it  has  now 
teemed  forth  at  a  birth. ' '  so 

Similarly,  in  the  fifteenth  century,  "it  was  the  early  success 
of  the  French  war  which  gave  the  stimulus  that  was  needed  to 
produce  the  firstfruit  of  a  national  historical  literature"  in 
England;51  while,  not  to  multiply  instances  unnecessarily,  it  is 
a  commonplace  of  knowledge  that  European  historiography  in 
the  nineteenth  century  was  born  of  war. 

Pursuing  this  phase  of  the  subject,  it  will  be  seen  further 
.that  historiography  is  the  account  of  struggles  seen  in  the  light 
of  their  outcome.  A  concurrent,  moment-for-moment  record  of 
occurrences,  if  any  such  existed,  would  provide  most  desirable 
materials  for  history,  but  would  not  be  regarded  as  historio- 
graphy. The  relation  of  statement  to  event  is  uniquely  brought 
out  by  Sir  Ian  Hamilton : 


«  W.  P.  Ker,  Epic  and  Romance  (London,  1897),  p.  24. 

4»  "History,"  in   Greek  Literature,  a  Series  of  Lectures  delivered  at 
Columbia  University  (New  York,  1912),  p.  152. 

so  Works,  tr.  by  H.  W.  Fowler  and  F.  G.  Fowler  (Oxford,  1905),  II, 
110. 

81  C.  L.  Kingsford,  English  Historical  Literature  in  the  Fifteenth  Cen- 
tury (Oxford,  1913),  p.  8. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  187 

"If,"  he  says,  "facts  are  hurriedly  issued,  fresh  from  the  mint  of 
battle,  they  cannot  be  expected  to  supply  an  account  which  is  either 
well-balanced  or  exhaustive.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  equally  certain 
that,  when  once  the  fight  has  been  fairly  lost  or  won,  it  is  the  tendency 
of  all  ranks  to  combine  and  recast  the  story  of  their  achievement  into 
a  shape  which  shall  satisfy  the  susceptibilities  of  national  and  regi- 
mental vainglory.  It  is  then  already  too  late  for  the  painstaking  his- 
torian to  set  to  work.  He  may  record  the  orders  given  and  the  move- 
ments which  ensued,  and  he  may  build  up  thereon  any  ingenious  theories 
which  occur  to  him;  but  to  the  hopes  and  fears  which  dictated  those 
orders,  and  to  the  spirit  and  method  in  which  those  movements  were 
executed,  he  has  forever  lost  the  clue.  On  the  actual  day  of  battle  naked 
truths  may  be  picked  up  for  the  asking;  by  the  following  morning  they 
have  already  begun  to  get  into  their  uniforms. ' '  52 

It  is  evident,  then,  that  historiography,  however  near  the 
event,  is  not  a  colorless  record,  but  is  a  rendering  of  what  has 
happened  in  terms  of  the  emotions  awakened  by  the  result. 
Here  the  case  of  Thucydides  suggests  itself.  On  the  basis  of  his 
statement  that  ' '  he  began  to  write  when  they  first  took  up  arms, ' ' 
modern  opinion  appears  to  assume,  despite  the  evidence,  that  the 
history  as  we  have  it  was  composed  concurrently  with  the  events. 
So  it  is  asserted,  for  example,  that  "he  did  not  take  up  his 
pen  to  celebrate,  his  aim  was  to  understand."53  What  the  hopes 
and  intentions  of  Thucydides  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  may 
have  been  Ave  do  not  know ;  it  was  the  result — or  shall  we  say  the 
peripeteia,  the  tragic  "revolution,"  the  climax  of  pity  and  terror, 
the  decisive  reversal? — which  determined  that  the  Athenian 
version  of  the  history  of  the  Peloponnesian  War  should  be  an 
Athenian  tragedy.54  "The  catastrophe  of  404  B.C.  set  in  a  new 
light  the  significance  of  all  that  had  happened  since  the  original 
outbreak  of  hostilities  in  431  B.C.,  and  imparted  to  the  whole 
series  of  events  a  unity  of  meaning."55  The  writings  of  con- 
temporary historians  convey  something  that  can  never  be  incor- 


52  A    Staff   Officer's   Scrap-Book   during    the   Eusso- Japanese    War    (5th 
impr.,  London,  1907),  I,  v. 

53  J.  B.  Bury,  The  Ancient  Greek  Historians  (New  York,  1909),  p.  78. 

54  Sir   R.   C.   Jebb,   "The   Speeches  of  Thucydides,"  in   Hellenica:   a 
Collection  of  Essays,  ed.  by  Evelyn  Abbott   (London,  1880),  p.  319.     Cf. 
F.  M.  Cornford,  Thucydides  Mythistoricus  (London,  1907). 

55  Bury,  as  cited,  p.  80. 


188          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

porated  in  the  results  of  scholarship,  and  this  is  the  spirit  mani- 
fested in  the  community  of  which  the  writer  is  a  part.  The 
description  of  the  conflict  may  be  imperfect  or  inaccurate,  but 
it  reflects  the  emotion  of  those  whose  fortunes  turned  upon  the 
issue.  Men  of  genius,  it  has  been  said, 'are  in  general  distin- 
guished by  their  extreme  susceptibility  to  external  experience; 
the  great  historians  are  men  of  genius  who  have  felt  and  rendered 
adequately  the  emotions  of  their  fellows  in  the  crises  of  national 
existence.  So  it  is  true  that  " contemporary  history  never  dies," 
that  "Thucydides  and  Clarendon  are  immortal."  and  that  "on 
the  other  hand,  no  reputation  is  so  fleeting  as  that  of  the 
'standard'  historian  of  his  day."56 

The  spirit  in  which  history  is  written  can  best  be  appreciated 
from  a  study  of  origins.  Heroic  poetry  begins  in  descriptions 
of  contemporary  happenings.  A  perfect  example  of  this  type 
of  narrative  is  the  Old  English  poem  on  the  battle  of  Maldon. 
The  Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle  records  the  incident  to  which  the 
poem  relates  (991  A.D.)  :  "This  year  was  Ipswdch  plundered;  and 
very  soon  afterwards  was  Alderman  Britnoth  slain  at  Maldon." 
The  poem  is  epic  in  quality  and  its  tone  may  be  caught  from 
Professor  Ker  's  translation  of  a  notable  passage : 

"Byrhtwold  spoke  and  grasped  his  shield — he  was  an  old  companion 
— he  shook  his  ashen  spear,  and  taught  courage  to  them  that  fought: — 

"  'Thought  shall  be  the  harder,  heart  the  keener,  mood  shall  be 
the  more,  as  our  might  lessens.  Here  our  prince  lies  low,  they  have 
hewn  him  to  death!  Grief  and  sorrow  forever  on  the  man  that  leaves 
this  war-play!  I  am  old  of  years,  but  hence  I  will  not  go;  I  think  to 
lay  me  down  by  the  side  of  my  lord,  by  the  side  of  the  man  I  cherished. '  '  '57 

The  speech  is  the  poet's  but  it  embodies  the  spirit  of  the 
time  and  glories  in  the  heroic  deed  even  though  it  ended  in 
disaster,  and  prizes  the  virtues  of  loyalty  to  the  chieftain  and 
unflinching  courage  in  the  face  of  defeat.58  "Heroic  poetry — 


se  Mark  Pattison,  Essays   (Oxford,  1889),  I,  1. 
57  Ker,  as  cited,  p.  63. 

ssChadwick,  as  cited,  p.   97,  says   of  the  poem:     "There  can   be  no 
reasonable  doubt  that  it  was  composed  within  a  few  years,  possibly  even 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  189 

indeed  in  a  sense  we  may  say  the  Heroic  Age  itself — owes  its 
origin"  to  contemporary  compositions  which  glorify  the  hero's 
exploit  immediately  after  the  event.  ' '  The  chief  object  which  the 
characters  of  the  Heroic  Age  set  before  themselves,"  Chadwiek 
continues,  ' '  was  to  '  win  glory ' — to  have  their  fame  celebrated  for 
all  time,"59  and  such  glory  was  to  be  won  by  brave  deeds.  "Let 
him,  who  can,"  is  the  sentiment  of  Beowulf,  "win  for  himself 
glory  before  he  dies;  that  is  the  best  thing  which  can  come  to  a 
warrior  in  after  times,  when  he  is  no  more."  In  the  heroic  age, 
the  deeds  celebrated  and  the  glory  attained  were  alike  personal, 
and  the  hero  neither  hesitated  to  boast  of  his  own  prowess  nor  to 
reward  others  for  singing  his  praises.  ' '  The  great  works  of  com- 
memoration,"  Hirn  says,  "are  all  monuments  of  boasting.  By 
the  grandiloquent  hieroglyphics  on  palaces  and  pyramids  and  by 
the  extolling  hymns  that  he  orders  to  be  sung  in  his  praise,  the 
exultant  hero  endeavors  to  win  from  future  admirers  a  meed 
of  praise  which  .shall  quench  his  thirst  for  glorification.  Even 
in  this  case,  therefore,  history,  in  its  psychological  sense — that 
is,  the  concentration  of  attention  upon  times  other  than  the 
present — has  been  born  of  pride.  By  relying  on  this  emotional- 
istic  interpretation,"  he  proceeds,  "we  can  explain  the  otherwise 
extraordinary  development  of  commemorative  art  amongst  tribes 
on  relatively  low  stages  of  intellectual  development.  The  same 
explanation  also  accounts  for  the  artistic  value  of  the  primitive 
records.  The  intensely  emotional  element  of  exultation,  pride, 
and  boasting  that  pervades  so  many  of  the  commemorative  poems 
and  dramas  makes  this  kind  of  history  an  art  in  the  proper 
sense  of  the  word."80 

With  the  passing  of  time,  the  once-contemporary  heroic  nar- 
rative came  to  relate  to  long-past  deeds.  How  the  content  of  the 
story  suffered  in  transmission  and  retelling  need  not  here  be 


months,  of  the  battle."  F.  J.  Snell  says:  "It  is  a  contemporary  history 
permeated  by  the  spirit  and  illumined  with  the  art  of  heroic  poetry. 
...  It  is  not  a  mere  tale  to  amuse,  but  a  trumpet-call  to  the  courage 
and  patriotism  of  the  nation,  which,  in  some  quarters,  were  evidently 
beginning  to  flag."  The  Age  of  Alfred  (London,  1912),  p.  114. 

so  Chadwiek,  as  cited,  pp.  87,  88,  97,  325  ff.,  339. 

so  Hirn,  as  cited,  p.  181. 


190          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     LV°L- 4 

considered  at  length;  suffice  it  to  say  that  "the  epic  poem  is  cut 
loose  and  set  free  from  history,  and  goes  on  a  way  of  its  own."01 
The  facts  disappear,  and  all  that  remains  is  the  emotional  impres- 
sion that  the  earlier  poetry  conveyed.  Thus  "all  that  is  constant, 
or  common,  in  the  different  poetical  reports  of  Attila,  is  that  he 
was  great.  What  touches  the  mind  of  the  poet  out  of  the  depths 
of  the  past  is  nothing  but  the  tradition,  undefined,  of  something 
lordly."62  The  sort  of  history  embedded  in  the  epic,  therefore, 
may  be  compared  with  that  retained  in  the  popular  mind  in 
regard  to  such  national  heroes  as  Washington  and  Lincoln.  The 
epic  poet,  Professor  Ker  continues,  "is  bound  to  the  past,  in  one 
way ;  it  is  laid  upon  him  to  tell  the  stories  of  the  great  men  of  his 
own  race,"  and  "it  does  not  matter  in  what  particular  form  the 
history  may  be  represented,  so  long  as  in  some  form  or  other  the 
power  of  the  national  glory  is  allowed  to  pass  into  his  work."03 


At  this  point,  Aristotle's  discussion  of  poetry  and  history 
inevitably  forces  itself  upon  attention.64  The  dictum  which 
everyone  remembers  is  that  "the  distinction  between  historian 
and  poet  is  not  in  the  one  writing  prose  and  the  other  verse — you 
might  put  the  work  of  Herodotus  into  verse,  and  it  would  still 
be  a  species  of  history. ' '  The  distinction  between  them  ' '  consists 
really  in  this,  that  the  one  describes  the  thing  that  has  been,  and 
the  other  a  kind  of  thing  that  might  be."65  Stated  again,  the 


ei  Ker,  as  cited,  p.  27. 

62  Ker,  as  cited,  p.  28. 

63  Ker,  as  cited,  p.  28.     Cf.   S.  H.  Butcher,  as  cited  below,  p.  402: 
' '  Much  of  the  poetry  of  the  Greeks  might  be  called  authentic  history — 
true  not  in  precision  of  detail  or  in  the  record  of  personal  adventures,  but 
in  its  indication  of  the  larger  outlines  of  events  and  in  its  embodiment 
in  ideal  form  of  the  past  deeds  of  the  race." 

a*  See  S.  H.  Butcher,  Aristotle's  Theory  of  Poetry  and  Fine  Art  (3rd 
ed.,  London,  1902),  and  Ingram  Bywater,  Aristotle  on  the  Art  of  Poetry 
(Oxford,  1909);  we  are  fortunate  in  having  in  these  editions  equally  fine 
examples  of  two  different  types  of  critical  scholarship. 

65  Poetics,  IX,  2,  tr.  Bywater,  p.  27;  cf.  Butcher,  p.  35. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  191 

distinction  is  that  "poetry  tends  to  express  the  universal,  history 
the  particular."  By  'the  particular'  Aristotle  means  what, 
for  example,  Alcibiades  did  or  suffered;  by  'the  universal'  he 
means  "how  a  person  of  a  certain  type  will  on  occasion  speak  or 
act,  according  to  the  law  of  probability  or  necessity."  That  is, 
"given  a  personage  of  a  certain  character  and  in  a  certain  posi- 
tion as  the  beginning  of  the  story,  all  the  rest  must  be  the  natural 
or  necessary  consequence  of  this  initial  situation."60 

"The  element  of  'universality'  in  Greek  Tragedy,  as  Aristotle  under- 
stands it,  means  no  more  than  is  indicated  in  his  present  distinction 
between  a  poem  and  a  history;  and  it  is  in  no  wise  peculiar  to  Tragedy. 
Aristotle  tells  us  it  was  to  be  seen  in  the  Comedy  of  his  time;  and  it 
is  found  in  just  the  same  way  in  the  modern  novel — even  in  the  historical 
and  in  the  so-called  realistic  novel.  In  all  these  forms  of  imaginative 
literature  the  personages  are,  as  we  say,  'characters,'  in  other  words, 
ideal  personalities,  made  to  act  and  speak  in  accordance  with  the  law 
of  character  which  the  author  has  assumed  for  each. "  67 

As  thus  stated  by  Aristotle,  the  contrast  between  history  and 
poetry  appears  self-evident ;  in  reality,  however,  it  is  an  inven- 
tion of  the  critic :  the  element  of  '  universality '  is  found  in 
historiography  as  well  as  in  tragic  or  epic  poetry.  The  fact  is, 
Aristotle,  on  the  one  hand,  considers  only  the  finished  product  of 
the  dramatist — not  the  artist's  way  of  working — and,  on  the 
other,  he  ignores  entirely  the  treatment  of  character  in  historio- 
graphy. The  Greek  tragic  poet  did  not  begin  with  the  conception 
of  "a  person  of  a  certain  character,"  but  with  legends  (or 
histories68)  whose  outcome  was  predetermined  and  known.  "By 
consecrated  usage  the  tragedian  was  confined  to  a  circle  of 
legends  whose  main  outlines  were  already  fixed."  "The  great 
facts  of  the  legends  could  not  be  set  aside. "  "  The  details  of  the 
story  might  vary  within  wide  limits,  but  the  end  was  a  thing 
given ;  and  in  the  drama  the  end  cannot  but  dominate  the  struc- 
ture of  the  whole — incidents  and  character  alike."69  In  Greek 


ee  By  water,  as  cited,  pp.  187-88. 
6?  Bywater,  as  cited,  p.  189. 

ss  "Aristotle  himself  speaks   of  the  myths   as   history,"   Butcher,   p. 
402. 

69  Butcher,  as  cited,  pp.  356-57. 


192          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [Vot.  4 

tragedy,  then,  the  end  of  the  story  was  the  dramatist 's  starting- 
point,  and  from  this  he  worked  back  to  a  beginning.  The 
invention  of  the  author  was  concerned,  not  with  displaying  the 
consequences  that  would  follow  upon  a  given  character  being 
placed  in  a  certain  initial  situation,  but  with  presenting  such 
a  character  as  would  make  the  known  outcome  appear  rational 
and  inevitable — not  indeed  in  terms  of  the  commonplaces  of 
ordinary  life,  but  setting  forth  the  highest  possibilities  of  human 
nature  in  the  stress  of  unwonted  circumstances.  Now,  from 
the  time  of  Herodotus  to  the  present  day,  historians  have  devoted 
themselves  to  an  exactly  similar  undertaking ;  they  have  described 
great  and  serious  events  in  the  light  of  their  outcome,  and  have 
sought  to  make  the  deeds  of  heroes  intelligible  by  the  imagina- 
tive reconstruction  of  character.  "It  is  in  the  realizing  of  grand 
character,"  Stubbs  says,  "that  the  strength  of  historical  genius 
chiefly  displays  itself,"70  and  a  more  recent  observer  has  re- 
marked that  "the  only  peculiar  province  of  written  history  is 
in  dealing  with  individual  character  and  influence."71  In  this 
important  particular,  therefore,  historiography  is  indistinguish- 
able from  imaginative  literature.72 

"The  history  of  a  political  community  is  analogous  to  an  epic  or 
dramatic  composition,  or  to  a  novel;  inasmuch  as  they  both  narrate  a 
succession  of  human  acts  and  sufferings. "  73 


70  William    Stubbs,    Seventeen   Lectures    (Oxford,    1887),    p.    112.      Cf. 
Theodore  Watts-Dunton,  "Poetry,"  in  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  9th  ed., 
XIX,   280:     "The   artist's  power   of   thought   is   properly   shown   not   in 
the  direct  enunciation  of  ideas  but  in  mastery  over  motive. ' ' 

71  W.   M.  F.   Petrie,   "Archaeological   Evidence,"   in   Lectures   on    the 
Method  of  Science,  ed.  by  T.  B.  Strong  (Oxford,  1906),  p.  230. 

"2  In  order  that  the  force  of  the  foregoing  statement  may  be  fully 
appreciated,  the  following  extracts,  taken  at  random  from  a  late  volume 
(XXTX)  of  the  English  Historical  Review,  are  subjoined.  "We  prefer 
her  treatment  of  a  really  heroic  character.  .  .  .  Her  analysis  of  the 
marshal's  character  is  just  and  illuminating"  (H.  W.  C.  Davis,  pp.  145, 
146).  "Mr.  Williams  has  built  up  the  first  credible  and  convincing  por- 
trait of  his  hero.  .  .  .  On  the  character  of  Chatham,  both  as  man  and 
as  statesman,  Mr.  Williams  is  absolutely  satisfactory"  (W.  L.  Grant, 
p.  380).  "It  is  in  the  judgment  of  persons  that  one  finds  most  to  seek. 
Mr.  Vickers  never  seems  to  have  a  hero,  and  the  general  depreciation 
•of  most  of  the  great  names  which  figure  in  his  pages  has  a  somewhat 
•depressing  effect  on  the  reader.  This  is  conspicuously  the  case  with  the 
Icings  and  members  of  the  royal  house"  (C.  L.  Kingsford,  p.  555). 

73  Sir  G.  C.  Lewis,  A  Treatise  on  the  Methods  of  Observation  and 
Reasoning  in  Politics  (London,  1852),  I,  120. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  193 

"La  tache  de  1'historien  ne  differe  pas  en  cela  de  celle  du  dramaturge 
ou  du  romancier.  Comme  eux,  il  doit  assignor  dea  roles,  combiner  des 
scenes,  preparer  des  effets,  graduer  1'interet  et  faire  que  le  lecteur  ne 
s'ennuie  pas  un  instant."7* 

It  has  been  a  serious  detriment  to  the  study  of  historiography 
that  Aristotle  regarded  history  as  annals.  ' '  In  Aristotle 's  view  a 
history  is  a  chronicle,  or  register,  of  events  taken  just  as  they 
came  in  order  of  time,  however  separate  and  disconnected  they 
may  have  been  in  themselves."75  In  poetic  story,  on  the  other 
hand,  there  must  be  unity  and  logical  coherence  of  the  parts ;  the 
action  must  be  a  whole  with  a  beginning,  middle,  and  end.  Thus, 
from  Aristotle's  point  of  view,  "poetry  in  virtue  of  its  higher 
subject-matter  and  of  the  closer  and  more  organic  union  of  its 
parts  acquires  an  ideal  unity  that  history  never  possesses."7'5 
The  two  things  that  are  here  set  over  against  one  another  are 
not  commensurable.  Aristotle  compares  epic,  a  highly- wrought 
form  of  historic  art  in  which  the  emotion  awakened  by  past 
deeds  has  liberated  itself  from  the  burden  of  fact,  and  annals, 
the  skeleton  of  history,  but  not  yet  history  itself  because  the 
dry  bones  have  not  been  clothed  with  flesh  and  endowed  with 
the  spirit  of  life.  The  contrast,  as  formulated  by  Aristotle,  is 
extreme,  but  since  historiography  has  followed  the  precedent  of 
Herodotus  and  Thucydides,  which  to  all  appearance  Aristotle 
condemned,77  the  discussion  can  no  longer  be  maintained  on  the 
lines  which  he  laid  down.  In  historiography,  as  distinct  from 
annals,  the  first  consideration — as  in  tragedy — is  the  'action,' 
and  the  problem  confronting  every  historian  is  how  to  bring 


74  Louis  Bourdeau,  L'histoire  et  les  historiens  (Paris,  1888),  p.  205. 

75  Bywater,  as  cited,  p.  187;   cf.  p.  306. 

76  Butcher,  as  cited,  p.  185. 

77  Bywater  thinks  (p.  305)  a  correction  is  required  in  Poetics  XXIII, 
1,  1459a21,  as  the  accepted  reading  "makes  him  say  that  our  ordinary 
histories   should   not   be   like   tragedies   or   epics,   as   though   there   were 
something  in  the  practice  of  the  historians  that  he  wished  to  set  right." 
So   far   am   I   from   being  disposed   to   admit   "the   absurdity   of  such   a 
notion,"  that  even  the  beauty  of  Bywater 's  suggested  emendation  does 
not  shake  the  belief  that  Aristotle  was  out  of  sympathy  with  the  tend- 
encies that  found  expression,  say,  in  the  history  of  Ephorus. 


194          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

the  heterogeneous  materials  at  his  disposal  within  the  compass 
of  a  unity. 

"The  dramatic  action  ...  is  a  coherent  series  of  events,  standing  in 
organic  relation  to  one  another  and  bound  together  by  the  law  of  cause 
and  effect.  The  internal  centre,  the  pivot  round  which  the  whole  system 
turns,  is  the  plot."78 

The  type  of  unity  in  historiography  differs  in  an  important 
particular  from  that  of  tragedy ;  a  point  the  more  deserving  of 
notice  since  Aristotle  (iv.  10)  states  that  tragedy  succeeded  epic. 
In  early  heroic  poetry,  the  'action'  is  simple,  being  concerned 
with  the  deeds  of  individual  heroes.  In  the  Homeric  epic,  how- 
ever, the  scope  of  the  narrative  has  significantly  widened.  ' '  The 
story  and  the  deeds  of  those  who  pass  across  its  wide  canvas  are 
linked  with  the  larger  movement  of  which  the  men  themselves 
are  but  a  part.  The  particular  action  rests  upon  forces  outside 
itself.  The  hero  is  swept  into  the  tide  of  events.  The  hairbreadth 
escapes,  the  surprises,  the  episodes,  the  marvelous  incidents  of 
epic  story,  only  partly  depend  on  the  spontaneous  energy  of  the 
hero."  "The  epic  poem,"  in  short,  "relates  a  great  and  com- 
plete action  which  attaches  itself  to  the  fortunes  of  a  people,  or 
to  the  destiny  of  mankind."  Tragedy,  on  the  other  hand,  "repre- 
sents the  destiny  of  the  individual  man."  In  tragic  drama  "it 
is  but  seldom  that  outward  circumstances  are  entirely  dominant 
over  the  forces  of  the  spirit."79  Obviously,  then,  tragedy  in 
succeeding  to  epic  does  not  carry  over  that  notable  outlook  in 
which  the  fate  of  the  individual  appears  subordinated  to  the 
fortunes  of  a  group.  Aristotle's  words  are  applicable  to  the 
surface-continuity  of  subject-matter  between  epic  and  tragedy — 
the  Athenian  tragedies  utilized  the  epic  poems — but  he  does  not 
remark  the  less  immediately  apparent  continuity  of  treatment 
between  epic  and  historiography,  even  though  Herodotus  had 
succeeded  to  the  width  of  vision  of  a  Homer. 

In  the  wonderful  creative  outburst  that  followed  the  Persian 
War,  drama  and  history,  springing  from  the  same  root  in  epic, 


•s  Butcher,  as  cited,  p.  348. 
79  Butcher,  as  cited,  p.  353. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  195 

so  completely  developed  their  special  types  of  appeal  that  they 
appear  to  us,  as  to  Polybius  (ii.  56),  "widely  opposed  to  each 
other."  Tragedy,  even  at  the  beginning,  assumed  "the  point 
of  view  which  takes  the  human  mind  to  be  the  essence  in  all 
drama."  The  interest  of  the  dramatist  lies  in  the'  common 
destiny  of  individual  men ;  and  he  presents  the  individual  human 
soul  struggling  in  the  self-woven  toils  of  fate.  History,  in  a 
wholly  different  spirit,  presents  the  group  through  the  activities 
of  its  representative  men.  The  dramatist  speaks  for  all  men; 
the  historian  for  the  men  of  his  own  time  and  country.  The 
dramatist  identifies  himself  emotionally  with  "characters,"  the 
historian  identifies  himself  with  a  particular  nation.  We,  the 
auditors,  recognize  in  any  drama  what  might  happen  to  ourselves 
personally,  and  in  any  history  what  might  befall  our  own  country. 
In  neither  case  is  there  ' '  teaching ' '  as  such ;  there  is  simply  the 
clear  and  definite  picture  of  an  outcome — black-visaged  or  tri- 
umphant— and  the  means — folly  or  devotion,  treachery  or  single- 
ness of  will — by  wilich  it  came  to  be. 

It  is  not  the  fate  of  individuals  with  which  history  is  con- 
cerned, but  of  nations.  Yet,  inasmuch  as  the  group  is  only 
to  be  seen  in  the  named  individuals  who  represent  it,  there  is  an 
insistent  tendency  on  the  part  of  historians  to  lose  the  wider 
vision  and  follow  the  traditions  of  drama.  The  tendency  is 
obvious  in  classical  historiography  owing  to  the  convention,  in- 
herited from  epic  poetry,  that  permitted  the  introduction  of 
speeches;  but  the  admiration  of  modern  historical  scholars  for 
Thucydides  and  Tacitus  (in  each  of  whom  the  dramatic  attitude 
was  pronounced),  the  persistent  emphasis  on  "character- 
drawing,"  and  the  far-reaching  attraction  of  historical  romance, 
show  the  danger  in  which  the  art  of  Herodotus  ever  stands  from 
the  rival  art  of  Aeschylus  and  Sophocles. 

5 

The  characteristic  'action'  in  historiography  presents  the 
issue  of  a  crucial  struggle  between  different  groups,  societies, 
or  nations;  and  the  histories  that  men  have  chosen  to  keep  in 


196          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

remembrance  have  been  inspired  by  bitter  conflicts.  This  dis- 
tinctive schema  appears  fully  developed,  at  the  beginning  of 
prose  historiography,  in  Herodotus.  In  its  first  form,  the  work 
of  the  "Father  of  History"  consisted  merely  of  the  story  of  the 
Persian  invasion  now  comprised  in  the  last  three  books.80  The 
author  thus  began  with  the  narrative  of  a  single  war  which  was 
to  him  recent  history.  This  was  a  story,  simple  in  action,  con- 
ceived in  the  old  heroic  spirit,  of  a  victory  won  against  over- 
whelming odds.  The  account  was  one  that  redounded  to  the 
glory  of  Athens  and  flattered  Athenian  pride.  Herodotus  repre- 
sented the'  Athenians  as  "truly  the  saviours  of  Greece;"  but 
' '  he  did  more :  he  gave  currency  and  authority  to  a  story  which 
embodied  Athenian  tradition  and  justified  Athenian  empire." 
"If  the  story  is  true,"  Bury  remarks,  "that  the  Athenians 
bestowed  on  him  ten  talents  in  recognition  of  the  merits  of  his 
work,  it  was  a  small  remuneration  for  the  service  he  rendered 
to  the  renown  of  their  city."81 

At  some  later  point  in  his  career,  Herodotus  came  to  have  a 
new  vision  of  the  war,  seeing  in  it  the  culmination  of  different 
converging  series  of  events,  and  it  is  in  this  later  form  that  his 
history  has  won  the  undying  admiration  of  men.  Some  dangor 
there  has  been  in  modern  times  that  the  appreciation  of  his 
supreme  artistry  might  be  obscured  by  the  interest  taken  by 
scholars  in  the  details  of  his  subject-matter.  Herodotus  is. 
indeed,  one  thing  to  the  student  of  ancient  history;  another  to 
the  investigator  of  the  growth  of  historical  criticism ;  and  yet  a 
third  to  the  historian  of  historiographic  literature.  "It  is  some- 
thing," Macan  says,  "to  have  written  the  best  story-book  in 
Greek  literature,  perhaps  in  European  literature.  No  other 
Greek  writer  has  covered  so  large  a  world  with  so  full  a  pop- 
ulation of  living  and  immortal  men  and  women  as  Herodotus 
(no,  not  even  his  master,  Homer).  The  work  of  Herodotus  is  a 
prose  Iliad  and  Odyssey  in  one,  rich  in  episodes  and  details,  and 


so  Herodotus,  IV- VI,  ed.  by  R.  W.  Macan  (London,  1895),  I,  xcii. 
8i.I.  B.  Bury,   The  Ancient  Greek  Historians    (New  York,  1909),  pp. 
62,  65. 


Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  197 

more  indisputably  one  and  indivisible  than  either  Epos."82 
This  appreciation  may  be  taken  to  illustrate  the  kind  of  interest 
that  has  charmed  countless  men  and  women  in  all  ages;  it  does 
not,  however,  touch  the  element  that  entitles  the  work  of  Her- 
odotus to  its  high  place  as  a  history.  What  constitutes  it  a  master- 
piece of  historical  writing  is  the  wide  vision  that  gives  unity 
to  the  whole  narrative.83  This  vision  is  inseparable  from  the 
emotion  in  the  light  of  which  it  is  beheld.  Whether  the  Persians 
retired  unbeaten,  having  effected  their  object,  or  whether  the 
honor  of  their  repulse  should  be  accorded  to  the  arms  of  Sparta, 
is,  in  this  connection,  immaterial ;  what  matters  is  that  Athens 
was  remade,  intellectually  reborn,  as  a  result  of  the  war.  The 
first  form  of  the  work  of  Herodotus  may  well  be  set  down  as  the 
expression  of  a  pardonable  vainglory;  the  enlargement,  on  the 
other  hand,  reflects  not  merely  pride  in  achievement,  but,  what 
is  of  the  highest  significance,  the  ambition  born  of  victory — the 
inspiration  of  which,  for  a  moment,  made  all  things  seem  possible ; 
the  dream  that  led  Athens  to  defeat  and  Alexander  to  conquest. 
The  work  of  Herodotus  is  of  the  type  of  history  that  narrates 
the  details  of  a  recent  event,  with  a  prefatory  account  of  the 
circumstances  that  led  up  to  it.  In  such  works  the  focus  is  the 
denouement  as  it  appears  to  the  author;  the  unity  is  inspired 
by  the  outcome.  Furthermore,  it  is  characteristic  of  this  type 
that  in  proportion  as  the  event  is  felt  to  be  decisive  will  there 
be  a  marked  tendency  to  look  upon  the  present  outcome  as  deter- 
mining the  future.  Of  this  type,  Polybius,  especially  in  view  of 
his  self-conscious  explanation,  is  an  interesting  example. 

"Now  in  the  times  preceding  this  period,"  he  says,  "the  events  of 
the  world's  history  may  be  said  to  have  happened  in  a  state  of  isolation, 


82  Macan,  as  cited,  I,  Ixxiii,  and  cf.  cxvii-viii. 

83 ' '  Mais  lorsque  les  Perses  arriverent,  et  repartirent  vaincus,  une 
admirable  matiere  s'offrit  aux  artistes.  Non  seulement  les  victoires  de 
Marathon  et  de  Salamine  flattaient  1 'amour-propre  national,  et  assur- 
aient  le  reussite  a  quiconque  parlerait  d'elles,  mais  elles  fournissaient 
un  moyen  facile  d'ordonner  le  chaos  des  evenements.  .  .  .  et  seule  la 
vanite  d'un  peuple  triomphant  put  voir  dans  la  conquete  de  1'Egypte 
et  1 'expedition  de  Scythie,  des  travaux  d'approche  centre  la  minuscule 
presqu  'ile  hellenique. ' '  Henri  Ouvre,  Les  formes  litteraires  de  la  pensee 
grecque  (Paris,  1900),  pp.  307-8. 


198          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

because  each  action,  both  in  its  inception  and  in  its  development,  was 
disconnected  with  all  others  by  time  or  place.  But  from  this  period 
we  find  that  the  history  has  become  an  organic  whole,  and  the  affairs 
of  Italy  and  Libya  are  bound  up  with  those  of  Asia  and  Greece,  and  the 
general  current  of  events  sets  to  one  fixed  point."  "The  distinctive 
feature  of  our  work,"  he  goes  on  to  say,  "corresponds  with  the  mar- 
vellous characteristic  of  our  time's;  for  as  Fortune  has  swayed  almost 
all  the  affairs  of  the  world  to  one  centre,  and  compelled  every  force  to 
set  in  one  and  the  same  direction,  so  we  would  by  means  of  our  History 
bring  under  a  common  view,  for  the  benefit  of  our  readers,  the  oper- 
ations which  Fortune  has  employed  for  the  completion  of  a  combined 
system  of  the  world.  Indeed  it  was  this  above  everything  that  incited 
and  urged  us  to  attempt  the  writing  of  history. ' '  84 

The  theme  of  Roman  conquest  unified  the  work  of  Polybius; 
at  the  same  time,  the  far-reaching  success  of  the  Republic  led 
him  to  look  towards  the  future,  for,  he  remarks  (iii.  4),  "it 
seemed  agreed  and  forced  on  the  conviction  of  all  men,  that  all 
that  remained  to  the  world  is  to  submit  to  the  Romans,  and  to 
perform  whatever  they  shall  enjoin."  The  idea  that  the  success 
of  Rome  introduced  a  unity  into  history  is  seen,  therefore,  to 
antedate  the  writings  of  Professor  Freeman. 

The  extension  of  the  power  of  Rome  had,  however,  a  wider 
influence  on  historiography  than  in  affording  an  inspiration  to 
Polybius.  It  may  be  said,  indeed,  to  have  forced  upon  men  a 
second  type  of  history,  namely,  that  in  which  the  past  of  a  single 
nation  is  seen  as  a  self-contained  whole.  This  type,  of  which  the 
great  example  in  classical  antiquity  is  the  history  of  Livy,  and 
which  to  us,  owing  to  its  cultivation  in  the  nineteenth  century,85 
may  seem  even  the  natural  and  proper  form  of  history,  was  not 
only  late  in  emerging,  but  even  after  its  appearance  suffered,  in 
the  Middle  Ages,  a  long  eclipse. 

In  Herodotus,  everything  leads  up  to  the  crisis  of  the  Persian 
invasion  and  the  happenings  antecedent  to  this  event  fall  within 


s*  Polybius,  I,  3,  4;  tr,  by  J.  L.  Strachan-Davidson. 

ss  The  historian's  "work  seems  rather  to  be  to  display  the  develop- 
ment of  a  nation  or  of  a  period,  and  to  record  accurately,  and  in  the 
light  of  the  spirit  of  the  nation  or  period,  the  sequence  of  events  in 
which  its  character  has  manifested  itself."  Viscount  Haldane,  The 
Meaning  of  Truth  in  History  (London,  1914),  p.  10. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  199 

the  "action"  of  the  drama  he  presents,  setting,  as  it  were,  the 
characters  upon  the  stage  and  introducing  the  "complication." 
In  Livy,  the  stimulus  is  also  a  crisis  in  the  affairs  of  a  people,  but 
of  a  different  kind.  The  author  is  not  stirred  to  write  by  the 
outcome  of  a  single  war,  nor  is  there  a  dramatic  climax  in  his 
presentation.  The  crisis  is,  one  may  say,  "unresolved;"  it  is 
present  to  the  minds  of  Livy  and  his  auditors,  rather  than 
depicted  in  his  work.  Livy's  view  is  concentrated  upon  the 
internal  history  of  the  Roman  people ;  he  looks  back  from  the 
height  to  which  a  long  series  of  achievements  has  brought  the 
Roman  people,  and  sees  at  every  step  victory  won  by  Roman 
piety,  constancy,  and  discipline.  The  spirit  in  which  he  writes 
is  not,  however,  that  of  exultation  in  victory,  even  though  his 
theme  is  the  ever-increasing  glory  of  Rome ;  it  is  pride,  certainly, 
but  the  pride  of  assured  position,  of  conscious  superiority.  His 
pride  is  also  of  a  contemplative  sort :  a  mingling  of  regret  for  the 
noble  virtues  of  former  generations,  of  distrust  in  the  present, 
and — far  from  an  ambitious  daring — an  actual  foreboding  of 
the  future.  So  he  says  in  the  memorable  preface  to  his  history : 

"The  subjects  to  which  I  would  ask  each  of  my  readers  to  devote 
his  earnest  attention  are  these — the  life  and  morals  of  the  community; 
the  men  and  the  qualities  by  which  through  domestic  policy  and  foreign 
war  dominion  was  won  and  extended.  Then  as  the  standard  of  morality 
gradually  lowers,  let  him  follow  the  decay  of  the  national  character, 
observing  how  at  first  it  slowly  sinks,  then  slips  downward  more  and 
more  rapidly,  and  finally  begins  to  plunge  into  headlong  ruin,  until  he 
reaches  these  days,  in  which  we  can  bear  neither  our  diseases  nor  their 
remedies." 

This  is  rhetoric  surely,  but  it  reveals  the  presence  in  the 
author's  mind  of  a  pictorial  composition  into  which  he  is  able 
to  fit  the  abundant  detail  of  his  seven  hundred  years. 


6 

How  or  when  the  vision  of  Roman  history  as  the  expression  of 
Roman  character  came  to  Livy  we  do  not  know,  but,  fortunately, 
among  modern  historians  of  the  first  rank  more  than  one  has 


200          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

revealed  the  secret  of  his  own  creative  experience.  Michelet, 
for  example,  in  the  preface  of  1869  to  his  Histoire  de  France, 
says: 

"Cette  ceuvre  laborieuse  d 'environ  quarante  ans  fut  conc,ue  d'un 
moment,  de  1 'eclair  de  Julliet  [1830].  Dans  ces  jours  memorables,  une 
grande  lumiere  se  fit,  et  j  'aperc.us  la  France.  Elle  avait  des  annales,  et 
non  point  une  histoire.  Des  hommes  eminents  1'avaient  etudiee  surtout 
au  point  de  vue  politique.  Nul  n 'avait  penetre  dans  1'infini  detail  des 
developpements  divers  de  son  activite.  .  .  .  Le  premier  je  la  vis  comme 
une  ame  et  une  personne. " 

Gibbon 's  equally  well-known  account  of  the  moment 's  inspira- 
tion that  gave  birth  to  the  Decline  and  Fall  may  likewise  be 
instanced : 

"It  was  at  Rome,  on  the  fifteenth  of  October,  1764,  that  as  I  sat 
musing  amidst  the  ruins  of  the  Capitol,  while  the  barefooted  fryars  were 
singing  Vespers  in  the  temple  of  Jupiter,  that  the  idea  of  writing  the 
decline  and  fall  of  the  City  first  started  to  my  mind."86 

These  statements  are  so  far  characteristic  that  they  might 
be  cited  in  a  handbook  of  psychology  to  illustrate  what  is  perhaps 
the  best-known  type  of  the  artist's  way  of  working.  The  flash- 
like  illumination  is  not,  however,  the  first  step,  whatever  ap- 
pearances may  suggest.  Back  of  the  sudden  emergence  of  the 
vision  or  picture  there  lies  of  necessity  a  period  of  gestation 
and  subconscious  growth ;  and  it  is  one  of  the  remarkable  features 
of  Gibbon's  autobiography  that  it  enables  us  to  trace  in  detail 
the  course  of  the  artist 's  brooding  that  preceded  the  most  interest- 
ing moment  in  his  literary  life. 

It  was  suggested  earlier  that  the  act  of  creation  which  is 
characteristic  of  art  has  its  beginning  when  an  experience  is 
lived  over  in  the  mind  of  the  artist  and  is  remade  by  contempla- 
tion. The  work  of  art  is  not  a  transcript  or  photograph  of  an 
experience,  but  the  experience  seen  through  the  haze  of  the 
impression  it  has  produced ;  it  is  not  the  utterance  of  personal 


se  The  Autobiographies  of  Edward  Gibbon,  ed.  by  John  Murray  (2d 
ed.,  London,  1897),  p.  302.  Cf.  pp.  405-6:  "I  must  not  forget  the  day, 
the  hour,  the  most  interesting  in  my  litterary  life.  It  was  on  the  fifteenth 
of  October,  in  the  gloom  of  evening,  as  I  sat  musing  on  the  Capitol,  while 
the  barefooted  fryars  were  chanting  their  litanies  in  the  temple  of 
Jupiter,  that  I  conceived  the  first  thought  of  my  history.  ..." 


19161  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  201 

hope,  fear,  pride  or  anger,  but  the  expression  of  such  an  emotion 
detached  from  its  immediate  relation  to  the  artist. 

Now  the  personal  experience  of  the  artist-historian  who  comes 
to  write  the  history  of  his  country  is  not  of  the  actual  events 
of  the  past,  but  of  what  others  have  said  of  these  events.  The 
historian  "lives  over"  not  scenes  that  he  himself  has  witnessed 
but  scenes  that  he  has  imagined  from  other  men's  descriptions. 
This  mode  of  procedure  is  not  peculiar  to  the  historian;  many 
dramatists  and  all  historical  novelists  follow  the  same  course. 
The  function  of  imaginative  literature  is,  however,  as  Aristotle 
says,  to  express  "the  universal,"  and  this  is  accomplished  by 
representing  deeds  or  happenings  as  the  outcome  of  character. 
Accepting  the  known  issue  of  events,  Shakespeare  and  Sir  Walter 
Scott  present  the  steps  by  which  the  individual  introduced  comes 
to  act  in  a  particular  manner  at  a  given  crisis.  The  interest 
lies  in  the  psychological  problem  of  how  a  man  of  a  certain 
character  will  act  in  certain  circumstances.  What  is  of  im- 
portance to  notice  here  is  that  the  dramatist  or  novelist  in  follow- 
ing this  course  is  on  safe  ground,  for  his  delineation  is  true  if  it 
is  recognized  as  true  to  human  nature;  but,  contrariwise,  the 
historian  in  pursuing  the  same  road  is  on  treacherous,  footing. 
"Character-drawing"  for  him  rests  only  upon  supposition  and 
fantasy.  The  concern  of  drama  and  novel  is  the  depiction  of 
character;  the  concern  of  history  is  the  statement  of  what  has 
taken  place  in  the  past ;  and  what  to  the  one  is  truth,  to  the  other 
is  mere  unsubstantial  imagining. 

It  is  evident,  furthermore,  that  in  going  to  the  past  for 
"situations"  the  dramatist  and  novelist,  Shakespeare  and  Scott, 
do  not  limit  themselves  to  what  they  find  contained  in  the  records 
they  consult,  but  rely  primarily  upon  the  knowledge  of  men 
they  have  acquired  through  their  own  personal  experience.  In 
precisely  the  same  manner,  the  experience  of  the  artist-historian 
is  not  confined  to  what  he  reads;  he  carries  with  him  to  the 
statement  of  past  events  a  vivid  realization  of  what  his  country 
is  in  his  own  day.  The  great  histories,  as  we  have  seen,  are 
reflections  of  crises  in  national  existences.  The  interest  of  the 


202          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

historian  is  awakened  by  the  changes  and  circumstances  through 
which  he  himself  lives;  and  the  past  is  revivified  for  him  in  a  far 
higher  degree  by  momentous  events  of  which  he  is  a  witness  than 
by  documentary  discoveries.  The  artist  is  the  consciousness  of 
his  fellows  in  respect  to  some  particular  aspect  of  life;  the  artist- 
historian  is  not  less,  but  more  susceptible  to  national  feeling 
than  the  public  of  which  he  is  the  spokesman. 

Patriotism  and  political  partisanship  are  of  all  feelings  the 
most  difficult  for  a  man  to  "get  outside."  Anger  is  wholly 
absorbing  at  the  time ;  if  a  man  is  possessed  by  a  passion  of  rage 
it  is  obvious  that  he  cannot  describe  this  passion  to  another ;  for 
the  time  being  he  is  that  passion,  and  reflection  is  impossible. 
Time,  however,  cools  anger ;  and  so,  later  on,  the  individual  may 
describe  the  situation  and  the  attendant  circumstances — perhaps 
humorously,  perhaps  with  a  feeling  of  conscious  pride.  Time 
has,  for  him,  exteriorized  the  passion  and  enabled  him  to  see  it 
detached  from  its  immediate  relation  to  himself.  The  direct 
expression  of  anger  is  not  art ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  exteriorized, 
detached,  "distanced"  view  is  the  very  core  of  aesthetic  presenta- 
tion.87 It  would  seem  as  if  men  found  some  almost  insuperable 
obstacle  -in  the  way  of  exteriorizing  or  "distancing"  political 
subjects.  When  political  questions  are  the  subject  of  discussion, 
passion  is  inevitably  aroused — more  especially  in  times  of  crisis. 
Loyalty,  indeed,  may  be  said  to  forbid  the  inhibition,  the  res- 
traint, of  such  feelings.  Misrepresentation  of  one's  country  stirs 
indignant  protest,  though  the  circumstances  are  a  century  old. 
The  essence  of  patriotism  is  personal  identification  with  one's 


8f  In  this  connection  the  historical  student  is  urged  to  make  himself 
familiar  with  the  remarkable  paper  of  Edward  Bullough,  "  'Psychical 
Distance'  as  a  Factor  in  Art  and  an  Aesthetic  Principle,"  British  Jour- 
nal of  Psychology,  5  (1912),  87-118.  Mr.  Bullough  says:  "Distance  is 
obtained  by  separating  the  object  and  its  appeal  from  one's  own  self, 
by  putting  it  out  of  gear  with  practical  needs  and  ends."  "It  de- 
scribes a  personal  relation,  often  highly  emotionally  coloured,  but  of 
.-a  peculiar  character.  Its  peculiarity  lies  in  that  the  personal  character 
•of  the  relation  has  been,  so  to  speak,  filtered.  It  has  been  cleared  of 
the  practical,  concrete  nature  of  its  appeal,  without,  however,  thereby 
losing  its  original  constitution"  (p.  91).  "There  are  two  ways  of  losing 
Distance:  either  to  'under-distance'  or  to  'over-distance.'  'Under-dis- 
tancing' is  the  commonest  failing  of  the  subject,  an  excess  of  Distance 
as  a  frequent  failing  of  Art"  (p.  94). 


1916J  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  203 

country,  and  so  it  comes  that  the  knowledge  of  the  past  derived 
from  records  is  realized  as  personal  memory,  and  when  the  his- 
torian writes  it  is  not  as  a  spectator,  but  as  one  personally  affected 
by  the  events.  Thus  it  is  that  Mommsen  said,  out  of  a  full 
experience,  "  Those  who  have  lived  through  historical  events, 
as  I  have,  begin  to  see  that  history  is  neither  written  or  made 
without  love  or  hate."88  It  is  this  intensity  of  personal  feeling, 
inseparable  from  patriotism  and  politics,  that,  on  the  one  hand, 
gives  history  its  specific  quality  and,  on  the  other,  has  remained 
the  great  obstacle  to  an  historiographic  art. 

At  this  point  there  would  seem  to  be  ample  justification  for 
the  remonstrances  made  in  recent  years  against  the  principle  of 
"impartiality" — upon  which  great  weight  has  always  been  laid 
by  historical  methodologists.89  In  his  introductory  note  to  The 
Cambridge  Modern  History,  Mandell  Creighton  says:  "In  the 
vast  and  diversified  area  of  modern  history,  the  point  of  view 
determines  the  whole  nature  of  the  record,  or  else  the  whole  work 
sinks  to  the  level  of  a  mass  of  details  uninformed  by  any  lumin- 
ous idea.  The  writer  who  strives  to  avoid  any  tendency  becomes 
dull,  and  the  cult  of  impartiality  paralyses  the  judgment."  In 
the  same  vein,  Cunningham  remarks :  ' '  The  claim  to  impartiality, 
on  the  part  of  the  historian,  seems  to  me  to  be  unmeaning ;  and 
in  so  far  as  it  has  a  meaning,  is  likely  to  be  a  mere  affectation."90 


«8  Quoted  in  G.  P.  Gooch,  History  and  Historians  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  (London,  1913),  p.  458.  Note  the  attitude  of  Bishop  Stubbs: 
"Without  some  infusion  of  spite,"  he  says,  "it  seems  as  if  history  could 
not  be  written;  that  no  man's  zeal  is  roused  to  write  unless  it  is  moved 
by  the  desire  to  write  down."  Seventeen  Lectures  (Oxford,  1887),  p.  126. 

89  ' '  The  third  distinctive  note  of  the  generation  of  writers  who  dug 
so  deep  a  trench  between  history  as  known  to  our  grandfathers  and  as 
it  appears  to  us,  is  their  dogma  of  impartiality."  Lord  Acton,  A  Lec- 
ture on  the  Study  of  History  (London,  1896),  p.  44.  "Le  premier  devoir 
de  1'historien  est  de  se  mettre  au  travail  sans  prejuge,  sans  colere,  sans 
idee  ni  passion  precongues.  II  s'abstraira  de  tous  les  sentiments  de 
Pepoque  presente. "  Camille  Jullian,  Extraits  des  historiens  fran^ais  du 
xix<>  siecle  (6e  ed.,  Paris,  1910),  p.  cxxvi. 

so  William  Cunningham,  ' '  Impartiality  in  History, ' '  Bivista  di  Scienza, 
1  (1907),  121.  Cf.  G.  M.  Trevelyan,  in  Sociological  Papers,  (London, 
1906),  II,  229:  "History  must  be  thought  about  from  some  standpoint, 
and  the  cant  of  pure  impartiality  in  history  is  only  equalled  by  the 
cant  of  historical  facts  having  value  except  as  food  for  thought  and 
speculation. " 


204          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

The  claim  of  "impartiality"  in  historiography  is  unmeaning. 
Every  student  of  history  knows,  however,  that  the  reasons  men 
give  for  their  actions  and  advocacies  rarely  touch  the  actual  aim 
of  their  endeavors.  "Partiality"  means  that  the  historian  takes 
sides,  that  he  is  affected  by  love  and  hate,  that  he  ' '  allows ' '  him- 
self to  be  influenced  by  personal  and  patriotic  considerations — 
that  he  is  Memory's  mouthpiece  for  his  countrymen.  The  de- 
mand for  "impartiality"  is  just  the  unconscious  recognition  of 
the  need  of  "distance"  in  history- writing. 

Modern  writers  have  not  improved  upon  the  statement  of  the 
case  for  "impartiality"  made  by  Polybius  in  speaking  of  Philinus 
and  Fabius. 

"Judging  from  their  lives  and  principles,  I  do  not  suppose,"  he  says, 
"that  these  writers  have  intentionally  stated  what  was  false;  but  I  think 
that  they  are  much  in  the  same  state  of  mind  as  men  in  love.  Partisan- 
ship and  complete  prepossession  made  Philinus  think  that  all  the  actions 
of  the  Carthaginians  were  characterised  by  wisdom,  honour,  and  courage: 
those  of  the  Komans  by  the  reverse.  Fabius  thought  the  exact  opposite. 
Now, ' '  Polybius  continues,  ' '  in  other  relations  of  life  one  would  hesitate 
to  exclude  such  warmth  of  sentiment:  for  a  good  man  ought  to  be  loyal 
to  his  friends  and  patriotic  to  his  country;  ought  to  be  at  one  with  his 
friends  in  their  hatreds  and  their  likings.  But  directly  a  man  assumes 
the  moral  attitude  of  an  historian  he  ought  to  forget  all  considerations 
of  that  kind.  "»i 

The  obvious  propriety  of  this  ' '  ought ' '  has  won  verbal  accept- 
ance of  a  principle  that  no  historian  has  been  able  to  apply  as  a 
rule  of  life.  Far  indeed  from  its  being  appropriate  that  the 
national  historian  should  dehumanize  himself  for  his  task,  the 
very  terms  of  his  undertaking  make  him  the  representative  of  the 
loyalty  that  "good  men"  feel  for  their  friends,  and  the  spokes- 
man of  that  patriotism  which  is  the  spirit  of  national  unity. 
While,  however,  the  "ought"  of  Polybius  has  been  regarded  by 
later  historians  as  a  moral  principle,  the  object  of  Polybius  him- 
self was  to  introduce  a  means  whereby  the  historian  might,  as 
he  says,  hold  himself  "entirely  aloof  from  his  fellows" — his  aim 
was  to  create  the  "distance"  necessary  for  art  by  the  interposi- 
tion of  moral  judgments. 


»i  Polybius,  i,  14;   tr.  by  E.  S.  Shuckburgh. 


1916J  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  205 

How  the  problem  of  "distance"  was  recognized  and  dealt 
with  by  the  greatest  of  historical  artists  is  disclosed  in  Gibbon's 
autobiographies — to  which  we  now  return.  Gibbon's  success  was 
not  due,  as  has  frequently  been  suggested,  to  some  fortunate 
accident  that  gave  him  a  great  subject,  nor  yet  to  the  brilliance 
of  his  style  or  his  accuracy  of  statement ;  it  was  due  to  the  deliber- 
ation with  which  he  approached  the  writing  of  history,  and  the 
pains  he  was  at  to  rule  out,  so  far  as  was  humanly  possible,  every 
element  of  failure.  There  is  this  peculiarity  about  historiography 
as  an  art  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  author  must  produce  a  work 
of  sufficient  proportions  to  have  his  claims  to  distinction  con- 
sidered, and  that,  on  the  other,  the  compass  of  life  rarely  permits 
of  his  profiting  by  earlier  experiences  to  achieve  a  later  triumph. 
Gibbon's  fame  rests  upon  a  single  work. 

The  reader  of  the  autobiographies  will  recollect  that  from 
youth  onwTard  he  "aspired  to  the  character  of  an  historian." 
Before  the  illumination  that  gave  him  his  subject,  he  had  spent 
years  in  search  of  a  suitable  topic.  Thus  he  had  been  much 
occupied  with  the  thought  of  writing  upon  some  period  of  English 
history — Richard  I  attracted  him,  as  did  the  Wars  of  the  Barons, 
the  exploits  of  the  Black  Prince,  and  the  lives  of  Sir  Philip 
Sydney  and  Sir  Walter  Raleigh.92  As  his  ideas  matured,  how- 
ever, Gibbon  eliminated  the  English  subjects  from  consideration. 
In  July  1762,  he  wrote  in  his  diary.  "I  am  afraid  of  being 
reduced  to  drop  my  Hero  [Raleigh]  .  .  .  Could  I  even  surmount 
these  obstacles  [which  he  has  detailed],  I  should  shrink  with 
terror  from  the  modern  history  of  England,  where  every  char- 
acter is  a  problem,  and  every  reader  a  friend  or  an  enemy ;  where 
a  writer  is  supposed  to  hoist  a  flag  of  party,  and  is  devoted  to 
damnation  by  the  adverse  faction."  "I  must,"  he  concludes, 
"embrace  a  safer  and  more  extensive  theme."  "The  history 
of  the  origin  and  establishment  of  the  liberty  of  the  Swiss"  next 
engaged  his  attention — Switzerland  having  become  for  him  a 
second  home.  This  "glorious  theme"  proved  so  attractive  that 


92  Autobiographies,  as  cited,  pp.  258-59;  cf.  pp.  193-97,  275-78,  301-2, 
407-9. 


206          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

Gibbon  actually  wrote  a  "first  book,"  which  was  badly  received 
and  so  abandoned.  He  was  conscious,  he  said,  that  he  had  not 
attained  "the  genuine  style,  the  middle  tone,  of  that  species  of 
writing."93  Thus,  after  years  of  study  and  deliberation,  he  de- 
cided against  writing  the  history  of  either  of  the  countries  to 
which  he  was  emotionally  attached.  That  is,  Gibbon  discovered 
that  the  characteristic  interest  or  emotion  of  national  history 
stood  in  the  way  of  the  production  of  a  work  of  art :  on  the  one 
hand,  he  could  not  achieve  "the  middle  tone,"  and,  on  the  other, 
his  audience  could  not,  in  reading,  overcome  their  political  feel- 
ings. After  consideration  of  the  outstanding  problems  of  histo- 
riography, he  found  that  what  has  here  been  called  "distance" 
was  to  be  achieved  only  in  relation  to  a  period  remote  from  the 
embarrassment  of  political  or  patriotic  emotion. 

Here  it  may  well  appear  to  one  who  reflects  upon  the  effect 
produced  by  the  histories  he  has  read  that  "distance"  is,  in 
actuality,  a  marked  characteristic  of  older  historical  writings. 
This  is  undoubtedly  true;  but  the  "distancing"  in  these  cases 
is  not  due  to  the  skill  of  the  artist ;  it  is  the  effect  of  time.  The 
work  of  an  earlier  historian,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem,  may  be 
' '  distanced ' '  art  for  us,  though  ' '  underdistanced ' '  for  the  genera- 
tion in  which  it  was  written.  This  is,  however,  merely  the  corol- 
lary of  the  fact  that  while  the  emotion  expressed  in  the  first 
instance  is  that  of  the  author's  present,  the  emotion  conveyed  is 
that  of  the  reader's  present.  Consequently,  if  the  reader  is  no 
longer  affected  by  the  immediacy  of  the  political  feeling  expressed 
by  the  historian,  what  was  ' '  underdistanced ' '  for  a  contemporary 
may  be  art  for  him.  The  ambitious  writer  will,  nevertheless, 
scarcely  be  content  with  the  possibility  that  this  fortuitous  cir- 
cumstance suggests.  A  work  which  is  not  art  in  the  .first  place — 
the  "standard"  history  of  its  day  that  Mark  Pattison  refers  to — 
is  much  more  likely  to  be  forgotten  than  to  be  appreciated  by 
later  generations.  On  the  other  hand,  a  great  work  of  art.  such 
as  Gibbon's  Decline  and  Fall,  retains  its  prestige  in  despite  of 


Autobiographies,  as  cited,  pp.  195-96,  276,  408. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  207 

Time,  though  its  statements  may  be  challenged  in  detail  by 
Teutonic  and  Slavonic  "researchers." 

What  art  does  is  to  create  clear  and  definite  objects  or  pic- 
tures, which  awaken  emotion  (but  not  partisanship  or  antagon- 
ism), and  satisfy  the  reader  by  "that  harmony  and  sense  of  the 
inevitableness  which  only  a  work  of  art  can  give."  Consciously 
or  unconsciously,  it  is  at  the  creation  of  just  such  "clear  and 
definite  objects"  that  the  historian  aims.  Stubbs  illustrates  this 
when  he  speaks  of  the  historian's  work  as  "an  artistic  unity,  a 
perfect  image,  true  to  its  author's  idea."94  The  great  obstacle 
to  his  success  lies  in  the  fact  that,  owing  apparently  to  a  naive 
self-distrust  or  timidity,  he  invariably  regards  historiography 
through  the  eyes  of  the  critic,  and  hesitates  to  consider  himself 
in  the  light  of  a  creative  artist.  There  is,  in  fact,  a  chill  in  the 
air  when  the  modern  historical  scholar  comes  to  discuss  the 
writing  of  history,  and  the  source  of  this  chill  may  be  detected 
in  the  context  of  the  phrase  just  quoted  from  Stubbs.  .  ' '  The 
result  will, ' '  he  says,  "be  an  artistic  unity,  a  perfect  image,  true 
to  the  author's  idea,  and,"  he  continues,  "if  he  has  not  let  his 
own  idea  prejudice  him  in  the  manipulation  of  his  materials, 
true  to  the  reality,  so  far  as  the  reality  can  be  discovered."  The 
"if"  here  is  the  academic  doubt.  The  scholar-historian  is  to  be 
an  artist,  but  he  is,  at  the  same  time,  to  distrust  the  inspiration 
and  question  the  vision  without  which  art  is  impossible.  It  is 
against  this  misapplication  of  the  critical  spirit  that  men  like 
Creighton  and  Cunningham  rise  in  protest.  It  is  indeed  only  by 
reliance  on  the  artist 's  vision  that  the  ' '  impartiality ' ' — the  ' '  dis- 
tance"— demanded  is  to  be  attained.  Vision  is  not  surrender 


»4  Stubbs,  as  cited,  p.  112.  Caird  has  aptly  described  the  procedure 
of  the  historian:  "Banging  over  the  vast  mass  of  seemingly  hetero- 
geneous materials  with  which  he  has  to  deal,  and  impelled  simply  by 
the  unconscious  effort  after  unity  of  effect,  Ire  seizes  intuitively  on 
the  events  that  have  gone  to  mould  or  that  express  the  spirit  of  an 
age  or  the  characteristic  genius  of  a  people."  University  Addresses  (Glas- 
gow, 1899),  pp.  244—45.  Cf.  Albert  Sorel,  Nouveaux  essais  d'histoire  et  de 
critique  (Paris,  1898),  p.  12:  "Toute  la  methode,  tout  1'art  de  1'historien 
consistent  a  exercer,  a  perfectionner  cette  faculte  naturelle  de  retenir 
1 'image  des  objets,  de  reunir  les  images,  de  les  grouper,  d'en  former 
une  image  totale  et  persistante.  L'homme  compose  1'histoire  comme  il 
compose  les  souvenirs  de  sa  propre  vie." 


208          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

to  personal  passion.  ' '  So  far  from  being  self-expression,  artistic 
production  is  the  indirect  formulation  of  a  distanced  mental 
content,"95  and  this  subconscious  formulation  is  realized  con- 
sciously in  the  flash-like  illumination  that  has  been  illustrated 
from  the  experience  of  Michelet  and  Gibbon. 


Historiography,  then,  is  no  mere  colorless  product  of  scholar- 
ship. It  is  the  mental  reflectioil  of  the  consciousness  of  national 
existence,96  it  is  the  memory  of  what  men  cherish  in  the  life  of 
the  nation  to  which  they  belong.  It  is  the  expression  of  the 
spirit  of  the  community  that  gives  it  birth,  and  takes  new  forms 
as  that  spirit  expands.  This  is  true  whether  the  historian  writes 
of  recent  times  or  of  times  remote.  A  Mommsen,  Ferrero  or 
Eduard  Meyer  may  present  the  picture  of  a  distant  past,  but 
he  speaks  always  with  the  voice  of  his  own  generation,  and 
gives  utterance  to  the  ideas  and  aspirations  of  his  own  com- 
munity. The  historian,  far  from  being  open  to  condemnation,  is 
true  to  his  calling  when  he  follows  his  ' '  natural  impulses,  like  the 
common  run  of  men,"  for  he  does  not  write  as  a  scholar,  but  as 
the  spokesman  of  a  people. 

From  the  days  of  the  Greeks  down  to  the  present,  there  has 
been  a  constant  tendency  among  historians  to  discuss  the  utility 
of  history.  If,  now,  ceasing  to  repeat  what  Thucydid'es  and  Poly- 
bius  said,  we  examine  the  evidence,  it  will  be  to  find  that,  in 
giving  expression  to  national  pride,  history  provides  a  body  of 
ideas  which  serves  to  unify  the  attitude  of  the  individuals  of  a 
nation  towards  their  common  country;  in  fact,  the  feeling  of 
nationality  is  due  primarily  to  a  common  pride  in  past  events. 


as  Bullough,  as  cited,  p.  115. 

»6  ' '  The  Reformation  quickened  history  into  a  new  life,  as  it  quickened 
the  world;  the  consciousness  of  national  existence,  of  which  it  was  the 
outcome,  naturally  sought  its  vindication  in  the  study  which  is,  after 
all,  but  the  mental  reflection  of  that  consciousness. "  J.  R.  Green, 
Historical  Studies  (London,  1903),  p.  56. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  209 

' '  Le  veritable  patriotisme  n  'est  pas  1  'amour  du  sol,  c  'est  1  'amour 
du  passe,  c'est  le  respect  pour  les  generations  qui  nous  ont  pre- 
cedes."97 Historians  follow  close  upon  the  movements  of  race 
and  of  people;  their  "invention,"  their  originality,  consists 
chiefly  in  vitalizing  old  materials,  in  interpreting  the  records  in 
the  light  of  the  present,  in  recreating  and  ever  renewing  the 
memory  of  the  past.  The  potency  of  this  type  of  emotionalized 
information  for  inducing  unity  of  sentiment  and  action  is  one 
of  the  notable  discoveries  of  the  nineteenth  century  ;98  by  this 
means  the  spirit  of  small  nations  has  been  resuscitated,  and  the 
imagination  of  greater  units  has  been  fired  to  the  point  of  ag- 
gression. It  is  to  the  efforts  of  historians  that  the  awakening  of 
patriotism  during  the  last  century  is  to  be  attributed.90 

From  such  recognition  of  the  influence  of  historians  it  is  but 
a  step  to  say  with  Gabriel  Monod :  ' '  L  'histoire  travaille  d  'une 
maniere  secrete  et  sure  a  la  grandeur  de  la  Patrie  en  meme 
temps  qu'au  progres  du  genre  humain."100  Indeed,  not  only 


87  Fustel  de  Coulanges,  Questions  historiques  (Paris,  1893),  p.  6;  cf. 
Ernest  Kenan,  "Qu'est-ce  qu'une  nation,"  in  his  Discours  et  conferences 
(Paris,  1887). 

98  "In   Germany  at  least  it  was  the   dynasty  of  historians,  and  not 
the   abstract   men,   who   supplied   the   final   clenchers   for   public   opinion 
and   national  resolution. ' '     Lord  Morley,  Notes   on  Politics  and  History 
(New  York,  1914),  p.  183. 

The  discovery  was,  as  is  well  known,  that  of  Stein.  In  1829,  he 
wrote:  "In  the  year  1818  I  gave  an  impulse  to  this  undertaking,  be- 
cause I  thought  it  for  the  honaur  of  the  nation  to  collect  and  set  out 
properly  the  monuments  of  its  history,  because  I  considered  history  an 
efficacious  means  of  exciting  patriotism,  and  sustaining  it  against  the 
influence  of  self-interest."  See  Sir  J.  E.  Seeley,  Life  and  Times  of 
Stein  (Cambridge,  1878),  III,  499;  cf.  pp.  441  ff. 

"Only  through  history,"  Schopenhauer  remarked  in  1818,  "does  a 
nation  become  completely  conscious  of  itself."  The  World  as  Will  and 
Idea,  tr.  by  R.  B.  Haldane  and  J.  Kemp  (London,  1886),  III,  228. 

99  Lord    Acton,    "Nationality"    [1862],    in    his    History    of    Freedom, 
and  other  Essays   (London,  1907),  pp.  270-300;   and  "German  Schools  of 
History"    [1886],  in  his  Historical  Essays  <$•  Studies   (London,   1908),  p. 
348.    Also  H.  M.  Stephens,  ' '  Modern  Historians  and  their  Influence  on  Small 
Nationalities,"   Contemporary  Beview,  52    (1887),   107-121;   for  the  later 
views  of  Professor  Stephens  see  his  address,  "Nationality  and  History," 
American    Historical   Beview,    21  (1916),  225-236.      The   Earl    of   Cromer's 
article  on  "The  Teaching  of  Patriotism,"  Nineteenth  Century  and  After, 
78  (1915),  1012-20,  should  also  be  read  in  this  connection. 

!oo  Eevue  historique,  1  (1876),  38.  The  practical  application  of  this 
view  appears  in  the  advice  of  Zurbonsen:  "Studiere  die  Geschichte  als 


210          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

has  history-writing  in  the  nineteenth  century  awakened  dormant 
emotions,  it  has  incited  peoples  to  action  with  visions  of  the 
future.  Success,  as  in  the  case  of  Athens,  leads  on  ambition; 
and  the  historian,  like  Herodotus,  justifies  the  forward  policy. 
"Through  recounting  or  representing  the  exploits  of  earlier 
generations,"  Hirn  says,  "the  descendants  acquire  that  healthy 
feeling  of  pride  which  is  the  most  important  factor  of  success"101 
in  the  struggle  for  national  existence,  and  now  that  primitive 
modes  of  excitation  are  out  of  date  history-teachers  take  the 
place  of  the  scops  and  scalds  of  our  forefathers.  History,  like 
any  art,  is  not  to  be  judged  by  what  it  becomes  under  the  tutelage 
of  mediocrities,102  but  by  what  it  is  in  the  hands  of  great  men ; 
it  is  not  merely  a  vehicle  for  the  training  of  critics  or  a  literature 
suitable  for  the  promotion  of  general  culture,  but  it  is  a  great 
moving  spirit  in  the  open  world  and  a  living  force  inspiring  the 
actions  of  men. 

The  foregoing  analysis  has  been  undertaken  for  the  reason 
that  in  discussions  upon  historical  method  there  is  a  marked 
tendency  to  assert  what,  it  is  thought,  historiography  should 
be,  and  an  equally  marked  neglect  to  observe  what  it  actually 
has  been  and  is.  There  is,  indeed,  something  remarkable  in 
the  fact  that  historical  study  should  be  involved  in  difficulties 
because  historical  scholars,  in  dealing  with  their  own  subject, 
cling  tenaciously  to  the  absolute  or  philosophical,  as  opposed  to 
the  relative  or  historical  method  of  criticism.103  One  of  the  great 


Patriot.  Patriotismus  erwarmt  das  Studium;  'sanctus  amor  patriae 
dat  animum!'  1st  das  schone  Motto  der  Monumenta  Germaniae  historica. 
Aber  sei  kein  Chauvinist;  Chauvinismus  blendet  und  macht  ungerecht. 
Wir  Deutsche  sind  nicht  das  einzige  Volk  auf  der  Welt."  Anleitung 
sum  wissenschaftlichen  Studium  der  Geschichte  (2.  Aufl.,  Berlin  [1910]),  p.  5. 

loiYrjo  Hirn,  The  Origins  of  Art  (London,  1900),  pp.  178-179;  cf. 
pp.  180,  268. 

io2«The  strongest  and  most  impressive  personalities,  it  is  true,  like 
Macaulay,  Thiers,  and  the  two  greatest  of  living  writers  [1895], 
Mommsen  and  Treitschke,  project  their  own  broad  shadow  upon  their 
pages.  This  is  a  practice  proper  to  great  men,  and  a  great  man  may 
be  worth  several  immaculate  historians."  Lord  Acton,  A  Lecture  on 
the  Study  of  History  (London,  1896),  p.  30. 

103  "The  [philosophical]  point  of  view  implies  the  existence  of  definite 
standards  and  clear  principles;  the  [historical]  leads  us  to  the  great 


1916J  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  211 

services  of  the  "method  of  origins"  is  that  it  enables  us,  by  going 

back  to  a  point  where  our  personal  judgments  are  not  immedi- 

i 

ately  involved,  to  follow  up  the  line  of  advance,  and,  as  it  were,  to 
take  our  prepossessions  in  the  rear.  In  no  subject  would  this 
procedure  appear  to  be  more  necessary  than  in  that  now  under 
consideration ;  and  what  the  historical  study  of  historiography 
renders  conspicuous  is  the  property-interest  of  the  community  in 
the  recital  of  the  story  of  its  past.  ' '  History, ' '  the  record  of  what 
men  of  the  same  group  cherish  in  common,  is  a  literature  that 
cannot  readily  be  superseded  or  replaced,  because  it  fills  a  definite 
social  need.  To  provide  materials  for  this  record  is  no  unworthy 
object  of  research ;  and,  indeed,  there  would  seem  to  be  an  obliga- 
tion upon  scholars  to  serve  their  fellows  by  bringing  old  deeds 
and  reputations  to  the  test  of  "what  it  was  that  actually  hap- 
pened. ' ' 

Nevertheless,  there  maintains  itself  in  the  minds  of  present- 
day  scholars  a  hope  that  the  study  of  history  may  possibly  be 
directed  to  other  ends  than  the  satisfying  of  national  vainglory ; 
and  the  plea  that  history  should  be  studied  for  its  own  sake 
represents  a  striving,  as  yet  not  wholly  conscious  of  its  aim, 
toward  something  different.  It  must  be  evident  from  what  has 
gone  before  that  the  primary  obstacle  in  the  way  of  historical 
inquiry  leading  to  scientific  results  lies  in  the  subordination  of 
inquiry  to  historiography.  Such,  however,  is  the  vitality  of  the 
tradition  in  the  presence  of  which  the  historian  lives  that  he  finds 
it  difficult  to  conceive  of  "history"  as  presented  in  other  form 
than  that  of  chronologized  narrative,  and  so  adheres  with  per- 
tinacity to  a  type  of  historical  composition  that  antedates  the 
first  beginnings  of  criticism  among  the  Greeks. 

It  might  now  seem  the  obvious  course  to  proceed  with  a 
statement  of  the  means  to  be  adopted  by  historical  investigators 


problem  of  historical  genesis.  In  the  first  instance  we  refer  the  subject 
we  are  interested  in  to  standards  and  principles,  which  we  must  either 
assume  or  demonstrate;  in  the  latter  case  we  connect  the  object  of  our 
study  historically  with  its  antecedents  and  surroundings  in  time  and 
place. "  J.  T.  Merz,  A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  (Edinburgh,  1912),  III,  131. 


212         University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

having  for  their  aim  the  achievement  of  scientific  results.  The 
road,  however,  is  not  yet  clear,  for  in  defense  of  orthodoxy  and 
tradition  it  is  now  declared  that  "logic  has  at  length  justified 
the  historical  method" — meaning  historiography —  and  hence  it 
becomes  necessary  to  consider  the  relation  in  which  History 
stands  to  Philosophy. 


1916J  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  213 


IV 
HISTORY  AND  PHILOSOPHY 


The  mind  of  a  thinking  being  is  largely  occupied  in  making 
constructions;  impressions  come  to  us  and  we  fit  them  into  our 
own  schemes  of  thought.  Our  constructions,  conscious  or  un- 
conscious, are  framed  for  the  purpose  of  setting  up  an  intelligent 
conception  of  the  world  we  live  in,  and  Philosophy  and  Science 
are  the  two  methods  available  for  the  attainment  of  this  object. 
Philosophy  regards  the  universe  as  a  totality,  and  adopts  the 
view  that  the  significance  of  any  part  depends  upon  the  meaning 
of  the  whole.  The  philosopher  may  be  said  to  look  upon  the 
universe  as  a  work  of  art.  For  him  it  is  made  up  of  details,  but 
is  not  a  mere  aggregate ;  it  is  a  whole  or  unity  in  which  the  details 
acquire  a  significance  that  does  not  attach  to  them  taken  sep- 
arately. In  a  work  of  art,  and  in  the  universe  as  the  philosopher 
views  it,  the  whole  is  something  more  than  the  sum  of  all  its 
parts;  and  this  conception  finds  expression  in  the  doctrine  that 
analysis  always  falsifies,  because  the  parts  of  a  complex  whole 
are  different,  as  contained  in  that  whole,  from  what  they  would 
otherwise  be.  Science,  on  the  other  hand,  maintains  that  any 
view  of  the  whole  must  be  in  conformity  with  what  is  known 
of  the  parts,  and  so,  putting  off  the  entire  question  of  ' '  meaning, ' ' 
devotes  itself  to  the  laborious  undertaking  of  dissecting  and 
sorting  the  objects  of  experience.  In  either  case,  it  should  be 
observed,  the  construction  is  an  hypothesis;  but  whereas  the 
hypotheses  of  science  relate  to  strands  or  factors  of  which  more 
than  one  example  is  to  be  found  in  the  world,  those  of  philosophy 
relate  to  a  unique  thing,  the  universe  itself,  so  that  verification 
by  comparison  is  here  impossible.  It  follows  that  while  the 
constructions  of  science  may  be  tested  by  reference  to  objective 
actualities,  those  of  philosophy  can  be  criticized  only  in  respect 


214          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

to  their  self-consistency  in   thought — Philosophy,   as  Kant  re- 
marked, is  constructed  out  of  the  resources  of  reason. 

"The  essence  of  philosophy  lies  in  the  connected  vision  of  the  totality 
of  things,  maintaining  in  every  point  the  subordination  of  every  element 
and  factor  to  every  other  element  and  factor  as  conditioned  by  the 
totality.  It  may  be  compared  to  the  best  theory  of  Impressionism.  You 
may  perfect  your  detail  and  finish  as  much  as  you  please,  but  there  is 
one  inexorable  condition.  Lose  subordination  to  the  whole  and  all  is  lost. 
You  must  never  violate  the  singleness  of  the  impression. ' '  i 

It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  the  philosopher  is  in  the  position  of 
assuming  that  we  may  grasp  the  meaning  of  the  entire  complex 
of  existence  while  remaining  in  ignorance  of  the  factors  or  strands 
of  which  this  is  made  up.  There  will  be  little  difficulty  in  ap- 
preciating the  fact  that  any  such  construction  can  be  but  a  tem- 
porary expedient  which  must  be  abandoned  or  revised  with  every 
new  contribution  to  knowledge  made  by  science.  Philosophy  is 
an  expression  of  the  human  desire  to  arrive  at  an  understanding 
of  the  significance  of  life  and  human  endeavor  on  the  basis  of 
the  knowledge  available  at  any  given  time.  In  contradistinction 
to  this  point  of  view,  the  scientist  is  in  the  position  of  asserting 
that  we  must  first  identify  and  name  the  objects  to  be  discussed 
if  we  are  ever  to  become  mutually  intelligible  to  each  other. 
From  his  experience  of  the  difficulty  of  verifying  hypotheses  in 
limited  fields,  he  is  distrustful  of  hypotheses  framed  to  describe 
"wholes."  From  his  experience  of  the  mind's  way  of  working, 
he  distrusts  all  constructions  that  proceed  "from  the  resources 
of  reason  ; ' '  and  he  cannot  concede  that  our  interpretations  of  the 
exterior  world  can  be  justified  by  their  consistency  in  thought. 

Historically  speaking,  all  forms  of  inquiry  were  originally 
conducted  in  accordance  with  the  method  of  philosophy,  and  it 
has  been  but  slowly  that  one  field  after  another  has  come  to  be 
placed  upon  a  scientific  footing.  With  the  rise  of  many  new 
sciences  in  modern  times,  philosophy  has  seen  its  old  supremacy 
challenged,  and  has  been  forced  to  define  its  field  with  reference 
to  the  activities  of  science.  It  is  admitted  that  ' '  the  need  which 


i  Bernard  Bosanquet,  "Science  and  Philosophy,"  Aristotelian  Society, 
Proceedings,  n.  s.,  15  (1914-15),  13. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  215 

modern  philosophy  has  of  the  particular  sciences  in  their  modern 
form  is  urgent  and  indispensable."2  The  exact  status  of  this 
dependence  has,  however,  been  the  subject  of  an  indeterminate 
debate.  A  view  widely  accepted  is  that  of  Professor  Paulsen: 
' '  Philosophy, ' '  he  says,  ' '  cannot  be  separated  from  the  sciences ; 
it  is  simply  the  sum-total  of  all  scientific  knowledge."3  "The 
most  important  distinction, ' '  Sidgwick  says,  ' '  is  that  the  sciences 
concentrate  attention  on  particular  parts  or  aspects  of  the  know- 
able  world,  abstracting  from  the  rest;  while  it  is,  in  contrast, 
the  essential  characteristic  of  philosophy  that  it  aims  at  putting 
together  the  parts  of  knowledge  thus  attained  into  a  systematic 
whole ;  so  that  all  methods  of  attaining  truth  may  be  grasped 
as  parts  of  one  method ;  and  all  the  conclusions  attained  may  be 
presented,  so  far  as  possible,  as  harmonious  and  consistent."4 
Philosophy,  then,  takes  the  world  as  science  finds  it ;  but  does 
not  on  that  account  admit  a  subordination  of  function.  On  the 
contrary,  it  assumes  that  the  devotion  of  the  man  of  science  to 
his  restricted  problem,  by  limiting  his  outlook,  renders  him 
incapable  of  a  comprehensive  grasp  of  what  is  possible  to  science 
as  a  \vhole.  Hence  philosophy  undertakes  the  formulation  of 
a  wider  synthesis  than  is  possible  to  any  one  of  the  sciences ;  not 
that  the  complete  unification  and  systematisation  of  knowledge 
lies  beyond  the  province  of  science,  but  since  this  is  "the  goal 
of  science  as  a  whole,  it  cannot  be  the  task  of  a  particular  indi- 
vidual discipline."5  That  is,  philosophy  in  its  endeavor  to  deal 


2  G.  T.  Ladd,  Knowledge,  Life  and  Reality   (New  York,  1909),  p.   12. 

3  Friedrich   Paulsen,  Introduction   to  Philosophy,  tr.  by   Frank   Thilly 
(New  York,  1895),  p.  19. 

*  Henry  Sidgwick,  Philosophy,  its  Scope  and  Relations  (London,  1902), 
p.  11.  Compare  Abel  Rey,  La  philosophic  moderne  (Paris,  1908),  pp.  360- 
61:  "Pourquoi  la  philosophic  ne  serait-elle  pas,  de  meme  fac,on,  une 
synthese  generale  de  toutes  les  connaissances  scientifiques,  un  effort 
pour  se  representer  1'inconnu  en  fonction  du  connu  afin  d 'aider  a  sa 
decouverte  et  de  maintenir  1 'esprit  scientifique  dans  sa  veritable 
orientation?  Elle  ne  differerait  de  la  science  que  par  la  plus  grande 
generalite  de  1'hypothese;  la  theorie  philosophique,  au  lieu  d'etre  la 
theorie  d  'un  groupe  de  f  aits  isoles  et  bien  delimites,  serait  la  theorie 
de  1 'ensemble  des  faits  que  la  nature  nous  presente. " 

s  Aloys  Riehl,  Introduction  to  the  Theory  of  Science  and  Metaphysics, 
tr.  by  Arthur  Fairbanks  (London,  1894),  p.  14.  Cf.  Oswald  Kiilpe, 
Introduction  to  Philosophy,  tr.  by  W.  S.  Pillsbury  and  E.  B.  Titchener 


216          University  of  Calif ornia  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

with  experience  as  a  whole,  as  a  systematic  unity,  is  dependent 
upon  the  results  of  the  special  sciences,  and  must  continually 
revise  its  judgments  as  scientific  knowledge  expands. 

It  is,  furthermore,  necessary  to  point  out  that  the  modern 
philosopher  occupies  himself  with  criticism  rather  than  with 
construction,  and  regards  as  his  particular  province  the  criti- 
cism of  the  methods,  as  well  as  the  analysis  of  the  fundamental 
conceptions  and  assumptions  of  the  sciences.  In  other  words, 
the  scientist  is  intent  upon  his  own  enterprise ;  the  ' '  philosopher 
comes  into  being  as  one  who  is  interested  in  observing  what 
it  is  that  the  scientist  is  so  intently  doing."6  Here,  again, 
philosophy  follows  science ;  and  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
in  the  present  connection  to  observe  that,  while  it  investigates 
methodology,  philosophy,  logic,  or  science  of  knowledge,  does  not 
devise  methods  for  men  of  science  to  follow.  "As  the  sciences 
progress  in  actual  insight  they  have  to  complete,  improve,  refine, 
and  extend  their  methods;"7  the  logician  simply  analyses 
the  methods  actually  employed  by  the  sciences  at  a  given  time. 
"It  is  not  the  business  of  the  logician,"  Rashdall  says,  "to  lay 
down  rules  for  the  guidance  of  scientific  men.  In  so  far  as  logic 
is  concerned  with  the  actual  methods  of  particular  sciences,  the 
logician  must  rather  analyse  the  methods  actually  employed  in 
those  sciences  up  to  the  present  than  to  attempt  to  prescribe 
a  priori  the  methods  that  they  must  follow."  "Each  branch  of 
learning  has  its  own  methods,  and  the  method  can  only  be  ac- 
quired by  familiarity  with  the  science  itself."8  Logic  does  not 
justify,  it  describes  method. 

A  good  illustration  of  the  procedure  of  logic  is  provided  in  the  de- 
scription of  the  method  of  the  historian   given  by  J.   G.  Hibben:     "To 


(London,  1901),  p.  239.  The  special  sciences,  "in  all  cases,  are  limited 
in  their  scope,  and  evade  the  ultimate  problems  which  their  subject- 
matters  suggest.  Metaphysics,  on  the  other  hand,  aims  at  completeness 
of  view,  and  seeks  to  press  all  its  questions  home."  J.  S.  Mackenzie, 
Outlines  of  Metaphysics  (London,  1902),  p.  10. 

6R.   B.   Perry,    The  Approach   to  Philosophy    (London,    1903),   p.   119. 

7  Wilhelm  Windelband,  in  Encyclopaedia  of  the  Philosophical  Sciences, 
tr.  by  B.  E.  Meyer  (London,  1913),  I,  43. 

8  Hastings    Rashdall,    in     Aristotelian    Society,    Proceedings,    n.s.,    6 
(1905-6),  1. 


1916]  Teggart :  Prolegomena  to  History  217 

solve  the  special  and  the  general  problems  of  history,  recourse  is  had 
to  an  analysis  of  events  on  the  basis  of  well-established  psychological 
results.  The  phenomena  of  history  are  substantially  the  activities  of 
man,  both  in  his  individual  and  collective  capacities.  Events  being  given, 
an  hypothesis  concerning  the  motives,  and  ends  which  actuated  them, 
is  framed  upon  the  supposition  that  men  ordinarily  are  impelled  by 
similar  motives  under  similar  circumstances,  in  order  to  achieve  similar 
ends.  Here  the  analogies  drawn  between  men  of  the  present  and  men 
of  the  past,  or  between  men  moving  in  the  ordinary  routine  of  every-day 
life  and  men  whose  acts  may  be  epoch-making,  furnish  a  basis  for  his- 
torical interpretation."  9 

What  the  scientist  may  hope  to  find  in  the  discussions  of 
logicians  is  not  a  justification  of  his  own  procedure,  but  a  fuller 
analysis  of  its  implications  than  he  himself  is  able  to  carry  out ; 
the  historical  student  may  utilize  logic  as  a  mirror  and  discover, 
if  he  will,  the  aspect  which  his  endeavor  presents  to  the  outside 
world,  or  as  a  means  to  enhance  that  self -consciousness  of  his 
own  mental  processes  which  is  a  prerequisite  of  successful  sci- 
entific work.  If,  then,  we  turn  to  logic,  as  to  a  candid  friend, 
it  will  be  to  discover  that  history  is  the  narrative  of  certain 
unique  happenings  particularised  by  names  and  dates,  and 
selected  by  an  individual  writer  as  of  value  or  worth  in  relation 
to  a  given  set  of  ideas.  In  short,  the  analysis  of  logic  demon- 
strates that  the  relationship  of  history  is  with  philosophy,  not 
with  science — and  there  are  even  philosophers  who  hold  the 
opinion  "that  History  is  Philosophy  and  Philosophy  History."10 

At  this  point,  the  inevitable  difficulty  over  the  use  of  words 
has  of  recent  years  become  prominent.  Men  "think"  history 
as  an  after-one-another  procession  of  events,  each  one  emerging 
somehow  from  what  has  gone  before,  and  they  assume  that  every 
occurrence  is  particular  and  unrepeated.  It  is  urged  that  in 
the  world  of  everyday  reality,  the  concrete  world  of  experience, 
the  world  of  action  and  of  men,  there  is  nothing  but  the  actuality 
of  deeds  done  that  may  not  be  undone,  of  words  uttered  that  may 
not  be  recalled.  In  this  world  of  unrepeated  fact,  it  is  argued, 


9  Inductive  Logic  (Edinburgh,  1896),  p.  291. 

1°  Benedetto  Croce,  in  Encyclopaedia  of  the  Philosophical  Sciences,  tr. 
by  B.  E.  Meyer  (London,  1913),  I,  212. 


218          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

history  stands  out  as  the  record  of  a  unique  series  of  events  that 
has  happened  once  for  all.  Among  the  myriad  possibilities  of 
a  given  moment  a  single  choice  is  made,  and  the  entire  future  is 
dominated  thereby;  among  the  ways  open  but  one  is  followed, 
and  this  can  never  be  retraced.  Recent  philosophical  discussion 
lays  stress  on  this  view,  which  is,  in  fact,  the  obvious  reflection 
of  the  narrative  method ;  and  the  logicians  assume  that  history, 
with  its  statements  of  unique  happenings,  differs  from  the 
sciences,  which  they  describe  as  concerned  only  with  recurrent 
uniformities.  This  distinction  reveals  the  initiatory  obstacle  to 
the  scientific  treatment  of  ' '  history ' ' — the  use  of  personal  names 
for  human  beings.  Biology  also  has  to  reckon  with  the  existence 
of  individuals,  but  documentary  history  is  the  only  field  of 
study  in  which  the  individual  is  differentiated  from  the  group 
by  a  special  nomenclature.  The  difficulty  is  incidentally  made 
clear  by  Professor  Bury  when,  on  the  one  hand,  he  asserts  that 
the  role  of  the  individual  is  the  heel  of  Achilles  for  historical 
theory,  and,  on  the  other,  admits  that  pre-documentary  history 
lends  itself  as  readily  to  scientific  treatment  as  zoology.11 

Until  recently  philosophy  has  asserted  that  history  is  not  a 
science;  this  characterization  goes  back  to  Aristotle,  and  is 
explicit  in  European  philosophy  since  the  Renaissance.  Various 
opinions  are,  however,  to  be  observed  in  the  definition  of  the  rela- 
tions posited  between  history  and  philosophy :  thus  an  early  view 
maintained  was  that  as  history  is  not  a  science  it  necessarily 
lies  outside  of  philosophy,  whereas  the  latest  is  that  as  history 
is  not  a  science  it  is  identical  with  philosophy.  Bacon  and 
Hobbes  thought  that  history  is  properly  concerned  with  indi- 
viduals, which  are  circumscribed  by  time  and  place,  whereas 
philosophy  discards  individuals  and  deals  only  with  abstract 


11 J.  B.  Bury,  "Darwinism  and  History,"  in  Danrin  and  Modern 
Science,  ed.  by  A.  C.  Seward  (Cambridge,  1909),  pp.  541,  537.  Karl 
Pearson,  The  Grammar  of  Science  (2d  ed.,  London,  1900),  p.  360,  says: 
"It  is  peculiarly  in  ' prehistoric  history '  that  we  are  for  the  time  being  best 
able  to  apply  the  scientific  method. "  T.  B.  Strong,  in  Lectures  on  the 
Method  of  Science  (Oxford,  1906),  p.  242,  remarks  that  "the  great 
source  of  the  difficulty  of  history  altogether  is  the  presence  of  the 
human  element." 


1916]  Teggart :  Prolegomena  to  History  219 

notions.  In  the  nineteenth  century  the  argument  shifts  so  as 
to  bring  the  antithesis  between  history  and  science:  thus 
Schopenhauer  asserts  that  history  is  not  a  science  because  it 
deals  with  the  particular  and  individual,  whereas  the  sciences 
are  systems  of  conceptions;  and  insists  that  while  the  sciences 
speak  of  what  always  is,  history  knows  only  "that  which  is  once, 
and  then  no  more."  More  recently  a  common  form  of  the  con- 
trast has  been  that  the  sciences  deal  with  facts  that  recur, 
whereas  in  history  what  has  once  happened  is  not  repeated  and 
can  never  be  reproduced.  The  antithesis  has  lent  itself  to  a 
wealth  of  expression:  Nature  deals  with  the  typical  in  the 
manifold,  History  separates  the  manifold  from  the  typical; 
Nature  is  the  realm  of  necessity,  History  is  the  realm  of  freedom ; 
Natural  Science  systematises  and  classifies,  History  individualises 
and  narrates;  Natural  Science  deals  with  the  abstract  and  con- 
ceptual, History  with  the  actual  and  concrete. 

In  current  discussion  the  antithesis  is  based  by  logicians  on 
the  practice  of  historians  during  the  nineteenth  century,  and  more 
particularly  on  the  formula  of  Ranke  that  the  office  of  the 
historian  is  simply  to  state  what  it  was  that  happened.12  While 
historians,  heedless  of  the  outcome,  were  occupying  themselves 
in  describing  the  succession  of  such  particular  events  in  one 
country  after  another  as  could  be  detailed  from  available  docu- 
ments, the  logicians  were  observing  their  procedure  with  the 
object  of  determining  the  principles  of  historical  method.  Now 
the  crux  for  logic  was  that  history  claimed  to  be  a  science,  though 
it  did  not  produce  scientific  results.  In  the  circumstances  there 
were  two  ways  of  escape  from  the  dilemma,  and  of  these  one  was 
adopted  by  English,  the  other  by  German  logicians.  Admitting 
the  claim,  English  logicians,  like  Mill  and  Fowler,  looked  for  a 
scientific  element  in  historical  work;  this  they  found  in  what 


12  ' '  Allein  die  vornehmste  Forderung  an  ein  historisches  Werk  bleibt 
doch  immer,  dass  es  wahr  sei,  dass  die  Dinge  sich  so  begeben  haben, 
wie  sie  dargestellt  werden. "  Sammtliche  Werke  (3.  Aufl.,  Leipzig,  1877), 
XII,  6.  "Man  hat  der  Historic  das  Amt,  die  Vergangenheit  zu  richten, 
die  Mit\velt  zum  Nutzen  zukiinf tiger  Jahre  zu  belehren,  beigemessen: 
so  hoher  Aemter  unterwindet  sich  gegenwartiger  Versuch  nicht:  er  will 
bios  zeigen,  wie  es  eigentlich  gewesen."  Same,  XXXIII,  vii. 


220          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

is  known  as  the  ''comparative  method,"  and  hence  it  comes  that, 
in  English  logic,  "historical"  and  "comparative,"  as  applied 
to  method,  are  synonymous  terms.  In  Germany,  on  the  other 
hand,  logicians  accepted  literally  the  claim  of  history  to  be  a 
science,  and,  following  out  this  assumption  to  its  conclusion, 
announced  that  history  constituted  a  science  of  a  new  type. 

The  argument  is  simple.  It  is  admitted  by  Windelband  and 
Rickert13  that  logic  follows  after  method  and  describes  it,  and 
that  the  method  of  history  differs  from  that  of  science.  They 
assume  that  the  practice  of  historians  exhibits  the  method  proper 
to  their  subject,14  and,  to  justify  this  view,  assume  further  that 
the  method  of  a  science  is  determined  by  the  object  it  has  in 
view.  Since,  then,  the  object  of  history  is  just  the  narrative 
description  of  unrepeated  happenings,  it  is  to  be  regarded  as  the 
science  of  the  particular  or  individual,  in  contradistinction  to 
the  natural  sciences  whose  object,  they  say,  is  the  discovery  of 
"laws."15 


J3  For  the  literature  see  Bibliographical  Appendix,  II,  4. 

!•*  ' '  Sous  le  pretexte  que  la  logique  vient  toujours  apres  la  pratique, 
enregistre  les  resultats  heureux  de  1  'activite  spontanee,  ils  prennent 
comme  type  de  la  reussite  historique  les  grands  historiens  du  passe.  Ranke, 
surtout,  est  considere  eomme  le  maitre.  Certains  deelarent  que  Thucydide 
ne  saurait  etre  depasse. "  Henri  Berr,  "Theoriciens  allemands, "  Revue 
de  synthese  historique,  10  (1905),  371. 

is  "Windelband  had  already  replaced  the  old  distinction  between 
natural  and  moral  sciences  by  that  between  the  sciences  of  events, 
Ereignisii'issenschaften,  and  sciences  of  laws,  Gesetzeswissenschaften,  ap- 
plying the  term  idiographisch  to  the  method  of  the  former,  and  nomo- 
thetisch  to  that  of  the  latter  (Geschichte  und  Naturwissenschaft,  Strassburger 
Rektoratsrede,  1894).  Xenopol,  too,  in  his  Les  principes  fondamentaux 
de  I'lmtoire  (Paris,  1899),  makes  a  similar  division,  distinguishing  the 
faits  de  repetition  from  the  faits  de  succession.  The  first  suggestion  of 
a  division  of  the  kind  occurs  in  Humboldt  's  Cosmos,  but  Cournot  was 
the  first  to  determine  it  clearly  and  to  extend  it  to  all  the  sciences 
(Consideration  sur  la  marche  des  idees  et  des  evenements  dans  les  temps 
modernes,  Paris,  1872,  p.  iv).  Hermann  Paul,  who  was  not  acquainted 
with  Cournot 's  work,  draws  a  distinction  in  his  Principien  der  Sprach- 
geschichte  (Halle,  1880)  between  the  Gesetzwissenschaften  and  the 
Geschichtewissenschaften."  Antonio  Aliotta,  The  Idealistic  Eeaction  against 
Science,  tr.  by  Agnes  McCaskill  (London,  1914),  p.  270. 

The  extended  note  of  Hanns  Oertel  on  pp.  5  and  6  of  his  Lectures 
on  the  Study  of  Language  (New  York,  1902)  should  be  read  in  this 
connection.  It  should  be  observed  that  the  views  of  this  school  are 
based  on  "the  comfortable  eighteenth  century  conception  of  'laws  of 
nature.'  '  Carl  Fries  points  out  that  "Rickert  betont  hier  nicht  genug 
den  Inhalt  des  Begriffes  Gesetz. "  Archiv  fiir  systematische  Philosophic 
16  (1910),  448  ff. 


Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  221 

Now,  the  admission  that  "history"  is  not  a  science  in  the 
recognized  meaning  of  the  word  is  all  that  need  here  be  taken 
into  consideration.  Rickert  describes  traditional  historiography 
and  applies  to  it  the  term  "scientific."  Obviously,  then,  the 
question  "whether  history  is  capable  of  scientific  treatment" 
remains  precisely  where  it  was  before.  Scholars  who  are  desirous 
of  placing  historical  investigation  upon  a  scientific  footing  will 
not  be  deterred  by  the  suggestion  that  they  will  no  longer  be 
regarded  as  writers  of  historiographic  literature ;  nor  on  the  other 
hand,  will  they  accept  the  implication  that  as  historiography 
is  the  result  with  which  historical  students  have  heretofore  been 
satisfied  it  therefore  represents  the  only  object  at  which  historical 
inquiry  may  aim.  In  short,  logic  ignores  the  scientific  possi- 
bilities of  historical  inquiry  because  the  historian  has  not  yet 
found  a  way  to  turn  to  account  the  opportunities  which  his 
materials  present. — "Je  vous  assure,"  Seignobos  stated,  "que 
je  ne  demanderais  pas  mieux  que  d'appliquer  en  historic  des 
modes  de  raisonnement  analogues  a  ceux  des  sciences  de  la 
nature;  mais  vraiment  je  ne  le  peux  pas."16 — The  thoughtful 
historian  will  hesitate  to  accept  the  designation  "scientific"  as 
applicable  to  the  type  of  statement  embodied  in  narrative  history, 
for  narration  has  always  been  and  must  remain  a  form  or  genre 
of  literary  art. 

The  attention  of  historical  students  should  be  called  to  the 
fact  that  although  his  principal  work  is  described  as  "eine 
logische  Einleitung  in  die  historischen  Wissenchaf ten, "  Rickert  is 
a  metaphysician,  and  an  exponent  of  that  type  of  philosophical 
thought  which  holds  that  the  fullest  revelation  of  "reality" 
is  to  be  found  in  the  aesthetic  point  of  view,  and  which  con- 
centrates its  critical  attention  upon  the  problems  of  Individ- 
uality and  Value.17  It  is  obvious  that  a  description  of  Rickert 's 
system  of  "transcendental  idealism"  would  here  be  out  of  place; 

is  Bulletin  de  la  Societe  frangaise  de  philosophie,  7  (1907),  298. 

IT  The  exposition  of  Rickert 's  views  on  history  contained  in  F.  M. 
Fling's  "Historical  Synthesis,"  American  Historical  Eeview,  9  (1903), 
1-22,  omits  all  reference  to  the  metaphysical  background — which  is 
indispensable. 


222          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL-  4 

but  an  indication  of  the  aspect  that  history  wears  from  this 
standpoint  cannot  be  omitted. 

Philosophy,  as  we  have  seen,  regards  the  world,  and  indeed 
every  particular  thing,  as  a  totality,  and  endeavors  to  ' '  explain ' ' 
it ;  science,  on  the  other  hand,  acts  upon  the  assumption  that  all 
additions  to  knowledge  proceed  from  the  application  of  the 
method  of  dissection — from  ''the  substitution  of  piecemeal,  de- 
tailed, and  verifiable  results  for  large  untested  generalities  recom- 
mended only  by  a  certain  appeal  to  imagination."18  The  philo- 
sopher urges  that  the  method  of  dissection  can  never  return  to 
the  concrete  individual  from  which  it  sets  out  (thus,  for  the 
moment,  enlisting  a  crude  realism  in  his  argument)  ;  the  scientist 
replies  simply  that  any  such  return  is  premature  until  an  ade- 
quate knowledge  of  the  workings  of  nature  has  been  obtained. 
Now,  the  interest  of  the  philosopher  in  "history"  is  that  it 
alone  "can  fill  the  gaps  left  by  the  formation  of  scientific  con- 
cepts, it  alone  can  substitute  reality  in  the  fulness  of  its  indi- 
vidual aspects  for  the  empty  abstractions  of  science. "  "  History, 
in  as  much  as  it  enables  us  to  watch  the  realisation  of  universal 
values  in  the  world  of  concrete  consciousness,  thus  becomes  the 
fundamental  organ  of  philosophy."19 


is  Bertrand  Kussell,  Scientific  Method  in  Philosophy  (Chicago,  1914), 
p.  4. 

is  Aliotta,  as  cited,  p.  206,  following  Heinrich  Rickert,  Die  Grenzen 
der  naturwissenschaftlichen  Begriffsbildung  (2.  Aufl.,  Tubingen,  1913), 
pp.  22-23.  ' '  Hier  sei  nur  noch  bemerkt,  dass  entsprechend  der 
Beschrankung  bei  der  Untersuchung  der  Naturwissenschaft  es  uns  auch 
fur  die  Geschichte  weniger  auf  den  Prozess  des  Forschens  als  auf  die 
Form  der  Darstellung,  d.h.  auf  die  logische  Struktur  der  geschichts- 
wissenschaftlichen  Ergebnisse  ankommt.  Sie  allein  konnen  die  Liicken  im 
naturwissenschaftlichen  Begreifen  der  Wirklichkeit  ausfiillen  und  sind 
daher  das  eigentlich  philosophisch  Interessante. ' ' 

For  criticism  of  Rickert 's  position  see  Aliotta,  pp.  216-17.  Also 
cf.  Bernard  Bosanquet,  The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value  (London, 
1912),  p.  33:  "For  better  or  worse,  the  historical  tense,  the  genuinely 
personal  subject,  .  .  .  are  unknown  to  the  processes  of  science.  A  general 
statement  is  an  extract  or  an  abstract.  ...  It  tells  us  things  about  reality ; 
...  It  does  not  pretend  to  speak  of  real  beings  in  their  whole  and  funda- 
mental nature.  That  is  to  judge  categorically  in  the  full  sense;  to  make 
assertions  regarding  the  nature  of  the  universe  as  a  whole.  And  this 
can  be  done,  if  at  all,  by  Philosophy  alone.  For  Philosophy  is  essentially 
of  the  concrete  and  the  whole,  as  science  is  essentially  of  the  abstract 
and  the  part."  But  "to  say  that  reality  can  only  be  found  in  the 
given,  and  not  in  its  expansion  and  interpretation  through  thought,  is 
surely  the  ancient  fallacy  of  nai've  Realism"  (p.  80). 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  223 

The  nature  of  the  distinction  between  history  and  science  thus 
introduced  is  brought  into  full  light  by  Urban 's  contrast  of 
"appreciative  description"  and  "scientific  description"20 — 
which,  furthermore,  serves  to  make  evident  the  aesthetic  leanings 
of  this  type  of  philosophy.  History,  or,  to  be  more  explicit, 
historiography,  is  "appreciative  description";  as  such,  it  dis- 
countenances "scientific  description,"  and  considers  the  facts 
provided  by  investigation  "in  order  to  pass  judgment  on  the 
intellectual,  moral,  and  aesthetic  worth  of  the  objects  in  question 
in  the  light  of  transcendental  ideal  standards  of  value."21 

Logic  cannot  "justify,"  its  business  is  to  describe,  method; 
and  the  South-German  "value-philosophers"  have  rendered  a 
service  to  historical  scholarship  by  revealing,  beyond  possibility 
of  equivocation,  the  ineradicable  philosophical  substratum  in  all 
attempts  to  describe  the  course  of  events  as  they  have  happened. 
The  effort  of  the  mind  in  such  a  case  is  to  grasp  the  meaning  of 
a  whole,  and  this  effort  is  the  characteristic  procedure  of 
philosophical  thought.  Critical  inquiry,  Merz  takes  pains  to 
show,  i '  succeeds  only  in  matters  of  detail ;  or,  where  larger  prob- 
lems are  at  stake,  only  by  the  aid  of  leading  ideas  and  command- 
ing points  of  view  which  have  themselves  outrun  criticism,  being 
the  spontaneous  outcome  of  the  inspired  and  divining  genius. 
This,"  he  continues,  "has  notably  been  the  case  in  the  treatment 
of  larger  historical  subjects.  ...  It  is  only  since  the  time  of 
Niebuhr,  who  was  followed  by  Ranke  and  his  school,  that  Ger- 
many has  produced  historians  who  have  had  great  influence 
outside  of  Germany:  this  reputation  rests  not  so  much  and 
perhaps  not  mainly  upon  the  critical  preparation  of  the  material 
with  which  they  dealt,  as  upon  the  general  aspects  from  which 
their  histories  were  written."22  "However  limited,"  Caird 
remarks,  "the  period  the  historian  undertakes  to  write  of,  as 
he  cannot  tell  all  the  facts,  he  must  select,  and  selection  involves 
a  criterion  or  principle  of  judgment  as  to  what  is  more  or  less 


20  w.  M.  Urban,  Valuation:  its  Nature  and  Laws  (London,  1909),  p.  8. 

21  A.  E.  Taylor,  Philosophical  Eeview,  15  (1906),  385. 

22  J.  T.  Merz,  A  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth  Century 
(Edinburgh,  1912),  III,  149-150. 


224          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

important,  that  is,  it  involves  a  kind  of  philosophy  however 
crude."  From  the  details  that  investigation  provides,  the  his- 
torian "fastens  by  a  certain  ideal  instinct  on  those  elements 
which  furnish  a  clue  to  its  meaning,  and  which  enable  him  to 
give  unity,  connexion,  relative  proportion,  harmony  and  sig- 
nificance to  the  whole. ' ' 23  Thus  Benedetto  Croce  can  say  that 
"if  a  man  is  to  narrate  history,  he  must  begin  by  understand- 
ing it,  and  he  can  only  do  this  by  bringing  into  consciousness 
the  ideas  which  lie  concealed  within  it. '  '24  In  short,  ' '  there  is  an 
implicit  philosophy  of  history  in  every  modern  historian,  even 
when  he  may  seem  for  the  time  to  have  no  interest  beyond  the 
narrative. ' ' 2S 

Lord  Acton's  pronouncement,  "I  exhort  you  never  to  debase  the 
moral  currency  or  to  lower  the  standard  of  rectitude,  but  to  try  others 
by  the  final  maxim  that  governs  your  own  lives,  and  to  suffer  no  man 
and  no  cause  to  escape  the  undying  penalty  which  history  has  the  power 
to  inflict  on  wrong, ' '  26  may  be  read  in  connection  with  Galloway 's 
remark  that  "the  final  presuppositions  of  history  as  of  ethics  are  specu- 
lative, not  scientific. ' '  27 

"What  the  good  historian  does  for  a  particular  period,"  D.  G. 
Eitchie  says,  "is  to  arrive  at  the  meaning,  or  underlying  principle  or 
'idea'  of  that  period."  "The  philosophy  of  history  ...  is  an  attempt  to 
read  the  plan  of  Providence,  to  unravel  the  plot  of  the  great  drama  that 
is  played  throughout  the  centuries."28 

"...  and  the  result  is,  in  one  after  another  of  our  historians,  the 
sense  of  something  wanting — of  a  want  of  'the  one  thing  needful,'  the 
moral  and  spiritual  life  without  which  history  is  nothing  but  an  old 
almanac.  "29 

"Stubbs  believed,  and  most  of  us  (I  think)  still  believe  to-day,  that 
the  science  which  we  love  is  not  merely  concerned  with  the  stringing 
together  of  facts  in  their  correct  order  and  the  reconstitution  of  annals, 
but  with  something  more.  We  must  draw  the  moral,  whether  we  will 
or  no:  ...  The  teacher  who  contents  himself  with  arraying  the  facts 
in  due  order  has  only  accomplished  half  his  task.  He  must  take  the  risk 


23  John  Caird,  University  Addresses  (Glasgow,  1899),  pp.  242,  245. 
2*  Croce,  in  Encyclopaedia  of  the  Philosophical  Sciences,  I,  211. 

25  W.  P.  Ker,  On  the  Philosophy  of  History  (Glasgow,  1909),  p.  15. 

26  A  Lecture  on  the  Study  of  History  (London,  1896),  p.  63. 

27  George  Galloway,  The  Principles  of  Religious  Development  (London, 
1909),  p.  33. 

28  "The  Rationality  of  History,"  in  Essays  in  Philosophical  Criticism 
(London,  1883),  pp.  127,  132. 

20  J.  R.  Green,  Historical  Studies  (London,  1903),  p.  249. 


19161  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  225 

and  endeavour  to  deduce  the  inner  meaning  of  the  annals  that  he  has 
set  forth,  content  to  err  if  err  he  must. ' '  30 

"For  the  marrow  of  civilized  history  is  ethical,  not  metaphysical, 
and  the  deep  underlying  cause  of  action  passes  through  the  shape  of 
right  and  wrong  ...  In  the  revolt  of  the  last  ten  years  [written  in 
1886]  against  utilitarians  and  materialists,  the  growth  of  ethical  knowl- 
edge has  become,  for  the  first  time,  the  supreme  object  of  history. "si 

"Besearch, "  Eucken  says,  "does  not  make  the  slightest  claim  to  be 
philosophy;  its  chief  desire  is  to  free  history  from  all  philosophical 
tutelage  and  make  it  entirely  self-reliant:  yet  this  tendency  could  not 
possibly  have  made  such  victorious  progress  and  won  such  whole-hearted 
devotion  unless  it  both  carried  in  itself  and  aroused  definite  convic- 
tions. ' '  32 

"  There  is  no  indication  in  the  work,  for  instance,  of  Maitland 
and  Vinogradoff  that  they  have  been  actuated  by  anything  but  the  purest 
motives  of  historical  research.  Yet  it  would  not  be  fanciful  to  attribute 
the  unusual  interest  in  their  work  to  the  fact  that  it  was,  however 
indirectly,  related  to  political  questions  and  to  modern  reconsiderations 
of  the  social  structure.  It  had  a  certain  imaginative  grasp  which  the 
work  of  many  of  their  fellow-historians  has  lacked.  "33 

"La  philosophic  de  1'histoire  consiste  a  prendre  parmi  les  doctrines 
contemporaines  une  idee  saillante  quelconque,  politique,  religieuse  ou 
autre,  et  a  faire  de  cette  idee,  ou  de  sa  negation,  le  pivot  d'un  recit 
historique. ' '  34 

"The  historian  will  fail  hopelessly  if  he  seeks  to  be  a  mere  recorder. 
For  the  truth  about  the  whole,  the  expression  of  which  is  what  matters, 
was  not  realised  in  its  completeness  until  time  and  the  working  of  the 
spirit  of  the  period  had  enabled  the  process  developed  in  a  succession 
of  particular  events  to  be  completed.  .  .  .  His  business  is  to  select  in 
the  light  of  a  larger  conception  of  the  truth.  He  must  look  at  his  period 
as  a  whole  and  in  the  completeness  of  its  development.  And  this  is 
a  task  rather  of  the  spirit  than  of  the  letter,  "ss 

Lest  misunderstanding  should  intrude  itself  at  this  point, 
it  may  be  said  that  the  world  is  many-sided  and  that  there  is 
room  for  every  form  of  heedful  inquiry.  "Philosophy  of  his- 


so  Charles  Oman,  Inaugural  Lecture  on  the  Study  of  History  (Oxford, 
1906),  pp.  7-8. 

si  Lord  Acton,  Historical  Essays  and  Studies  (London,  1908),  p.  362. 

32  Rudolf  Eucken,  Main  Currents  of  Modern  Thought,  tr.  by  Meyrick 
Booth  (New  York,  19121),  pp.  311-12. 

33  E.  H.  Gretton,  History   (London   [1914]),  p.  47. 

s*  H.  d'Arbois  de  Jubainville,  Deux  manieres  d'ecrire  1'histoire  (Paris, 
1896),  p.  5. 

35  Viscount  Haldane,  The  Meaning  of  Truth  in  History  (London,  1914), 
pp.  28-29. 


226          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

tory, "  which  all  historical  students  are  brought  up  to  view  with 
suspicion,  has  its  legitimate  place,  for  it  must  not  be  forgotten 
that  the  desire  to  find  a  meaning  in  life  and  history  is  an  in- 
eradicable possession  of  the  human  spirit.  The  chaos  and  for- 
tuitousness of  events  creates  wonderment,  and  drives  men  to 
formulate  explanations.  There  must  be  some  meaning,  we  feel, 
in  this  drama,  some  end  or  aim  to  all  this  earnestness  and  striv- 
ing. The  desire  for  such  an  interpretation  cannot  be  set  aside 
by  arguments  to  prove  the  impracticability  of  its  object,  for 
it  has  its  origin  in  our  highest  aspirations.  As  Lotze  said :  ' '  All 
human  longing  to  find  a  guiding  thread  in  the  confused  variety 
of  history  springs  from  the  unselfish  desire  to  recognise  a  worthy 
and  sacred  order  in  the  system  and  course  of  the  world."  So 
men  cling  tenaciously  to  the  idea  of  a  divine  Providence  which 
controls  at  once  the  immediate  happenings  of  our  individual  lives 
and  the  far-off  destiny  of  the  human  race.  The  justification  of 
all  such  constructions  is  the  need  men  have  for  a  guiding  prin- 
ciple in  the  conduct  of  life.  Scientific  knowledge  is  incomplete, 
and  these  philosophical  constructions  are  temporary  working 
hypotheses  for  the  conduct  of  life  which  cannot  well  be  dispensed 
with. 

The  constructions  of  historiography  are  based  upon  the 
philosophico-aesthetic  method  of  "appreciative  description";  to 
make  this  fact  clear  it  is  only  necessary  to  examine  the  teachings 
of  those  who  are  most  urgent  in  proclaiming  that  "history  is  a 
science." 

An  important  case  is  that  of  Principal  Caird.  In  his  ' '  Study 
of  History"  he  begins  by  showing  that,  as  applied  to  human 
actions,  individual  or  collective,  the  wrord  "science"  cannot  be 
employed  in  accordance  with  its  ordinary  usage:  "In  history." 
he  says,  "the  phenomena  never  repeat  themselves,  and  can  never 
be  reproduced";  "the  facts  do  not  relate  to  a  fixed  and  abiding 
order,  they  cease  forever  with  the  single  instance  of  their  occur- 
rence, and  can  never  be  recalled."  He  then  brings  the  problem 
to  the  form:  "In  what  sense  can  the  term  'science'  be  applied 
to  the  record  of  the  past  life  of  man?",  and  to  find  an  answer 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  227 

sets  up  the  further  question  "Whether  philosophy,  which  claims 
to  be  the  science  of  sciences,  .  .  .  can  be  accused  of  presumption 
when  it  attempts  to  introduce  the  light  of  reason  and  intelligible 
law  into  the  seeming  confusion  and  complication  of  human  his- 
tory?" The  function  of  a  "science"  of  history  would  then  be, 
in  accordance  with  Caird's  theory,  the  discovery  of  "a  secret 
order  of  reason  in  the  life  of  nations  and  of  the  world"36 — in 
other  words,  he  proposes  that  history,  in  order  to  become  a 
"science,"  should  adopt  the  method  of  philosophy. 

Again,  .Professor  Robinson  is  among  those  who  believe  that 
history  has  been  raised  "to  the  dignity  of  a  science."  Having 
reached  this  conclusion  he  finds  himself  confronted  with  the  prob- 
lem of  the  relationship  of  history  to  the  specialised  histories  of 
art,  law,  religion,  and  so  forth.  Is  history,  as,  he  says,  Seeley 
maintained,  merely  a  residuum  left  after  these  subjects  have 
become  independent  sciences,  and  is  this  residuum  destined  to. 
be  still  further  reduced  by  some  secession  of  tomorrow?  Robin- 
son's answer  might  have  been  drawn  from  any  Introduction  to 
Philosophy.  The  vital  phenomena  of  human  life  cannot,  he  says, 
be  exhausted  by  any  number  of  monographs  on  special  topics. 
Man  is  more  than  the  sum  of  his  scientifically  classifiable  oper- 
ations. The  whole  is  something  quite  distinct  from  the  sum  of 
its  parts ;  ' '  these  may  be  studied,  each  by  itself,  with  advantage, 
but  specialisation  would  lead  to  the  most  absurd  results  if  there 
were  not  some  one  to  study  the  process  as  a  whole,  and  that  some 
one  is  the  historian."  3T  Thus,  it  appears,  that  both  in  spirit  and 
in  aim  the  "new"  history  would  identify  itself  with  philosophy. 

The  specialist  might  appear  to  be  the  person  best  qualified  to  trace 
the  history  of  such  subjects  as  mathematics,  chemistry,  and  painting. 
This,  it  seems,  is  a  mistake.  The  specialist,  Professor  Eobinson  says, 
is  not  trained  to  "conceive  remote  and  unfamiliar  conditions  which 
historically  lie  back  of  the  conceptions  which  he  entertains,"  arid  the 
historian  "is  constantly  shocked  by  a  certain  awkwardness  which  those 
inexperienced  in  historical  research  are  almost  sure  to  betray.  They 
make  mistakes  which  he  would  not  make,  in  spite  of  their  greater  knowl- 
edge of  the  subject  with  which  they  are  dealing." 


se  Caird,  as  cited,  pp.  234,  236,  249,  255. 

37  J.   H.   Eobinson,    The   New   History    (New   York,   1912),   pp.    65-68. 


228          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

For  a  fuller  insight  into  this  attitude,  which  is  not  exceptional,  see 
the  remarks  of  Professor  Edward  Channing:  "The  time  comes  when 
the  historian  must  begin  to  make  up  his  mind.  In  doing  this  it  is  not 
at  all  necessary  that  he  should  have  read  every  bit  of  evidence.  Take 
the  countless  diaries  and  journals" — descriptive  of  an  historical  event — 
"there  are  differences  between  them,  no  doubt,  but  in  essentials  they 
teach  the  same  truths.  These  will  be  patent  to  the  man  of  historical 
genius  when  he  has  read  three  or  four  of  them,  and  will  never  become 
visible  to  him  whose  mind  works  in  another  way,  no  matter  how  many 
he  may  read. ' '  38 

Furthermore,  as  Professor  Bury  has  given  currency  to  the 
widely-quoted  phrase  that  ' '  history  is  a  science,  no  less  and  no 
more, "  it  is  of  some  importance  to  understand  that  he  advocates 
the  philosophical  interpretation  of  history  as  "the  only  hypothesis 
on  which  the  postulate  of  'history  for  its  own  sake'  can  be 
justified  as  valid."39  "It  is  one  of  the  remarkable  ideas  which 
first  emerged  explicitly  into  consciousness  in  the  last  century," 
he  says,  "that  the  unique  series  of  the  phenomena  of  human 
development  is  worthy  to  be  studied  for  itself,  without  any 
ulterior  purpose,  without  any  obligation  to  serve  ethical  or  theo- 
logical, or  any  practical  ends.  This  principle  of  'history  for 
its  own  sake',"  he  continues,  "might  be  described  as  the  motto 
or  watchword  of  the  great  movement  of  historical  research  which 
has  gone  on  increasing  in  volume  and  power  since  the  beginning 
of  the  last  century.  But,"  he  asks — and,  in  asking,  passes  over 
from  the  attitude  of  a  scientific  inquirer  to  seek  the  countenance 
of  some  exterior  authority — "but  has  this  principle  a  theoretical 
justification?"  "It  seems  to  me,"  he  says,  "that  our  decision 
of  this  question  must  fall  out  according  to  the  view  we  take  of 
the  relation  of  man's  historical  development  to  the  whole  of 
reality.  We  are  brought  face  to  face  with  a  philosophical  prob- 
lem. Our  apprehension  of  history  and  our  reason  for  studying 
it  must  be  ultimately  determined  by  the  view  we  entertain  of 
the  moles  et  machina  mundi  as  a  whole."40  So,  in  bringing  his 


38  American   Antiquarian   Society,    Proceedings,   n.s.    20  (1910),  433-34. 

39  J.  B.  Bury,  ' '  The  Place  of  Modern  History  in  the  Perspective  of 
Knowledge,"  Congress  of  Arts  and  Science,  St.  Louis,  1904,  ed.  by  H.  J. 
Rogers   (Boston,  1906),  II,  144. 

•*o  Bury,  as  cited,  pp.  143-44. 


1916]  Teggart :  Prolegomena  to  History  229 

discussion  to  a  close,  he  says  that  "the  answer  to  the  question, 
'What  is  the  position  of  modern  history  in  the  domain  of  uni- 
versal knowledge?'  depends  in  the  first  instance  on  our  view  of 
the  fundamental  philosophical  question  at  issue  between  idealism 
and  naturalism."41 

Professor  Bury  has  evidently  adopted  the  philosophical  system  of 
his  Cambridge  colleague,  Professor  James  Ward.  "Nothing  but  a 
spiritualistic  view  of  the  world  can,  without  encountering  the  difficulty 
of  absolute  idealism,  afford  an  intelligible  explanation  of  the  unity  of 
nature  and  thought,  and  the  universal  teleology  of  the  'ought  to  be,' 
which  the  philosophy  of  values  regards  as  controlling  the  evolutionary 
movement  of  experience.  If  the  universe  be  not  a  brute  mechanism, 
but  the  realm  of  ends  and  of  history,  the  outcome  of  the  interweaving 
of  spontaneous  individual  activities  whose  goal  is  the  actualisation  of 
the  ethical  order,  only  a  theistic  conception  will  enable  us  to  comprehend 
it.  The  logical  completion  of  the  philosophy  of  values  can  only  be  found 
in  a  form  of  spiritualism,  and  to  James  Ward  belongs  the  credit  of 
having  frankly  recognised  this  fact.  Ward,  in  his  GifFord  Lectures 
[Naturalism  and  Agnosticism  (London,  1899),  and  The  Eealm  of  Ends 
(Cambridge,  1911)]  waged  a  glorious  warfare  against  agnostic  natural- 
ism, and  sees,  like  Eoyce,  Miinsterberg,  and  Eickert,  in  the  historical 
and  concrete  aspect  of  the  world  its  true  reality  as  opposed  to  the 
abstract,  mechanical  fictions  of  science."42 

The  point  of  view  of  this  modern  school  which  embraces  history  in 
philosophy  seems  to  me  to  be  adequately  expressed  by  George  Galloway: 
"We  seem  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  the  goal  and  meaning  of  history 
are  not  to  be  found  in  this  temporal  order  of  things  at  all.  The  facts 
themselves  appear  to  necessitate  the  acceptance  of  some  form  of 
transcendency.  .  .  .  We  are  not  able  to  find  a  meaning  in  history, 
viewed  as  a  mundane  process  in  time,  which  will  satisfy  the  reason 
and  do  justice  to  the  moral  values  involved.  That  the  process  is  not 
meaningless  we  are  bound  to  assume.  Accordingly  we  make  the  postulate 
that  the  ultimate  meaning  of  history  must  lie  in  a  sphere  which  transcends 
the  present  temporal  order. ' '  ^ 

This,  then,  is  the  end  at  which  the  modern  historical  school, 
setting  out  with  the  resolution  to  avoid  philosophical  entangle- 
ments, has  arrived.  The  views  of  Caird,  Croce,  and  Ward,  Win- 
delband,  Eickert,  and  Bury,  however  unpalatable,  are  based  upon 
the  practice  of  historians — of  Thucydides  and  Ranke,  the  models 


41  Bury,  as  cited,  p.  152. 

42  Aliotta,  as  cited,  p.  265. 

43  The  Principles  of  Religious  Development   (London,  1909),  p.  37. 


230          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

of  the  logicians — and  if  this  practice  should  prove  to  be  the  only 
form  which  the  results  of  historical  research  may  take,  then  his- 
torical investigation  is,  after  all,  just  a  study  ancillary  to  philo- 
sophy. The  subordination  of  investigation  to  historiography 
carries  with  it  the  subordination  of  investigation  to  philosophical 
ideas. 


No  frequency  or  emphasis  of  assertion  that  "history  is  a 
science"  can  make  it  such;  nor  can  the  verbal  repudiation  of 
philosophical  ideas  exclude  these  from  the  historian's  statement 
of  his  results.  The  ineradicable  philosophical  outlook  of  historio- 
graphy is  perhaps  nowhere  better  displayed  than  in  the  idea  of 
"the  continuity  of  history"  which  has  been  proclaimed  as  "the 
most  fundamental  and  valuable  truth  which  the  past  has  to 
teach  us."44  To  observe  the  bearings  of  this  idea  we  may  take 
counsel  of  the  logicians. 

The  essence  of  the  historical  method,  Sabine  says,  "is  the  conception 
of  historical  continuity.  Every  institution,  social  or  political,  every 
art,  science,  or  religion,  in  fact,  everything  which  is  the  product  of 
human  activity,  as  well  as  every  race  or  nation,  has  a  history  and  is  to 
be  adequately  understood  only  by  a  study  of  its  genesis  and  course  of 
development.  A  nation  or  institution  as  it  exists  at  any  single  period, 
however  self-sufficing  it  may  be,  is,  so  to  speak,  a  cross-section  of  a 
long  process  which  extends  both  into  the  past  and  into  the  future; 
though  itself  an  individual,  it  is  a  member  of  a  larger  individual  which 
extends  beyond  the  limits  of  any  single  time.  Moreover — and  this  is 
the  real  meaning  of  historical  continuity — a  series  of  historical  events 
is  a  true  individual.  A  mere  succession  of  events  in  time  is  by  no 
means  adequate  to  form  an  historical  sequence;  a  thread  of  connection, 
a  relating  principle,  must  run  through  all  the  particular  events  and  give 
them  a  unity  in  the  light  of  which  alone  the  particular  event  can  have 
any  significance.  History  deals  always  with  the  progress  or  decadence 
of  a  unitary  being  which  persists  as  an  individual  in  spite  of  changes; 
it  never  deals  with  a  collection  of  sequent  but  unrelated  events.  Unless 
this  were  the  case,  any  fact  would  be  of  equal  importance  to  the  his- 
torian with  every  other  fact;  selection  can  take  place  only  with  reference 
to  a  universal.  "45 


*4  Robinson,  as  cited,  p.  14. 

45  G.   H.   Sabine,   "Hume's   Contribution   to   the   Historical   Method," 
Philosophical  Review,  15  (1906),  17. 


1916J  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  231 

Now,  it  is  of  the  first  importance  that  the  historical  student 
should  distinguish  between  "continuity"  as  the  basis  of  an 
effort  to  grasp  the  significance  of  the  course  of  history  as  a  whole, 
and  a  different  application  of  the  term,  in  which  it  appears 
simply  as  a  protest  against  the  acceptance  of  artificial  "breaks" 
in  the  sequence  of  events.  It  may  be  observed,  in  passing,  that 
since  the  time  of  Leibniz  the  word  "continuity"  has  been  one 
of  those  tantilizing  counters  of  thought  that  pass  current  though 
every  bargainer  has  a  different  notion  of  what  it  represents; 
hence  it  may  be  regarded  with  suspicion  when  it  is  introduced 
into  debate  without  full  and  sufficient  guarantees.  Today,  it 
stands  for  a  critical  interest  both  in  science  and  philosophy,  and 
implies  different  sets  of  ideas  in  different  fields  of  thought ;  there 
is  danger,  therefore,  that  its  use  in  many  different  connections 
may  convey  an  unfounded  assurance  of  its  validity  in  yet  other 
associations.  The  historical  student  should  at  least  be  warned 
at  the  outset  that  "it  would  hardly  be  an  exaggeration  to  say 
that  the  whole  logical  crux  of  metaphysics  centers  in  the  problem 
of  continuity  and  discreteness. "  46  As  Hoffding  remarks,  ' '  the 
relation  of  continuity  and  discontinuity  touches  the  highest 
interest  of  personality  as  well  as  of  science.  In  both  directions 
we  aim  at  unity  and  connectedness ;  and  in  this  regard  the  dis- 
continuous appears  as  an  obstacle  which  has  to  be  overcome. 
On  the  other  side  it  is  just  this  discontinuity  (difference  of  time, 
of  degree,  of  place,  of  quality,  of  individuality)  which  every- 
where, in  the  realm  of  science  as  well  as  of  life,  brings  something 
new,  releases  the  bound-up  forces,  and  places  before  us  the  great 
tasks."47 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  the  idea  of  "continuity"  derives 
its  significance,  in  the  first  place,  from  the  denial  it  involves 
of  noticeable  discontinuities  or  breaks  in  nature — for  example, 
Lyell's  theory  of  gradual  geological  changes  as  against  the  older 
theory  of  successive  cataclysms;  Darwin's  theory  of  gradual 


48  J.  A.  Leighton,  "On  Continuity  and  Discreteness,"  Journal  of 
Philosophy,  Psychology,  and  Scientific  Methods,  7  (1910),  231. 

47  Quoted  in  J.  T.  Merz,  History  of  European  Thought  in  the  Nineteenth 
Century  (Edinburgh,  1912),  III,  291-92. 


232          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

biological  changes  as  against  the  theory  of  special  creations  of 
living  species.  Leibniz  stated  the  principle  in  this  negative  form : 
"Nothing."  he  said,  "happens  all  at  once,  and  it  is  one  of  my 
great  maxims  .  .  .  that  nature  never  makes  leaps."  "Every- 
thing goes  by  degrees  in  nature,  and  nothing  by  leaps,  and  this 
rule  as  regards  changes  is  part  of  my  law  of  continuity. ' ' 48 
"Telle  est  cette  fameuse  loi  de  continuite,  dont  Kant  a  pu  dire 
qu'elle  etait  la  plus  haute  systematisation  de  1'esprit  humain."49 

In  history  also,  the  principle  of  continuity  finds  its  familiar 
application  in  the  denial  of  "breaks."  Thus  it  appears  that,  in 
the  eighteenth  century,  one  of  the  great  obstacles  which  historical 
criticism  had  to  overcome  was  the  dogma  of  the  literal  interpre- 
tation of  the  Bible.  So  long  as  its  narrative  and  events  were 
protected  by  a  veil  of  sanctity  men  accepted  its  statements  of 
supernatural  interventions — that  is,  of  discontinuities — in  his- 
tory. Leslie  Stephen  remarks  that  Conyers  Middleton  had  "a 
more  distinct  view  than  any  of  his  contemporaries  of  the  essen- 
tial continuity  of  history,"  and  that  the  aim  of  all  his  writings 
was  "to  remove  that  veil,  and  to  apply  the  same  methods  of 
enquiry  to  all  periods  and  all  nations,  and  to  show  how  the 
supposed  breaches  of  continuity  disappeared  under  closer  in- 
vestigation." 50 

In  the  nineteenth  century,  historians  like  Dr.  Arnold  and 
Bishop  Stubbs  held  that  there  was  a  significant  "break"  be- 
tween ancient  history  and  modern.  Arnold  said:  "The  state  of 
things  now  in  existence  dates  its  origin  from  the  fall  of  the  west- 
ern empire ;  so  far  we  can  trace  up  the  fortunes  of  nations  which 
are  still  flourishing ;  history  so  far  is  the  biography  of  the  living ; 
beyond,  it  is  but  the  biography  of  the  dead. '  '51  Stubbs  expressed 
the  same  idea,  saying  that  Modern  History  "compared  with  the 
study  of  Ancient  History  is  like  the  study  of  life  compared  with 


48  Tr.  in  Bertrand  Russell,  A  Critical  Exposition  of  the  Philosophy 
of  Leibniz  (Cambridge,  1900),  p.  222. 

4»  Louis  Daville,  Leibniz  historien  (Paris,  1909),  p.  671. 

so  Sir  Leslie  Stephen,  History  of  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth 
Century  (3d  ed.,  London,  1902),  I,  263;  cf.  58,  191. 

si  Thomas  Arnold,  Introductory  Lectures  on  Modern  History  (New 
York,  1857),  p.  42.  The  extract  is  from  his  Inaugural  Lecture,  1841. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  233 

that  of  death,  the  view  of  the  living  body  compared  with  that 
of  the  skeleton. "  "  It  is  Christianity, ' '  he  continues,  ' '  that  gives 
to  the  modern  world  its  living  unity  and  at  the  same  time  cuts 
it  off  from  the  death  of  the  past."  Ten  years  later,  in  1877,  in 
a  lecture  "On  the  Purposes  and  Methods  of  Historical  Study," 
he  said :  ' '  The  false  idea,  or  that  which  to  me  seems  practically 
misleading  in  the  term  the  Unity  of  History,  is  the  acceptance 
as  a  practical  rule  or  maxim  that  there  are  no  new  points  of 
departure  in  human  history;  that  modern  life  is  a  continuation 
of  medieval,  of  ancient  and  medieval,  history,  by  a  continuity 
and  unity  that  is  at  all  points  equally  important,  of  the  same 
consistency  in  fact."52  This  pronouncement  came  in  response 
to  Freeman's  Cambridge  lecture  in  1872,  in  which  it  was  main- 
tained against  Stubbs  that  historians  "must  cast  aside  all  dis- 
tinctions of  'ancient'  and  'modern,'  of  'dead'  and  'living,'  and 
must  boldly  grapple  with  the  great  fact  of  the  unity  of  history. 
As  man,"  he  said,  "is  the  same  in  all  ages,  the  history  of  man 
is  one  in  all  ages. ' '  The  history  of  mankind  must  be  looked  upon 
as  a  continuous  whole.  "No  period  of  history  can  be  clothed 
with  its  highest  interest  and  its  highest  profit,  if  it  be  looked  at 
wholly  in  itself."53  ,.  ,  | 


52  Seventeen  Lectures  (Oxford,  1887),  pp.  15,  18,  96.     Cf.  Lord  Acton, 
A  Lecture  on  the  Study  of  History   (London,  1896),  p.  8:    "The  modern 
age  did  not  proceed  from  the  medieval  by  normal  succession,  with  out- 
ward tokens  of  legitimate  descent.     Unheralded,  it  founded  a  new  order 
of  things,  under  a  law  of  innovation,  sapping  the  ancient  reign  of  con- 
tinuity. ' ' 

53  Comparative  Politics,  .  .  .  with  The  Unity  of  History  (2d  ed.,  London, 
1896),  pp.  197,  198.     First  ed.,  1873.     The  Unity  of  History  was  first  pub- 
lished in  1872. 

Freeman's  advocacy  of  'continuity  in  history'  goes  back  to  1849, 
when  he  published  the  first  of  three  pamphlets — Thoughts  on  the  Study 
of  History — opposing  the  establishment  of  a  School  of  Modern  History 
at  Oxford.  Cf.  W.  E.  W.  Stephens,  Life  and  Letters  of  Edward  A. 
Freeman  (London,  1895),  I,  117  ff.  His  essay  entitled  "The  Continuity 
of  English  History,"  Historical  Essays,  First  Series  (London,  1871),  was 
a  reprint  in  part  of  a  review  of  Eobert  Vaughan's  Revolutions  in  English 
History  (London,  1859).  In  his  Inaugural  Lecture  (1884),  he  returned 
to  the  attack  on  the  position  taken  by  Stubbs:  "But  I  cannot  help 
pointing  out,  now  at  the  very  beginning,"  he  said,  "that  this  unnatural 
division  into  'ancient'  and  'modern'  hinders  the  great  central  fact  of 
European  history,  the  growth  and  the  abiding  of  the  power  of  Rome,  from 
being  ever  set  forth  in  all  the  fulness  of  its  unity."  "We  may  well 
agree  to  draw  a  line  between  'ancient'  and  'modern,'  if  we  hold  our 


234          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

Freeman's  general  position  is  sound;  if  history  is  to  become 
a  scientific  study  it  cannot  pick  and  choose  periods  or  episodes, 
but  must  take  into  consideration  all  the  facts,  not  merely  such 
as  are  subjectively  interesting  to  a  given  individual.  Never- 
theless, Freeman  failed  to  live  up  to  the  principle  of  continuity 
as  set  forth  by  himself.  It  turns  out  to  be  European  history 
only  that  he  has  in  mind ;  this,  he  says,  ' '  forms  one  whole  in  the 
strictest  sense,  but  between  European  and  Asiatic  history  the 
connexion  is  only  occasional  and  incidental. "  54  ' '  While  we  claim 
the  records  of  Athenian  archons  and  Roman  consuls  as  essen- 
tially parts  of  the  same  tale  as  the  records  of  Venetian  doges 
and  English  kings,  we  welcome  the  recovered  records  of  the 
Accadian.  the  Assyrian,  and  the  Hittite,  as  materials  for  a  high 
and  worthy  study,  but  for  a  study  which  is  not  our  own."  55 

Almost  as  Freeman  was  speaking,  however,  a  younger  con- 
temporary at  Oxford  had  advanced  to  the  position  that  "in  the 
relation  of  Egypt  and  Persia  to  Greece,  of  Greece  to  Rome,  of 
Rome  to  the  nations  of  modern  Europe,  we  see  a  continuity  and 
a  succession  which  we  do  not  find  in  the  remoter  East.  They 
have  handed  on  to  one  another  the  lamp  of  civilization ;  Egypt, 
Persia,  Greece,  and  Rome  have  perished,  but  each  in  dying  has 
given  life  to  its  successor.  China  and  India  neither  live  nor 
die."56  Caird,  at  the  same  period,  recognized  the  continuity 
between  the  nations  of  the  Nearer  East  and  of  Europe,  but 
"outside  the  pale  of  civilization"  could  see  only  men  and  races 
that  had  ' '  no  history  any  more  than  herds  of  cattle. ' ' 5T 

By  such  steps,  in  the  thirty  years  that  have  elapsed  since 
Freeman  wrote,  has  the  principle  of  continuity  been  extended, 


'modern'  period  to  begin  with  the  first  beginnings  of  the  recorded 
history  of  Aryan  Europe."  The  Methods  of  Historical  Study  (London, 
1886),  pp.  22,  28. 

The  views  of  Freeman  and  Stubbs  on  'cycles'  might  also  be  profit- 
ably compared. 

s*  Comparative  Politics,  as  cited,  p.  215. 
i      £5  Methods,  as  cited,  p.  29. 

B«D.  G.  Ritchie,  "The  Rationality  of  History,"  in  Essays  in  Philo- 
sophical Criticism,  ed.  by  Andrew  Seth  and  R.  B.  Haldane  (London,  1883), 
p.  147. 

ST  John  Caird,  University  Addresses  (Glasgow,  1899),  pp.  268,  260-61. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  235 

until  today  it  covers  the  "break"  between  "historical"  and 
"unhistorieal"  times  and  peoples.  The  argument  for  discon- 
tinuity is,  however,  still  maintained,  though  it  no  longer  turns 
upon  supernatural  interventions;  it  upholds,  on  a  different  foot- 
ing, the  view  that  ' '  history ' '  is  restricted  to  the  period  for  which 
written  documents  are  available,  or,  with  Professor  Bury,  dis- 
tinguishes between  a  hypothetical  "primitive  ultra-prehistoric 
period"  in  which  man  was  dominated  mechanically  by  his 
physical  environment,  and  the  historical  period,  in  which  the 
problem  has  become  that  of  the  interrelation  of  human  wills.58 
Nevertheless,  the  enlargement  of  the  knowledge  of  classical  an- 
tiquity through  archaeological  discoveries  and  the  comparative 
study  of  institutions  has  actually  broken  down  the  "document- 
ary" limitation.  The  significance  of  "ancient"  history  for  the 
present  generation  lies  in  the  demonstration  it  provides  of  the 
artificiality  of  the  "break"  that  is  founded  upon  the  presence 
or  absence  of  a  particular  type  of  evidential  material.  The 
student  of  the  history  of  ancient  Greece  finds  "documents" 
everywhere — in  potsherds  and  stones,  misunderstood  allusions 
and  modern  survivals.  At  this  point,  moreover,  "history"  has 
been  brought  into  immediate  and  indeed  inseparable  connection 
with  the  work  of  that  great  group  of  scholars — Sir  Henry  Maine, 
Sir  Charles  Lyell,  Sir  John  Lubbock,  and  Sir  Edward  Tylor — 
who,  between  1861  and  1865,  established  the  foundations  of  the 
"comparative"  study  of  man. 

"While  the  principle  of  continuity  was  thus  enlarging  the 
general  scope  of  history,  in  its  application  to  the  history  of  indi- 
vidual countries  it  was  proving  equally  effective.  In  England, 
under  the  influence  of  the  Revolution  of  1688,  the  idea  emerged 
that  internal  political  changes  do  not  destroy  the  continuity  of 
national  existence.  In  Locke's  opinion  the  Revolution  was  a 
reformation  within  the  law,  not  a  breaking  of  legal  bonds.59 


ss  J.  B.  Bury,  ' '  Darwinism  and  History, ' '  in  Darwin  and  Modern 
Science,  ed.  by  A.  C.  Seward  (Cambridge,  1909),  p.  537. 

59  Sir  Frederick  Pollock,  Introduction  to  the  History  of  the  Science 
of  Politics  (London,  1890),  pp.  71-73.  Cf.  Eduard  Fueter,  Geschichte 
der  Neueren  Historiographie  (Miinchen,  1911),  p.  321:  "Er  hatte  ein 


236          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

Again,  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Burke,  stirred  by 
the  events  in  France,  expressed  the  view  that  societies  cannot 
make  a  clean  break  with  the  past,  "for  it  is  by  'the  discipline 
of  nature,'  as  it  operates  through  the  centuries,  and  not  by  the 
abrupt  initiatives  of  parties  to  an  explicit  contract,  that  peoples 
and  states  are  fashioned  and  perpetuated. ' ' 60  Thus  was  set 
up  the  theory  of  Romantic  historiography  of  "the  'soul  of  a 
people'  continuously  bodied  forth  in  its  customs,  laws,  religion, 
language,  art";61  and  the  influence  of  the  Romantic  theory  has 
been  to  give  history  a  fuller  content  by  gradually  extending  its 
purview  to  include  every  phase  of  the  social  activity  of  a  people. 

"History,"  Professor  Firth  says,  "is  not  easy  to  define;  but  to  me 
it  seems  to  mean  the  record  of  the  life  of  societies  of  men,  of  the 
changes  which  those  societies  have  gone  through,  of  the  ideas  which 
have  determined  the  actions  of  those  societies,  and  of  the  material 
conditions  which  have  helped  or  hindered  their  development."  62 

"Institutional,  economic,  social  development,  these  are  the  subjects 
that  excite  the  chief  interest  now. ' '  63 

"It  is  only  by  tracing  the  genesis  not  merely  of  culminating  events 
but  of  national  institutions,  and  by  exhibiting  them  as  the  outcome  and 
embodiment  of  the  genius  of  the  people  to  whom  they  belong,  that  in 
many  cases  they  can  be  made  intelligible.  This  principle  is  the  founda- 
tion of  the  historical  method."  64 

' '  D  'ailleurs  1  'histoire  ne  se  compose  pas  uniquement,  elle  ne  se  com- 
pose meme  pas  essentiellement  des  evenements  plus  ou  moins  dramatiques 
que  les  annalistes  et  les  historiens  d'autrefois  nous  ont  racontes;  elle 


Gefiihl  fur  historische  Kontinuitat.  Er  suchte  die  Theorien  der  englischen 
parlamentarischen  Juristen,  die  da  meinten,  sie  batten  nicht  eine  Revo- 
lution  gemacht,  sondern  bloss  das  alte  Recht  des  Landes  behauptet  oder 
wiederhergestellt,  in  geschichtliche  Anschauung  umzusetzen." 

«o  John  MacCunn,  The  Political  Philosophy  of  Burke  (London,  1913), 
p.  52.  'The  discipline  of  nature'  is  that  long  and  gradual  process  of 
historical  development  through  which  successive  generations  slowly  bring 
a  society  into  that  state  of  organization  in  which  the  varied  elements 
of  corporate  life  all  find  their  appropriate  place  and  function. 

si  Fueter,  as  cited,  speaks  of  Burke  as  "Der  erste  grosse  Theoretiker 
der  romantischen  Praskriptionslehre "  (p.  419);  and  as  "Ihr  haupt- 
sachlicher  Begriinder"  (p.  421). 

62  A   Plea   for   the   Historical    Teaching   of   History    (2d    ed.,    Oxford, 
1905),  p.  7. 

63  J.  H.  Eound,  "Historical  Research,"  Nineteenth  Century,  44  (1898), 
1013. 

«*  Viscount  Haldane,  The  Meaning  of  Truth  in  History  (London,  1914), 
p.  11. 


19161  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  237 

se  compose  aussi  de  tout  un  ensemble  d  'institutions,  de  coutumes  et  de 
lois,  de  manieres  de  vivre,  de  penser  et  de  sentir,  qui  constituent  la 
civilisation  des  di verses  epoques.  "65 

' '  L  'histoire  des  grands  hommes  et  des  guerres  a  regne  longtemps 
sans  conteste;  celle  des  institutions  politiques  -et  sociales  lui  a  succede, 
mais  elle  n'embrasse  encore  qu'un  champ  limite  de  1'activite  humaine 
et  si  1  'on  veut  arriver  a  cette  reconstruction  du  passe  dont  nous  parlions 
au  debut  de  ce  livre,  il  ne  faut  pas  s'interdire  1 'etude  des  aspects  qui 
sont  souvent  les  plus  caracteristiques  d'une  societe.  "66 

"Wir  verstehen  somit  unter  Geschichtswissenschaft  die  Wissenschaft 
von  den  Vorgangen  und  Veranderungen  unter  den  Menschen.  Es  miissten 
folglich  alle  Betatigungen  der  Menschen  in  den  Kreis  der  geschichtlichen 
Betrachtung  gezogen  werden. "  "  Diese  Beschrankung  des  Geschichts- 
begriffs  auf  die  Menschen  als  politische  Wesen,  .  .  .  die  man  oft  aus- 
gesprochen  findet,  ist  zu  eng. ' '  67 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  idea  of  "continuity"  as  applied 
to  history  has  proved  to  be  a  principle  of  genuine  importance; 
it  has  brought  us  back,  after  so  long  a  circuit,  to  the  view  of 
Diodorus  and  the  Stoics  that  "all  men  living,  or  who  once  lived, 
belong  to  the  common  human  family  though  divided  from  one 
another  by  time  and  space. " 68  It  has  broken  down  the  barriers 
that  limited  "history"  to  certain  political  divisions  of  Europe, 
and,  indeed,  to  the  actions  of  a  restricted  number  of  individuals 
in  these  countries.  As  a  result,  history  today  includes  not  alone 
every  manifestation  of  political  activity  among  men,  but  the 
entire  range  of  human  experience. 

Nevertheless,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  though  the  prin- 
ciple of  continuity  has  removed  an  obstacle  in  the  way  of  history 
becoming  a  science,  though  it  has  created  an  inclusiveness  of 
outlook  without  which  a  science  of  history  could  not  be  built  up, 
yet  this  principle  cannot  of  itself  be  said  to  have  converted  his- 
tory into  a  science.  After  the  belief  in  "breaks"  has  been 
abandoned,  the  conception  of  history  that  men  derive  from  the 


65  Gabriel  Monod,  "Histoire,"  in  De  la  methode  dans  les  sciences  (2* 
ed.,  Paris,  1910),  pp.  383-84. 

06  G.  Desdevises  du  Dezert  &  L.  Brehier,  Le  travail  historique  (Paris, 
1913),  p.  70. 

67  Aloys  Meister,  Grundziige  der  historischen  Methode  (2.  Aufl.,  Leipzig, 
1913),  p.  1. 

68  Tr.   in   J.   B.   Bury,  Ancient   Greek   Historians    (New   York,   1909), 
p.  235. 


238          University  of  Calif ornia  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

further  insistence  upon  the  idea  of  continuity  is  that  of  "  a  series 
involving  an  uninterrupted  succession  of  terms,"  "a  represen- 
tation of  a  number  of  objects  moving  successively  before  the  eye, 
like  the  impression  obtained  by  making  a  voyage  along  a  river, 
or  like  a  journey  through  a  country."69  As  Molinier  re- 
marks: "L'histoire  est  pour  ainsi  dire  un  tissu  sans  fin,  un 
enchevetrement  de  trames  compliquees,  et  toute  coupure  dans 
ce  vaste  ensemble  est  forcement  arbitraire. " 70  In  brief,  the 
theory  of  "continuity"  represents  an  adherence  to  the  view 
which  regards  history  as  an  unbroken  after-one-another  succes- 
sion of  events,  a  single  stream  of  which  scholarship  is  to  trace 
the  course,  a  unique  carpet  whose  unfinished  pattern  the  in- 
vestigator is  to  detect  upon  the  loom  of  Time  71 — the  view  that 
brings  history  into  affiliation  with  philosophy  and  effectually 
interposes  a  barrier  to  its  becoming  a  science. 


6»  Sir    G.    C.    Lewis,   A    Treatise   on    the   Methods   of    Observation    and 
Seasoning  in  Politics    (London,   1852),   I,   301. 

70  Auguste   Molinier,   Les  sources  de   I  'histoire  de  France.     V.      Intro- 
duction generale   (Paris,  1904),  p.  ii. 

71  Of.  J.  B.  Bury,  ' '  The  Place  of  Modern  History, ' '  as  cited,  p.  152. 


I916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  239 


V 
HISTORY  AND  EVOLUTION 

1 

The  methodological  principle  accepted  generally  by  historical 
students  in  the  nineteenth  century  was  expressed  in  the  formula 
that  the  aim  of  the  historian  is  to  state  what  it  was  that  acually 
took  place — in  other  words,  that  he  should  confine  himself  to 
the  presentation  of  concrete  individual  facts.  This  dictum  was 
not  based  upon  analysis  of  the  problems  of  historical  study,  but 
took  form  in  opposition  to  the  pragmatic  utilisation  of  historical 
materials.  The  new  policy  asserted  that  the  historian  should 
restrict  himself  to  setting  down  what  it  was  that  had  happened 
without  permitting  himself  to  introduce  moral  judgments  on 
the  actions  recorded  or  to  point  lessons  for  the  edification  of 
publicists  and  statesmen.  The  soundness  of  this  position  may 
well  seem  axiomatic,  but  what  seems  difficult  for  historians  to 
realize  is  that  the  procedure  advocated  leaves  the  actual  prob- 
lems of  historiography  wholly  untouched.  As  a  consequence, 
"history"  still  remains  identified  with  narrative,  and  the  func- 
tion of  historical  research  still  continues  to  be  the  preparation 
of  materials  for  the  use  of  the  history-writer.  The  investigator 
is  left  to  occupy  himself  with  the  determination  of  isolated  facts, 
while  the  historiographer  fits  the  details  into  a  philosophical 
framework.  If,  however,  "history"  is  to  become  a  scientific 
pursuit,  a  clear-cut  distinction  must  be  made  between  histori- 
ography and  historical  inquiry.  The  distinction  should  occasion 
no  difficulty,  but  historical  inquiry  cannot  be  placed  upon  a 
scientific  basis  so  long  as  it  remains  dependent  upon  history- 
writing  and  continues  to  be  occupied  with, the  mere  determina- 
tion of  individual  facts. 

"What  would  appear  to  be  a  fundamental  difficulty  in  the 
way  of  "history"  becoming  a  science  is  the  fact  that  the  word 


240          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

"history"  does  not  denote  a  subject-matter.  It  is  true  that  in 
ordinary  usage  a  political  content  is  read  into  the  word.  This 
limitation,  however,  does  not  accord  with  the  views  of  con- 
temporary scholars,  who  take  it  to  include  everything  that  affects 
civilized  man  in  his  social  relations;  and  if  an  examination  be 
made  of  the  "histories"  written  since  the  time  of  Herodotus  a 
continual  shifting  of  emphasis  in  their  content  will  be  observed. 
So,  while  later  writers  omit  the  record  of  meteorological 
phenomena  which  are  so  prominent  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  Chronicle, 
there  has  been  a  notable  tendency  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  his- 
torical writings  by  the  introduction  of  details  in  regard  to  the 
literary  and  artistic  achievements  of  the  people  concerned.  To- 
day, moreover,  there  is  much  uncertainty  as  to  what  relation 
should  subsist  between  "History"  and  the  subjects  designated 
"economic  history,"  "military  history,"  "the  history  of  civili- 
sation, ' '  and  the  other  special  histories  of  art,  literature,  religion, 
philosophy,  and  science.  Each  of  these  fields,,  apparently,  tends 
more  and  more  to  be  appropriated  by  an  independent  discipline, 
and  so  it  has  been  asked  whether  it  only  requires  that  political 
history  should  be  taken  over  by  Political  Science  to  leave  the 
"historian"  without  an  occupation. 

There  is,  too,  another  side  to  the  question.  The  historian, 
vacillating  and  uncertain  as  he  may  be  in  regard  to  the  subject- 
content  of  "history,"  has,  on  the  other  hand,  an  absolute  con- 
fidence in  the  "historical  method."  He  feels,  in  short,  that 
he  is  called  upon  to  emphasise  the  "historical"  aspect — the 
sequence  in  time,  the  after-one-another  relation — of  happenings, 
and  to  show  how  one  particular  event  has  come  to  follow  upon 
its  predecessor.  It  is  evident,  indeed,  that  a  scientific  value  is 
thought  by  the  historian  to  attach  to  the  chronological  enumer- 
ation of  events,  and  it  may  reasonably  be  inferred  that  he  holds 
to  the  term  "history"  in  preference  to  adopting  a  name  for  his 
subject-matter  because  his  chief  interest  lies  in  the  ordered 
presentation  of  sequences  of  happenings.  The  conception  which 
the  historian  seeks  to  maintain  is  that  events  have  taken  place 
in  the  past,  and  that  the  function  of  "history"  is  to  state  how 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  241 

these  events  have  followed  one  another  in  time.  It  is,  on  the 
other  hand,  only  necessary  to  examine  the  products  of  a  century 
of  historical  study  to  see  that  this  method  cannot  lead  to  scien- 
tific results.  The  statement  that  such  and  such  events  happened 
is  admittedly  the  work  of  the  annalist ;  the  historian  proper  comes 
in  to  supply  the  connecting  links,  to  show  how  the  particular 
event  followed  upon  its  antecedents.  The  explanation  provided 
is  based  upon  the  assumption  that  every  human  action  has  a 
motive;  and  each  action  in  history  is  explained  by  the  interpola- 
tion of  motives  which  inferentially  led  to  the  particular  event.1 
Again,  the  annalist  continues  his  record  indefinitely  both  as  re- 
gards time  and  the  nature  of  the  incidents,  and  his  work  may 
be  extended  without  inconsistency  by  any  number  of  continu- 
ators.  On  the  other  hand,  the  historian  aims  at  a  unity,  and 
this  unity  is  created  either  by  an  emotional  realization  or  a 
philosophical  conception  of  the  significance  of  a  given  event  or 
of  an  extended  series  of  happenings.  Clearly,  then,  "History" 
is  the  name,  not  of  a  scientific  subject,  but  of  a  literary  form  or 
genre,  and  as  such  may  be  grouped  writh  Poetry  and  Drama ; 
indeed,  one  may  say  that  confusion  would  be  avoided  if  this 
type  of  literature  were  designated  ' '  Story ' '  - — at  least,  the  ques- 
tion "Is  Story  Science?"  would  not  then  be  likely  to  arise. 

It  should  now  be  possible  to  see  the  question  ' '  whether  history 
is  capable  of  scientific  treatment ' '  in  its  proper  light.  ' '  History ' ' 
— the  statement  of  an  indeterminable  number  of  concrete  indi- 
vidual cases — is  not,  and  cannot  be  converted  into  a  science.  If, 
however,  the  question  be  restated  in  the  form:  "whether  the 
processes  manifested  in  the  concrete  instances  of  history  may 
be  investigated  in  accordance  with  the  method  of  science?"  a 
wholly  different  reply  may  be  anticipated.  Every  object  we  look 
out  upon,  as  every  idea  we  entertain,  has  a  history,  and  the  fact 
that  this  history  is  unrecorded  in  writing  does  not  negative  the 
statement  that  the  object  considered  has  come  to  be  as  it  is 


1  Cf.    William   Cunningham,   Politics   and   Economics    (London,    1885), 
p.  11. 

2  Story  <  storie  <  estoire  <  Mstoria.      Cf .    ' '  Story    of    the    Nations ' ' 
series. 


242          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

through  changes  it  has  undergone  in  the  course  of  time.  This 
point  of  view  applies  equally  to  the  earth  and  all  its  physical 
features,  the  forms  of  life  upon  the  globe,  and  the  acquirements 
of  man.  Astronomy,  Geology,  and  Biology  are  historical  sciences, 
and,  although  they  have  no  written  documents  upon  which  to 
base  narratives  furnished  with  names  and  dates,  their  efforts 
to  show  how  the  things  with  which  they  respectively  deal  have 
come  to  be  as  they  are  have  been  justified  by  the  results  obtained. 
Here,  then,  the  student  of  the  history  of  man,  forced  to  abandon 
the  non-scientific  procedure  of  attempting  to  state  "just  what 
it  was  that  took  place,"  may  find  for  his  guidance  a  scientific 
procedure  already  tested  and  approved.  Looking  out  upon  the 
world  he  may  see  men  constituted  like  himself,  but  employing 
different  languages,  entertaining  different  ideas,  and  living  under 
different  institutions,  and  the  problem  that  presents  itself  is  how 
all  these  have  come  to  be  as  we  now  find  them. 


2 

There  are  many  historical  sciences,  but  each  of  them  faces 
an  identical  problem.  Astronomy  and  Geology,  Biology  and  the 
Science  of  Man,  set  up  the  same  question  and  answer  it  writh  the 
same  word — "Evolution." 

The  wide  currency  of  this  term  in  recent  ye.ars  has  led  to 
not  a  little  ambiguity  in  the  meaning  attached  to  it.  Conse- 
quently, "it  must  be  borne  in  mind,"  as  J.  A.  Thomson  says, 
"that  the  general  idea  of  organic  evolution — that  the  present 
is  the  child  of  the  past — is  in  great  part  just  the  idea  of  human 
history  projected  upon  the  natural  world."3  "When  applied 
to  the  development  of  conscious  and  social  phenomena."  Under- 
bill remarks,  "it  is  very  hard  to  distinguish  Evolution  from 
what  our  forefathers  called  history."4  "I  take  it,"  Wood- 
bridge  says,  "that  the  term  'evolution,'  in  so  far  as  it  indicates 


s  Darwin  and  Modern  Science,  ed.  by  A.  C.  Seward  (Cambridge,  1909), 
p.  6. 

4  G.  E.  Underbill,  in  Personal  Idealism,  ed.  by  Henrv  Sturt  (London, 
1902),  p.  219. 


19163  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  243 

any  natural  fact,  indicates  initially  no  more  than  the  fact  that 
things  have  a  past,  that  they  have  a  history. ' ' 5  Nevertheless, 
there  is  a  significant  difference  in  the  meaning  of  the  two  words, 
for  in  all  its  various  uses  "evolution"  never  loses  the  suggestion 
of  process,  and  this  "history"  never  gains.  The  historian  states 
single  instances;  the  evolutionist  investigates  the  processes  man- 
ifested in  any  history.  "Evolution"  and  "history"  thus  deal 
with  the  same  facts;  and,  succinctly,  the  word  "evolution"  stands 
for  the  scientific  investigation  of  what  the  historian  sets  down. 
In  the  long  chain  of  happenings,  the  historian  undertakes  to 
relate  the  details  of  one  or  another  prominent  incident  that  still- 
existing  records  enable  him  to  describe;  the  evolutionist,  on  the 
other  hand,  endeavors  to  determine  what  the  processes  are  by 
which  the  object  before  him  has  come  to  be  as  it  is.  The 
historian,  from  the  materials  at  hand,  sets  himself  tn  w****  pip- 
tures  of  long-past  happenings  in  the  lives  of  men ;  the  evolutionist 
looks  upon  everything  around  him  as  having  come  into  existence 
through  the  operation  of  processes  which  are  still  going  on. 

An  analogue,  seemingly  closer  than  "history,"  of  the  word 
"evolution,"  is  the  word  "progress."  Actually,  the  modern  doc- 
trines of  evolution  originated  in  eighteenth-century  theories  of 
"progress,"0  and  these  theories  sprang  from  the  desire  of  men 
like  Condorcet  to  discover  a  meaning  in  the  world  around  them.7 
The  words  "evolution"  and  "progress"  are,  however,  by  no 
means  equivalent,  for  the  latter  definitely  connotes  betterment 
and  perfectibility.  As  used  in  biology,  the  term  "evolution"  is 
practically  synonymous  with  the  theory  of  descent,  and  means 
simply  that  living  species  of  plants  and  animals  are  descended 
from  earlier  forms  and  do  not  owe  their  origin  to  special  acts 
of  creation.  "Progress,"  on  the  other  hand,  implies  a  judgment 
of  value ;  "  it  assumes  a  standard — some  end  or  ends,  by  relation 


sF.  J.  E.  Woodbridge,  "Evolution,"  Philosophical  Review,  21  (1912), 
137. 

e  Patrick  Geddes  &  J.  A.  Thomson,  Evolution  (New  York,  1911), 
pp.  x-xi. 

7  On  the  history  of  the  idea  of  "progress"  see  Jules  Delvaille,  Essai 
sur  1'histoire  de  I 'idee  de  progres  (Paris,  1910). 


244          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

to  which  we  judge  historical  movements  and  declare  that  they 
mean  progress."  8  Quite  truly  "it  imparts  to  history  an  intenser 
meaning,"  and  leads  us  "to  conceive  the  short  development  which 
is  behind  us  and  the  long  development  which  is  before  us  as 
coherent  parts  of  a  whole";8  but  this  interest  in  values  and 
ends,  this  imaginative  projection  of  the  course  of  history — past, 
present,  and  to  come — which  Professor  Bury  contemplates,  is 
not  science,  it  is  philosophy.10  Indeed,  the  idea  of  progress  holds 
a  commanding  place  in  the  ' '  philosophy  of  history, ' ' 1X  and  the 
formulation  of  a  theory  of  progress  is  the  aim  of  the  branch 
of  philosophy  known  as  Sociology.12  It  should,  in  addition,  be 
noticed  by  the  historical  student,  that  as  the  idea  of  ' '  evolution ' ' 


s  J.  B.  Bury,  The  Ancient  Greek  Historians  (New  York,  1909),  p.  256. 

9  Bury,  as  cited. 

10  That    Professor   Bury   is    not   alone   in    this    respect    may    be    seen 
from  the  following  remarks  of  Bishop  Creighton:    "We  search  the  records 
of  the   past   of   mankind,   in   order   that  we   may  learn   wisdom   for   the 
present,  and  hope  for  the  future.  .  .   .  We  are  bound  to  assume  ...   a 
progress   in   human   affairs.      This   progress   must   inevitably   be   towards 
some  end;   and  we  find  it  difficult  to  escape  the  temptation,  while  we 
keep  that   end  in  view,   of  treating  certain   events   as   great   landmarks 
on  the  road.     A  mode  of  historical  presentation  thus  comes  into  fashion 
based   upon   an   inspiring   assumption."     Mandell   Creighton,   "Introduc- 
tory Note,"  Cambridge  Modern  History  (New  York,  1902),  I,  4. 

11  "The  growth  of  history  towards  a  scientific  stage  has  been  partly 
the  consequence  and  partly  the   cause   of  the  growth   of  certain   ideas, 
without  a  firm  and  comprehensive  grasp  of  which  no  philosophical  study 
or  conception  of  history  is  possible.  .  .  .  One  of  the  most  important  of 
the   ideas   referred   to   is   that   of   progress.      The   philosophy   of   history 
deals  not  exclusively  but  to  a  great  extent  with  laws  of  progress,  with 
laws  of  evolution;  and  until  the  idea  of  progress  was  firmly  and  clearly 
apprehended,  little  could  be  done  in  it."     Kobert  Flint,  Historical  Philo- 
sophy in  France  (New  York,  1894),  pp.  87-88. 

"La  loi  de  1 'evolution  est  1'objet  principal  de  la  philosophic  de 
1  'histoire.  Mais  ce  qui  nous  preoccupe  d  'une  fac.on  particuliere,  c  'est 
la  loi  de  1 'evolution  qualifiee  ou  subjective.  Autrement  dit:  la  loi  du 
progres.  Les  hommes,  au  risque  meme  de  se  trouver  en  contradiction  avec 
la  methode  objective,  aspirent  au  bonheur. ' '  Charles  Rappoport,  La 
philosophic  de  I 'histoire  comme  science  de  I 'evolution  (Paris,  n.  d.),  p.  24. 

12  "The  study  of  sociology  .  .  .  can  hardly  justify  its  existence  unless 
it  furnishes  us  a  theory  of  progress  which  will   enable  us  to  shape  the 
policies  of  society  with  a  view  to  future  improvement.     In  other  words, 
the  fundamental  task  of  the  sociologist  is  to  furnish  a  theory  of  social 
progress."     T.  N.  Carver,  Sociology  and  Social  Progress   (Boston,  1905), 
p.  7. 

' '  Sociology  .  .  .  must  offer  a  theory  of  progress  if  it  is  not  to  be 
an  abortive  affair,  but  to  take  its  place  among  the  living  sciences  vitally 
related  to  human  life  and  destiny.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  majority 
of  sociologists  from  Comte  down  have  made  the  problem  of  progress 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  245 

sprang  from  that  of  "progress,"  and  represents  the  attempt  to 
utilize  this  conception  for  scientific  purposes,  where  this  utiliza- 
tion has  not  been  made  complete,  "evolution"  must  remain  ex- 
posed to  the  teleological  implications  which  constitute  the  effective 
element  in  the  idea  of  ' '  progress. ' ' 

Having  thus  distinguished  between  the  terms  "evolution" 
and  "progress,"  the  historical  student  should  discriminate  be- 
tween the  scientific  application  of  the  idea  of  evolution  and  its 
place  in  philosophy.  Thus  constructively — as  it  is  the  business 
of  the  philosopher  to  discover  the  traits  common  to  all  phenomena, 
to  find  the  common  law  or  universal  synthesis  of  things — Herbert 
Spencer  attempted  to  formulate  a  universal  "law  of  evolu- 
tion."13 On  the  other  hand,  Taylor,  addressing  himself  to  the 
criticism  of  the  idea,  points  out  that  as  "the  infinite  individual 
whole  of  existence  has  no  environment  outside  itself  to  supply 
conditions  of  development  and  incentives  to  change,"  "the  in- 
finite whole  evolves  neither  forward  nor  backward. "  14  It  is,  for 


the  central  and  highest  problem  of  their  science. "  C.  A.  Ellwood, 
Sociology  in  its  Psychological  Aspects  (New  York,  1912),  p.  366. 

"Si  la  philosophic  a  pour  champ  d 'etude  le  probleme  metaphysique 
du  progres  cosmique  ...  la  sociologie,  pour  sa  part,  ne  s'inquiete  que 
du  progres  specifiquement  humain.  Pour  nous,  comme  pour  Comte  et 
Wundt,  la  philosophic  consiste  a  systematiser  le  savoir  total  du  genre 
humain.  .  .  .  Depuis  que,  avec  Comte,  la  sociologie  s'est  affirmee  comme 
une  branche  particuliere  de  la  philosophic,  son  existence  se  justifie  en 
tant  que  philosophie  de  la  societe  et  elle  ne  finira  qu'avec  la  culture 
elle-meme:  seul,  le  dernier  homme  sur  la  terre  sera  le  dernier  sociologue. " 
Ludwig  Stein,  "La  philosophie  du  progres,"  Annales  de  I'Institut  inter- 
national de  Sociologie,  14  (1912),  484.  Barth,  as  is  well  known,  identifies 
sociology  with  Philosophy  of  History;  see  his  Die  Philosophic  der 
Geschichte  als  Sociologie  (2.  Aufl.,  Leipzig,  1915). 

is  "The  aim  of  Darwin  is  a  theory  of  species,  of  Spencer  a  doctrine 
of  cosmical  progress.  .  .  .  The  theory  of  Darwin  accounts  for  the  genesis 
of  natural  kinds  through  adaptation  to  environment  in  virtue  of  natural 
selection  under  the  conditions  of  the  struggle  for  existence:  Spencer's 
'synthetic  system'  explains  the  world  and  life  on  the  basis  of  'the  con- 
tinuous redistribution  of  matter  and  motion. '  .  .  .  The  Spencerian  philo- 
sophy ...  is  so  inclusive  in  its  scope  that  the  synthesis  undertaken 
involves  from  time  to  time  the  transcending  of  the  limits  of  phenomenal 
inquiry. "  A.  C.  Armstrong,  Transitional  Eras  in  Thought  (New  York, 
1904),  pp.  160-161.  » 

!4  A.  E.  Taylor,  The  Elements  of  Metaphysics  (London,  1903),  p.  273. 
"In  short,"  W.  T.  Marvin  remarks,  "we  can  talk  of  sidereal  or  solar 
evolution,  of  human  or  social  evolution,  of  the  evolution  of  the  chemical 
atom,  but  let  us  give  up,  once  for  all,  talking  about  world-evolution." 
An  Introduction  to  Systematic  Philosophy  (New  York,  1903),  p.  316. 


246          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

all  practical  purposes,  sufficient  for  the  scientific  investigator  to 
comprehend  the  nature  of  these  discussions,  to  understand  that 
they  lie  wholly  outside  his  own  field,  and  to  realize  that  ultimately 
they  turn  upon  the  results  of  his  own  labors.  Even  to  take 
cognizance  of  them  will,  however,  lead  the  scientific  student  to 
see,  more  clearly  than  would  otherwise  be  the  case,  the  bearings 
of  his  own  efforts;  and  to  understand  the  importance  of  dis- 
tinguishing, in  its  present  instance,  between  ' '  history, ' '  the  series 
of  actual  concrete  happenings;  "history"  or  "historiography," 
the  statement  of  certain  cases  regarded  as  of  importance  by  a 
given  individual  writer ;  and  ' '  evolution, "  "  history ' '  viewed  as 
the  manifestation  of  constant  processes  which  it  is  the  work  of 
science  to  determine  and  describe. 


3 

"Evolution"  is  the  name  given  to  the  process-content  of  any 
history.  Now,  a  history  can  only  be  stated  in  detail,  and  that 
by  the  chronological  enumeration  of  its  particulars,  but  an  evo- 
lution, as  Darwin  showed,  may  be  brought  within  the  scope  of 
scientific  method.  An  idea  commonly  entertained  of  Darwin  is 
that  he  "proved"  Evolution.  What  he  actually  established— 
in  contradistinction  to  the  old  conception  that  every  species  was 
the  result  of  a  separate  act  of  creation — was  the  view  that 
"new"  forms  of  life  emerge  from  the  old  by  an  orderly  process 
of  which  the  factors  may  be  isolated  and  described.  It  has  been 
said  that  Darwin  projected  the  idea  of  human  history  upon  the 
world  of  nature,  but  it  was  never  his  purpose  to  write  a  "his- 
tory" fortified  with  names  and  dates.  He  may  indeed  have  seen 
in  the  past  a  vast  sequence  of  particular  events;  but  he  accom- 
plished the  intellectual  liberation  of  his  contemporaries,  not  by 
rehearsing  the  facts  of  this  sequence,  but  by  substituting  for 
the  theory  of  "special  creation"  a  hypothetical  statement  of 
the  process  by  which  "new"  species  had  their  origin.  His  great 
contribution  to  biological  science  was  the  hypothesis  of  Natural 
Selection,  and  the  investigator  of  another  evolution  will  turn 


1916J  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  247 

with  interest  to  examine  the  steps  by  which  he  arrived  at  results 
of  such  importance  in  the  history  of  ideas. 

In  turning  to  consider  Darwin's  method,  it  may  be  pointed 
out  that  such  training  as  he  appears  to  have  received  before  he 
joined  the  Beagle  was  under  the  direction  of  men  whose  attitude, 
like  that  of  the  modern  historical  scholar,  may  be  described  as 
a  devotion  to  the  ' '  fact ' '  in  and  for  itself.  The  biologists  of 
Darwin's  youth  recommended  their  students,  as  did  Cuvier,  "to 
confine  themselves  solely  to  the  exposition  of  positive  facts  with- 
out attempting  to  draw  from  them  inductions."  The  geologists 
of  the  same  period  "lived  under  the  spell  of  that  strong  reaction 
against  speculation  which  followed  the  bitter  controversy  be- 
tween the  Neptunists  and  Plutonists  in  the  earlier  decades  of 
the  century.  They  considered  themselves  bound  to  search  for 
facts,  not  to  build  up  theories. ' ' 15 

While  this  was  the  prevailing  attitude  towards  investigation, 
it  had  come  to  be  recognised  that  the  earth  and  the  forms  of  life 
upon  it  had  not  always  been  as  they  are  today,  and,  further, 
that  in  the  present  status  of  inorganic  and  organic  nature  there 
are  discernible  evidences  of  changes  which  had  taken  place  in 
the  past.  It  was  at  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  that 
William  Smith  established  the  historical  character  of  geology  by 
his  discovery  not  merely,  as  had  been  demonstrated  earlier,  that 
the  stratified  rocks  occur  in  a  definite  sequence,  but  that  each 
stratum  may  be  distinguished  by  the  fossils  peculiar  to  itself 
which  it  contains.  This  great  discovery  "showed  that  within 
the  crust  lie  the  chronicles  of  a  long  history  of  plant  and  animal 
life  upon  this  planet,  it  supplied  the  means  of  arranging  the 
materials  for  this  history  in  true  chronological  sequence,  and  it 
thus  opened  out  a  magnificent  vista  through  a  vast  series  of 
ages,  each  marked  by  its  own  distinctive  types  of  organic  life, 
which,  in  proportion  to  their  antiquity,  departed  more  and  more 
from  the  aspect  of  the  living  world."16  Biology,  no  less  than 
geology,  it  will  be  observed,  \\-as  thus  placed  upon  an  historical 


i?  Sir  Archibald  Geikie,  Landscape  in  History,  and  other  Essays  (Lon- 
don, 1905),  p.  175. 

16  Geikie,  as  cited,  p.  169. 


248          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

footing.  Linnaeus,  in  working  out  his  classification  for  the  sys- 
tematic description  of  existing  plants  and  animals,  had  arranged 
these  in  an  order  from  the  simplest  forms  to  the  most  complex. 
The  new  science  of  historical  geology,  comparing  this  classifica- 
tion of  existing  species  with  the  time-order  of  appearance  of 
species  revealed  in  the  rocks,  reached  the  conclusion  that  the 
systematic  arrangement  from  simplest  to  most  complex  repre- 
sented an  historical  sequence  from  earliest  to  most  recent. 

Darwin  wrote:  "For  my  part,  following  out  Ly ell's  metaphor,  I  look 
at  the  natural  geological  record,  as  a  history  of  the  world  imperfectly 
kept,  and  written  in  a  changing  dialect;  of  this  history  we  possess  the 
last  volume  alone,  relating  only  to  two  or  three  countries.  Of  this 
volume,  only  here  and  there  a  short  chapter  has  been  preserved;  and 
of  each  page,  only  here  and  there  a  few  lines.  Each  word  of  the  slowly- 
changing  language,  in  which  the  history  is  written,  being  more  or  less 
different  in  the  successive  chapters,  may  represent  the  apparently 
abruptly  changed  forms  of  life,  entombed  in  our  consecutive,  but  widely 
separated,  formations. "  " 

The  principle  of  comparison  thus  established  in  regard  to  the 
whole  series  of  life-forms  had  been  recognised  earlier  in  the  study 
of  morphology.  Buffon  had  been  led  by  comparison  of  the  struc- 
ture of  different  species  to  observe  that  animals  carry  with  them 
internal  evidence  that  they  "are  no  longer  what  they  formerly 
were."  "The  pig,"  he  said,  "is  a  compound  of  other  animals; 
it  has  evidently  useless  parts,  or  rather  parts  of  which  it 
cannot  make  any  use,  toes  all  the  bones  of  which  are  perfectly 
formed,  and  which,  nevertheless,  are  of  no  service  to  it."18  So 
by  tracing  the  structural  similarities  of  closely  allied  groups, 
by  demonstrating  the  fundamental  likeness  of  structures  used  for 
different  purposes,  and  by  pointing  out  the  prevalence  of  vestigial 
remains,  comparative  anatomy  had  brought  to  light  the  exist- 
ence of  evidence  in  living  forms  of  changes  which  they  had 
undergone  in  the  past.  Similarly,  the  comparative  study  of 
embryology  had  arrived  at  the  "recapitulation  theory,"  in  which 


IT  Origin  of  Species   (London,  1909),  p.  271. 

18  Quoted  in  H.  F.  Osborn,  From  the  Greeks  to  Darwin   (2d  ed.,  New 
York,  1905),  p.  132. 


19161  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  249 

the  striking  resemblances  between  the  embryos  of  higher  and  the 
adult  forms  of  lower  animals  were  interpreted  as  evidence  that 
the  embryos  of  higher  animals  recapitulated  in  their  life-history 
the  series  of  ancestral  forms  through  which  the  species  had  passed. 
Furthermore,  before  Darwin's  time,  the  methodological  prin- 
ciple through  which  these  different  series  of  historical  facts  were 
to  be  brought  within  the  scope  of  scientific  method  had  been  laid 
down  by  the  Scotch  geologist  James  Hutton.19  "With  the  in- 
tuition of  genius,"  Geikie  says,  "Hutton  early  perceived  that 
the  only  solid  basis  from  which  to  explore  what  has  taken  place 
in  bygone  time  is  a  knowledge  of  what  is  taking  place  today. 
He  felt  assured  that  Nature  must  be  consistent  and  uniform  in 
her  working,  and  that  only  in  proportion  as  her  operations  at 
the  present  time  are  watched  and  understood  will  the  ancient 
history  of  the  earth  become  intelligible.  Thus,  in  his  hands,  the 
investigation  of  the  Present  became  the  key  to  the  interpretation 
of  the  Past.  The  establishment  of  this  great  truth  was  the 
first  step  towards  the  inauguration  of  a  true  science  of  the 
earth. ' ' 20  Hutton  started  from  the  point  of  view  that  the  sur- 
face of  the  globe  has  not  always  been  as  it  is  today,  and  based 
his  inquiries  upon  the  principle  that  it  has  come  to  be  as  it  is 
through  the  continued  action  of  the  same  factors  of  change  that 
are  to  be  observed  in  operation  at  the  present  time;  "we  are," 
he  said,  "to  examine  the  construction  of  the  present  earth,  in 
order  to  understand  the  natural  operations  of  time  past."21 

' '  But  how, ' '  he  asks,  ' '  shall  we  describe  a  process  which  nobody 
has  seen  performed,  and  of  which  no  written  history  gives  any  account? 
This  is  only  to  be  investigated,  first,  in  examining  the  nature  of  those 
solid  bodies,  the  history  of  which  we  want  to  know;  and  2dly,  in  ex- 
amining the  natural  operations  of  the  globe,  in  order  to  see  if  there 
now  actually  exist  such  operations,  as,  from  the  nature  of  the  solid 
bodies,  appear  to  have  been  necessary  to  their  formation. "  22 


is  Hutton  was  born  in  1726  and  died  in  1797.  His  Theory  of  the 
Earth  was  read  before  the  Royal  Society  of  Edinburgh  in  1785,  and  was 
first  published  iji  its  Transactions,  vol.  1,  part  2,  I,  pp.  209-304. 

20  Geikie,  as  cited,  p.  171. 

21  Hutton,  as  cited,  p.  218. 
--  Hutton,  as  cited,  p.  219. 


250          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     T TOL.  4 

It  is  to  be  observed  that  Hutton  postulated  that  ' '  Time,  which 
measures  everything  in  our  idea,  and  is  often  deficient  to  our 
schemes,  is  to  nature  endless  and  as  nothing";23  and  adopted 
the  point  of  view  that  it  was  no  part  of  his  undertaking  to  con- 
sider " questions  as  to  the  origin  of  things."  "By  thus  placing 
his  theory  on  a  basis  of  actual  observation,  and  providing  in  the 
study  of  existing  operations  a  guide  to  the  interpretation  of  those 
in  past  times,  he  rescued  the  investigation  of  the  history  of  the 
earth  from  the  speculations  of  theologians  and  cosmologists,  and 
established  a  place  for  it  among  the  recognised  inductive  sci- 
ences."24 

Button's  contribution  received  scant  recognition  in  his  life- 
time, but  after  his  death  it  was  restated  by  his  friend  John  Play- 
fair  in  a  work  "which  for  luminous  treatment  and  graceful  dic- 
tion still  stands  without  a  rival  in  English  geological  litera- 
ture."25 From  Playfair  the  mantle  of  Hutton  descended  to  Sir 
Charles  Lyell,26  and  it  was  to  Lyell  that  Darwin  dedicated  the 
later  edition  of  the  Narrative  of  the  Voyage  of  the  Beagle  "as 
an  acknowledgement  that  the  chief  part  of  whatever  scientific 
merit  this  Journal  and  the  other  works  of  the  author  may  possess, 
has  been  derived  from  studying  the  well-known  and  admirable 
Principles  of  Geology." 

It  should,  therefore,  occasion  no  surprise  to  find  that  Darwin 's 
method  is  simply  that  of  Hutton  applied  to  a  new  field.  With 
the  fact  borne  in  upon  him  by  his  South  American  observations 
that  species  become  modified,  Darwin  consciously  put  aside  all 


23  Hutton,  as  cited,  p.  215. 

24  Geikie,  as  cited,  p.  173.  * 

25  Geikie,  as  cited,  p.  164. 

26  Lyell  wrote  in  1839:    "The  mottos  of  my  first  two  volumes  were 
especially  selected  from  Playfair 's  Huttonian  Theory,  because   although 
I  was   brought   round   slowly,   against   some   of   my   early   prejudices,   to 
adopt  Playf air's  doctrines  to  the  full  extent,  I  was  desirous  to  acknowl- 
edge his  and  Button's  priority,  and  I  have  a  letter  of  Basil  Hall's  in 
which   after  speaking  of  points  in  which   Hutton  approached   nearer  to 
my  doctrines  than  his  father,  Sir  James  Hall,  he  comments  on  the  man- 
ner  in   which    my   very   title-page    did    homage    to   the   Huttonians,   and 
complimented  me  for  thus  disavowing  all  pretensions  to  be  the  originator 
of  the  theory  of  the  adequacy  of  modern   causes. ' '     Life,  Letters,  and 
Journals  of  Sir  Charles  Lyell  (London,  1881),  II,  49. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  251 

questions  of  the  origin  of  life,  and  addressed  himself  to  the  in- 
vestigation of  the  changes  that  are  to  be  observed  between  suc- 
cessive generations  of  plants  and  animals  at  the  present  time. 
' '  After  my  return  to  England, ' '  he  wrote  in  his  Autobiography, 
"it  appeared  to  me  that  by  following  the  example  of  Lyell  in 
Geology,  and  by  collecting  all  facts  which  bore  in  any  way  on 
the  variation  of  animals  and  plants  under  domestication  and 
nature,  some  light  might  perhaps  be  thrown  on  the  whole  sub- 
ject."27 He  assumed,  as  Hutton  had  done,  that  Nature  was 
uniform  in  her  ways  of  working,  and  that  if  the  factors  in  the 
process  of  change  now  going  on  could  be  discovered  they  might 
with  confidence  be  taken  as  applicable  throughout  the  past.  He 
assumed,  in  short,  that  things  have  come  to  be  as  they  are  through 
the  continuous  operation  of  processes  that  are  now  to  be  observed 
in  nature. 

Darwin  found  it  impracticable  to  observe  changes  among 
animals  living  under  natural  conditions,  and  hence  his  investi- 
gations were  largely  concerned  with  ' '  domesticated  productions. ' ' 
He  soon  perceived  that  the  keystone  of  man's  success  in  making 
useful  races  of  animals  and  plants  was  the  selection  exercised  in 
breeding,  that  without  the  intelligent  interference  of  the  breeder 
there  would  be  no  new  race.  The  problem  then  presented  itself, 
and  remained  for  some  time  a  mystery  to  him,  how  selection 
could  be  applied  to  organisms  living  in  a  state  of  nature — in 
Weismann's  words,  "how  what  was  purposive  could  conceivably 
be  brought  about  without  the  intervention  of  a  directing  power. ' ' 
The  next  step  he  thus  describes:  "In  October,  1838,  that  is, 
fifteen  months  after  I  had  begun  my  systematic  enquiry,  I  hap- 
pened to  read  for  amusement  '  Malthus  on  Population, '  and  being 
well  prepared  to  appreciate  the  struggle  for  existence  which 
everywhere  goes  on  from  long-continued  observation  of  the 
habits  of  animals  and  plants,  it  at  once  struck  me  that  under 
these  circumstances  favourable  variations  would  tend  to  be  pre- 
served, and  unfavourable  ones  to  be  destroyed.  The  result  of 


27  Life  and  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin,  ed.  by  Francis  Darwin    (New 
York,  1889),  I,  67-68. 


252          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

this  would  be  the  formation  of  new  species.  Here  then  I  had  at 
last  got  a  theory  by  which  to  work."28 

"The  Darwinian  hypothesis,"  Huxley  said,  "has  the  merit 
of  being  eminently  simple  and  comprehensible  in  principle,  and 
its  essential  positions  may  be  stated  in  a  very  few  words:  all 
species  have  been  produced  by  the  development  of  varieties  from 
common  stocks,  by  the  conversion  of  these  first  into  permanent 
races  and  then  into  new  species,  by  the  process  of  natural  selec- 
tion, which  process  is  essentially  identical  with  that  artificial 
selection  by  which  man  has  originated  the  races  of  domestic  ani- 
mals^— the  struggle  for  existence  taking  the  place  of  man,  and 
exerting,  in  the  case  of  natural  selection,  that  selective  action 
which  he  performs  in  artificial  selection."29  In  Darwin's  state- 
ment :  "As  many  more  individuals  of  each  species  are  born  than 
can  possibly  survive ;  and  as,  consequently,  there  is  a-  frequently 
recurring  struggle  for  existence,  it  follows  that  any  being,  if  it 
vary  however  slightly  in  any  manner  profitable  to  itself,  under 
the  complex  and  sometimes  varying  conditions  of  life,  will  have  a 
better  chance  of  surviving,  and  thus  be  naturally  selected.  From 
the  strong  principle  of  inheritance,  any  selected  variety  will  tend 
to  propagate  its  new  and  modified  form. ' ' 30 

For  the  present  purpose  it  is  unnecessary  to  proceed  with 
an  analysis  of  Darwin's  hypothesis  or  to  follow  the  debates  to 
which  it  has  given  rise.31  Here  it  is  his  method  only  that  is 
of  moment.  The  problem  that  he  set  for  himself  was  to  discover 
how  "new"  species  arise,  and  the  hypothetical  element  in  his 
description  of  this  process  wras  the  role  he  assigned  to  "the  strug- 
gle for  existence."32  He  began,  as  we  have  seen,  by  attempt- 


28  Life  and  Letters,  as  cited,  I,  68. 

29  T.  H.  Huxley,  Lay  Sermons,  Addresses,  and  Reviews  (5th  ed.,  Lon- 
don, 1874),  p.  292. 

so  Darwin,  as  cited,  p.  16. 

si  See  V.  L.  Kellogg,  Darwinism  To-day  (New  York,  1907). 

32  ' '  The  only  element  of  theory  in  his  doctrine  of  evolution  by  natural 
selection  has  reference  to  the  degree  in  which  these  observable  facts, 
when  thus  brought  together,  are  adequate  to  account  for  the  process  of 
evolution."  G.  J.  Romanes,  Darwin  and  after  Darwin,  I  (Chicago,  1892), 
p.  264.  ' '  The  characteristic  feature  in  which  Natural  Selection  differs 
from  every  other  attempt  to  solve  the  problem  of  evolution  is  the  account 
taken  of  the  struggle  for  existence,  and  the  role  assigned  to  it. "  E.  B. 
Poulton,  Charles  Darwin  and  The  Origin  of  Species  (London,  1909),  p.  8. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  253 

ing  to  determine  the  factors  of  change  which  are  to  be  observed 
at  the  present  time;  he  investigated  change  in  the  Present  on 
the  methodological  assumption  that  the  processes  which  had  been 
in  operation  throughout  the  Past  were  still  active;  and,  haying 
arrived  at  his  hypothesis,  he  applied  it  to  the  Past  on  the  further 
assumption  that  "Time  is  to  nature  endless  and  as  nothing." 
The  outcome  of  Darwin's  work,  in  his  own  eyes,  was  the  demon- 
stration of  "how  things  had  come  to  be  as  they  are."  "It  is 
interesting,"  he  says  in  conclusion,  "to  contemplate  an  entangled 
bank,  clothed  with  many  plants  of  many  kinds,  with  birds  singing 
on  the  bushes,  with  various  insects  flitting  about,  and  with  worms 
crawling  through  the  damp  earth,  and  to  reflect  that  these  elab- 
orately constructed  forms,  so  different  from  each  other,  and 
dependent  on  each  other  in  so  complex  a  manner,  have  all  been 
produced  by  laws  acting  around  us.  These  laws,  taken  in  the 
largest  sense,  being  Growth  with  Reproduction;  Inheritance 
which  is  almost  implied  by  reproduction ;  Variability  from  the 
indirect  and  direct  action  of  the  external  conditions  of  life,  and 
from  use  and  disuse ;  a  Ratio  of  Increase  so  high  as  to  lead  to  a 
Struggle  for  Life,  and  as  a  consequence  to  Natural  Selection, 
entailing  Divergence  of  Character  and  the  Extinction  of  less- 
improved  forms.  Thus,  from  the  war  of  nature,  from  famine  and 
death,  the  most  exalted  object  which  we  are  capable  of  conceiv- 
ing, namely,  the  production  of  the  higher  animals,  directly  fol- 
lows." 33 


The  investigator  in  another  field  who  proposes  to  follow  the 
method  of  Hiitton  and  Darwin  must  be  prepared  to  conduct  his 
investigations  with  complete  independence  of  spirit.  Every  sci- 
ence must  formulate  its  own  hypotheses  in  its  own  terminology 
on  the  basis  of  its  own  material. 

"Each  science  is  but  an  aspect  of  the  whole,  a  pictured  facet  of 
Nature's  unity,  but  it  has  its  own  categories,  its  own  values.  No  one 
of  the  main  sciences  ...  is  intelligibly  reducible  into  the  concepts  of 


33  Darwin,  as  cited,  p.  413. 


254          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     !TOL- 4 

any  other,  those  of  mechanics,  physics,  chemistry,  despite  their  long 
exaggerated  pretensions,  as  little  as  any.  ...  So  then  for  biology.  Its 
theory  of  life,  of  evolution  must  be  in  its  own  terms,  of  function  and  form, 
and  free  therefore  from  absorption  into  the  lower  physical  order,  as  from 
exaggeration  into  the  higher  ethical  and  political  one. '  '34 

This  necessity  is  the  more  to  be  noted  since  the  stimulus  to 
thought,  and  the  impetus  to  biological  inquiry  occasioned  by 
Darwin's  hypothesis  have  tempted  some  theorists  to  assume  that 
Natural  Selection  is  a  universal  formula  applicable  to  every  evo- 
lution. Thus  J.  M.  Baldwin  says :  ' '  The  theory  of  natural  selec- 
tion is  to  be  accepted  not  merely  as  a  law  of  biology  as  such, 
but  as  a  principle  of  the  natural  world,  which  finds  appropriate 
application  in  all  the  sciences  of  life  and  mind."35  Now  the 
particular  evolution  investigated  by  Darwin  was  that  of  the 
physical  forms  of  animal  species ;  whereas  the  evolution  to  be 
considered  by  the  student  of  "history"  is  fundamentally  intel- 
lectual and  involves  the  purposive  activities  of  men.  Conse- 
quently, even  if  biologists  had  not  arrived  at  the  conclusion  that 
"Natural  Selection  has  long  since  ceased  to  be  the  dominant 
factor  in  human  progress, " 36  it  might  properly  be  inferred 
that  the  terms  descriptive  of  the  one  would  not  be  applicable 
to  the  other.  There  is  a  special  reason,  however,  why  the  student 
of  "history"  should  be  on  his  guard  against  adopting  the  term- 
inology of  Darwin's  theory.  The  nearly  identical  hypotheses 


3*  Patrick  Geddes  and  J.  A.  Thomson,  Evolution  (New  York,  1911),  pp. 
231-32. 

ss  Darwin  and  the  Humanities  (Baltimore,  1909),  p.  89.  To  reach  this 
conclusion,  Professor  Baldwin  defines  "the  principle  of  selection  as 
Darwin  conceived  it,"  not  in  Darwin's  words,  but  as  "the  principle 
of  survival  from  varied  cases"  (p.  viii) ;  it  is,  however,  just  the  specific 
biological  content  of  the  theory,  which  this  re-formulation  so  carefully 
excludes,  that  gives  the  theory  its  working  value. 

36  Lloyd  Morgan,  in  Darwin  and  Modern  Science,  ed.  by  A.  C.  Seward 
(Cambridge,  1909),  p.  445.  "The  mental  qualities  which  have  developed 
in  Man,  though  traceable  in  a  vague  and  rudimentary  condition  in  some 
of  his  animal  associates,  are  of  such  an  unprecedented  power  and  so  far 
dominate  everything  else  in  his  activities  as  a  living  organism,  that  they 
have  to  a  very  large  extent,  if  not  entirely,  cut  him  off  from  the  general 
operation  of  that  process  of  Natural  Selection  and  survival  of  the  fittest 
which  up  to  their  appearance  had  been  the  law  of  the  living  world." 
Sir  E.  K.  Lankester,  The  Kingdom  of  Man  (London,  1907),  p.  25.  Cf. 
Charles  Darwin,  The  Descent  of  Man  (New  York,  1871),  I,  161-177: 
' '  Natural  Selection  as  affecting  Civilized  Nations. ' ' 


Teggart :  Prolegomena  to  History  255 

of  Darwin  and  Wallace  were  both  suggested  by  reading  Malthus, 
which  was  itself  an  "historical"  study;  the  two  hypotheses  were 
derived,  broadly  speaking,  from  observation  of  English  society 
in  the  earlier  part  of  the  nineteenth  century;37  and  the  terms — 
"struggle  for  existence,"  "survival  of  the  fittest,"  "natural 
selection" — used  by  Darwin  to  designate  the  factors  of  organic 
evolution  were  metaphorical  expressions  suggested  by  human 
experience.  So  "behind  these  fatal  phrases,  which  have  become 
almost  household  words,  lurk  many  dangers  for  the  unwary. ' ' 38 

The  student  of  the  evolution  represented  in  the  facts  of 
human  history  must,  therefore,  be  prepared  to  take  upon  him- 
self the  burden  of  an  independent  investigation ;  he  cannot  hope 
to  adopt  ready-made  the  formulae  which  have  proved  useful  in 
other  subjects;  and  he  will  turn  to  Darwin  simply  to  observe 
the  method  which  he  employed. 

Again,  before  accepting  Darwin's  mode  of  approach  to  his 
subject,  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  the  investigator  in 
another  field  should  take  account  of  certain  fundamental  objec- 
tions that  have  been  urged  against  the  theories  of  Lyell  and 
Darwin. 

Hutton.  as  has  been  already  mentioned,  assumed,  that  "Time 
is  to  nature  endless  and  as  nothing. ' '  Building  upon  this  founda- 
tion, Lyell  postulated,  not  only  that  all  the  changes  in  the 
earth's  surface  have  been  due  to  operations  similar  to  those 
still  going  on  around  us,  but  that  these  "have  never  acted  with 
different  degrees  of  energy  from  that  which  they  now  exert. ' ' 39 
In  other  words,  he  advocated  the  view  that  things  have  come 


37  ' '  There  has  prevailed  in  the  main,  and  still  prevails,  a  naive  for- 
get fulness  of  the  social  origins  of  these  naturalists'  discoveries."  Geddes 
and  Thomson,  as  cited,  p.  214.  For  Wallace's  account  of  his  discovery 
of  the  theory  of  natural  selection,  see  his  autobiography,  My  Life  (New 
York,  1905),  I,  361-62. 

ss  Darwin  himself  recognised  this  criticism:  "Every  one  knows," 
he  said,  "what  is  meant  and  is  implied  by  such  metaphorical  expressions; 
and  they  are  almost  necessary  for  brevity."  Origin  of  Species,  as  cited, 
p.  79.  The  difficulty,  which  presents  itself  even  in  biology,  is,  however, 
greatly  increased  when  these  words,  freighted  with  new  meanings,  are 
carried  back  again  into  the  discussion  of  social  problems. 

39  Life,  Letters,  and  Journals  of  Sir  Charles  Lyell  (London,  1881), 
I,  234. 


256          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

to  be  as  they  are  by  a  process  of  continuous  slow  modification 
through  unlimited  time.  Neither  in  Lyell's  day  nor  subsequently 
has  this  view  passed  unchallenged;  and  there  has  been  a  pro- 
nounced disposition  among  later  geologists  to  insist  that  the 
known  agencies  of  geological  change  have  operated  with  vary- 
ing degrees  of  intensity  in  different  periods.  Indeed,  that  some 
modification  of  ' '  unif ormitarianism ' '  is  necessary  seems  to  follow 
from  the  growing  realisation  that  the  life-history  of  the  earth, 
however  indefinitely  extended  it  may  appear  to  human  reckon- 
ing, falls,  nevertheless,  within  a  limited  period  of  time.40 

Darwin,  it  must  be  clearly  understood,  accepted  Lyell's  view, 
and  held  that  "as  natural  selection  acts  solely  by  accumulating 
slight,  successive,  favourable  variations,  it  can  produce  no  great 
or  sudden  modification ;  it  can  act  only  by  very  short  and  slow 
steps.  Hence  the  canon  of  'natura  non  facit  saltum.'  "41  He 
says  further:  "I  am  well  aware  that  this  doctrine  of  natural 
selection,  ...  is  open  to  the  same  objections  which  were  at  first 
urged  against  Sir  Charles  Lyell's  noble  views  on  'the  modern 
changes  of  the  earth,  as  illustrative  of  geology';  but  we  now 
seldom  hear  the  action,  for  instance,  of  the  coast-waves,  called  a 
trifling  and  insignificant  cause,  when  applied  to  the  excavation 
of  gigantic  valleys  or  to  the  formation  of  the  longest  lines  of 
inland  cliffs.  Natural  selection  can  act  only  by  the  preservation 
and  accumulation  of  small  inherited  modifications,  each  profit- 
able to  the  preserved  being;  and  as  modern  geology  has  almost 
banished  such  views  as  the  excavation  of  a  great  valley  by  a 
single  diluvial  wave,  so  will  natural  selection,  if  it  be  a  true 
principle,  banish  the  belief  of  the  continued  creation  of  new 
organic  beings,  or  of  any  great  and  sudden  modification  in  their 
structure."42  That  is,  natural  selection  will  alter  a  specific  type 
slowly  and  continuously  in  adaptation  to  a  gradually  changing 
environment.43  Darwin's  theory  is  thus  literally  an  addendum 


40  Cf.,  Sir  Joseph  Prestwich,  Geology  (Oxford,  1886).  I,  2;  Sir  Archi- 
bald Geikie,  Text-book  of  Geology   (4th  ed.,  London,  1903),  p.  3;   W.  J. 
Sollas,   The  Age  of  the  Earth   (London,   1905),  p.   2. 

41  Darwin,  as  cited,  p.  397;   cf.  p.  179. 

42  Darwin,  as  cited,  p.  91. 

*3  Romanes,  as  cited,  pp.  260-61. 


1916]  Tcggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  .       257 

to  that  of  Lyell;  but  if  "it  is  characteristic  of  a  species  that 
it  always  exhibits  a  constant  relation  to  a  particular  environ- 
ment."44 and  if,  as  Darwin  asserted,  "scarcely  any  palaeonto- 
logical  discovery  is  more  striking  than  the  fact  that  the  forms 
of  life  change  almost  simultaneously  throughout  the  world,"  it 
would  follow  from  the  admission  of  accelerated  geological  changes 
that  far-reaching  changes  of  environment  may  at  times  have 
led  to  species-modifications  which  were  not  "insensibly  fine 
gradations."45 

It  is  of  interest  to  note  that  Wallace's  theory  was  also  based  upon 
that  of  Lyell.  "Along  with  Malthus, "  he  says,  "I  had  read,  and  been 
even  more  deeply  impressed  by,  Sir  Charles  Lyell 's  immortal  Principles 
of  Geology;  which  had  taught  me  that  the  inorganic  world — the  whole 
surface  of  the  earth,  its  seas  and  lands,  its  mountains  and  valleys,  its 
rivers  and  lakes,  and  every  detail  of  its  climatic  conditions — were  and 
always  had  been  in  a  continual  state  of  slow  modification.  Hence  it 
became  obvious  that  the  forms  of  life  must  have  become  continually 
adjusted  to  these  changed  conditions  in  order  to  survive.  The  succes- 
sion of  fossil  remains  throughout  the  whole  geological  series  of  rocks 
is  the  record  of  the  change;  and  it  became  easy  to  see  that  the  extreme 
slowness  of  these  changes  was  such  as  to  allow  ample  opportunity  for 
the  continuous  automatic  adjustment  of  the  organic  to  the  inorganic 
world,  as  well  as  of  each  organism  to  every  other  organism  in  the  same 
area,  by  the  simple  process  of  '  variation  and  survival  of  the  fittest. ' 
Thus  was  the  fundamental  idea  of  the  'origin  of  species'  logically  formu- 
lated from  the  consideration  of  a  series  of  well  ascertained  facts. ' '  46 

From  the  point  of  view  of  method,  it  is  to  be  regretted  that 
Lyell  had  not  read  Hutton  with  greater  care,  for  the  latter  dis- 
tinctly points  out — what  Lyell  does  not  seem  to  have  fully 
recognised  and  Darwin  completely  ignored — that  the  postulate 
of  uniformity  or  gradual  modification  is  a  methodological  assump- 
tion set  up  for  the  convenience  of  the  investigator.  ' '  We  have, ' ' 


44  Georg  Klebs,  in  Darwin  and  Modern  Science,  as  cited,  p.  227. 

45  ' '  Huxley,  in  his   early  correspondence  upon   the  Origin  of  Species, 
tried  to  convince  Darwin  of  the  possibility  of  occasional  rapid  leaps  or 
changes  in  Nature,  analogous  to  those  which  St.  Hilaire  had  advocated, 
.  .  .  Darwin  held  to  his  original  proposition,  handed  down  from  Leibnitz: 
'Natura  non  facit  saltum'."     II.  F.  Osborn,  From  the  Greeks  to  Darwin 
(2d  ed.,  New  York,   1905),  p.   238. 

46  A.   E.   Wallace,   quoted   in   J.   W.   Judd,    The   Coming   of   Evolution 
(Cambridge,  1910),  p.  79. 


258          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

Hutton  says,  "been  representing  the  system  of  this  earth  as 
proceeding  with  a  certain  regularity,  which  is  not  perhaps  in 
nature,  but  which  is  necessary  for  our  clear  conception  of  the 
system  of  nature.  The  system  of  nature  is  certainly  in  rule, 
although  we  may  not  know  every  circumstance  of  its  regulation. 
We  are  under  a  necessity,  therefore,  of  making  regular  sup- 
positions [i.e.,  suppositions  of  regularity],  in  order  to  come  at 
certain  conclusions  which  may  be  compared  with  the  present 
state  of  things."  "We  are  not,"  he  says  emphatically,  "to  limit 
nature  with  the  uniformity  of  an  equable  progression,  although 
it  be  necessary  in  our  computations  to  proceed  upon  equali- 
ties. ' ' 47  The  postulate  of  continuous  slow  modification  was, 
therefore,  regarded  by  Hutton  as  a  methodological  assumption 
necessary  in  the  earlier  stages  of  scientific  inquiry,  but  as  one 
which  was  not  to  be 'permitted  to  interpose  an  obstacle  to  further 
investigation.  "Thus  also,"  he  remarks,  "in  the  use  of  means, 
we  are  not  to  prescribe  to  nature  those  alone  which  we  think 
suitable  for  the  purpose,  in  our  narrow  view.  It  is  our  busi- 
ness to  learn  of  nature  (that  is  by  observation)  the  ways  and 
means,  wrhich  in  her  wisdom  are  adopted ;  and  we  are  to  imagine 
these  only  in  order  to  find  means  for  further  information,  and 
to  increase  our  knowledge  from  the  examination  of  things  which 
actually  have  been."48 

In  toiling  upward  the  human  mind  progresses  by  making 
stretches,  now  to  one  side  of  the  ascent,  and  now  to  the  other. 
So  Lyell  explained:  "I  did  not  lay  it  down  as  an  axiom  that 
there  cannot  have  been  a  succession  of  paroxysms  and  crises, 
on  wrhich  'a  priori  reasoning'  I  was  accused  of  proceeding,  but 
...  I  complained  that  in  attempting  to  explain  geological  phe- 
nomena, the  bias  has  always  been  on  the  wrong  side;  there  has 
always  been  a  disposition  to  reason  a  priori  on  the  extraordinary 
violence  and  suddenness  of  changes,  both  in  the  inorganic  crust 
of  the  earth,  and  in  organic  types,  instead  of  attempting  strenu- 
ously to  frame  theories  in  accordance  with  the  ordinary  opera- 


47  Hutton,  as  cited,  pp.  301-302. 

48  Hutton,  as  cited,  p.  302. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  259 

tions  of  nature."49  Lyell  accomplished  important  results  by 
holding  tenaciously  to  this  methodological  standpoint,  from 
which,  however,  the  succeeding  generation  of  geologists  diverged 
much  as  he  had  done  from  the  view  taken  by  his  predecessors. 
"While,  therefore,"  Geikie  says,  "the  geological  doctrine  that 
the  present  order  of  Nature  must  be  our  guide  to  the  interpre- 
tation of  the  past  remained  as  true  and  as  fruitful  as  ever, 
it  had  now  to  be  widened  by  the  reception  of  evidence  furnished 
by  a  study  of  the  earth  as  a  planetary  body. ' ' 50  Similarly, 
biologists  taking  up  the  study  of  organic  evolution  where  Dar- 
win left  it,  have  also  declined  "to  limit  nature  with  the  uniform- 
ity of  an  equable  progression,"  and  have  found  it  necessary  to 
supplement  "the  ordinary  operations  of  nature"  by  taking  into 
consideration  the  course  of  change  upon  the  face  of  the  earth. 

' '  All  known  facts  appear  to  suggest  that  the  processes  of  evolution 
have  not  operated  in  a  gradual  and  uniform  manner. "si 

' '  The  condition  of  the  earth  '&  surface  or,  at  least,  of  large  portions 
of  it,  has  for  long  periods  remained  substantially  the  same;  this  would 
involve  a  greater  degree  of  fixity  in  the  organisms  which  have  existed 
during  such  periods  of  little  change  than  in  those  which  have  come  into 
being  during  periods  of  more  rapid  transition;  for,  though  rejecting 
catastrophes  as  the  general  modus  agendi  of  nature,  I  am  far  from  saying 
that  the  march  of  physical  changes  has  been  always  perfectly  uniform.  "52 

'*.  .  .  These  considerations  lead  me  to  express  a  doubt  whether 
biologists  have  been  correct  in  looking  for  continuous  transformation 
of  species.  Judging  by  analogy  we  should  rather  expect  to  find  slight 
continuous  changes  occurring  during  a  long  period  of  time,  followed  by 
a  somewhat  sudden  transformation  into  a  new  species,  or  by  rapid 
extinction."  53 

"The  terrestrial  plant  is  inseparably  dependent  on  the  conditions, 
not  only  of  the  soil  and  the  water,  but  also  of  the  air  from  which  it 
derives  an  important  part  of  its  substance.  Any  change,  therefore,  in 
the  climatic,  terrestrial,  or  water  conditions  of  its  environment  directly 


49  Life  ...  of  Sir  Charles  Lyell,  as  cited,  II,  3. 

so  Geikie,  Landscape  in  History,  as  cited,  p.  177. 

si  A.  S.  Woodward,  Outlines  of  Vertebrate  Palaeontology  (Cambridge, 
1898),  p.  xxi. 

52  Sir  William  Grove,  ' '  Address  of  the  President, ' '  British  Associa- 
tion, Report  of  the  36th  Meeting,  1866,  p.  Ixxvi. 

ss  Sir  George  Darwin,  "President's  Address,"  British  Association, 
Eeport  of  the  '75th  Meeting,  1905,  p.  8. 


260          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

affects  the  plant  and  causes  morphologic  changes  to  a  greater  or  less 
degree,  the  greater  plant  variations  corresponding  usually  to  the  greater 
environmental  changes.  The  great  floral  revolutions  of  geologic  history 
are  connected  with  the  great  diastrophic  movements.  "$* 

We  are  here,  evidently,  at  a  point  of  some  importance  for 
evolutionary  study.  The  ''modern  changes"  which  Lyell  and 
Darwin  set  up  are  inadequate  as  a  statement  of  the  processes 
manifested  in  the  evolution  of  the  earth  and  the  forms  of  life 
upon  it.  Bateson  is  simply  re-echoing  the  words  of  the  geologists 
when  he  says  that  "we  see  no  changes  in  progress  around  us 
in  the  contemporary  world  which  we  can  imagine  likely  to  cul- 
minate in  the  evolution  of  forms  distinct  in  the  larger  sense. ' ' 55 
Clearly,  then,  the  question  arises  whether  the  method  we  have 
been  examining  is  inherently  sound,  or  whether  there  has  been 
some  failure  in  the  application  of  it. 

The  difficulty,  it  seems  to  me,  lies  in  a  too  instant  concen- 
tration of  attention  upon  the  element  of  "change."  "We  over- 
look and  half  forget  the  constant  while  we  see  and  watch  the 
variable. ' ' 56  The  business  of  science  is  to  discover  the  processes 
manifested  in  nature ;  and  ' '  we  should  not  forget  that  the  theory 
of  evolution  does  not  postulate  that  a  change  must  take  place  in 
the  course  of  time,  but  only  that  it  may  take  place  sometimes. ' ' 5T 
"We  are  all  accustomed,"  Huxley  remarked,  "to  speak  of  the 
number  and  the  extent  of  the  changes  in  the  living  population 
of  the  globe  during  geological  time  as  something  enormous;  .  .  . 
but  looking  only  at  the  positive  data  furnished  by  the  fossil 
world  from  a  broader  point  of  view  ...  a  surprise  of  another 
kind  dawns  upon  the  mind;  and  under  this  aspect  the  smallness 
of  the  total  change  becomes  as  astonishing  as  was  its  greatness 
under  the  other."  "Any  admissible  hypothesis  of  progressive 
modification,"  he  concludes,  "must  be  compatible  with  persist- 


B*  David  White,  in  Outlines  of  Geologic  History,  ed.  by  R.  D.  Salis- 
bury (Chicago,  1910),  p.  139. 

55  William  Bateson,  "President's  Address,"  British  Association,  Re- 
port of  the  84th  Meeting,  1914,  p.  21. 

sa  Walter  Bagehot,  Physics  and  Politics  [1869]  (New  York,  1912), 
p.  32. 

67  T.  H.  Morgan,  Evolution  and  Adaptation    (New  York,  1903),  p.  44. 


Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  261 

ence  without  progression,  through  indefinite  periods."58  It  is, 
in  fact,  this  remarkable  characteristic,  which  Huxley  calls  "per- 
sistence," that  makes  evolutionary  study  possible,  since  it  has 
preserved  for  us  indications  of  the  modifications  through  which 
the  earth,  life-forms,  and  human  ideas  and  associations  have 
passed. 

It  is  open  to  question,  therefore,  whether  the  investigation 
of  an  evolution  might  not  profitably  begin  with  an  attempt  to 
determine  the  processes  which  restrict  change  and  promote  sta- 
bility. Bearing  in  mind  that  change  is  discernible  only  against 
a  background  of  the  unchanging,  one  might  suggest  that  it  was 
the  status  of  thought  in  Darwin's  time  that  led  him  to  place 
"change"  in  the  forefront  of  his  inquiry.  No  man,  whatever 
his  intellectual  endowment,  is  independent  of  the  surroundings 
in  which  he  lives,  and  the  belief  in  the  fixity  of  species  current 
in  the  earlier  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  determined  that 
Darwin's  theory  of  species-formation  should  be  secondary  and 
contributory  to  his  theory  of  descent.59  In  Darwin's  argument, 
the  fact  of  ' '  persistence ' '  or  restriction  of  change  receives  recog- 
nition, but  he  explains  it  merely  by  saying  that  in  such  cases 
no  beneficial  variations  had  arisen.  "On  my  theory,"  he  re- 
marks, "the  present  existence  of  lowly  organised  productions 
offers  no  difficulty;  for  natural  selection  includes  no  necessary 
and  universal  law  of  advancement  or  development — it  only  takes 
advantage  of  such  variations  as  arise  and  are  beneficial  to  each 
creature  under  its  complex  relations  of  life."60  In  recent  bio- 
logical literature  there  are  indications  that  this  explanation  is 
felt  to  be  unsatisfactory,  and  the  question  has  been  raised 
"whether  the  object  of  our  search  ought  not,  instead  of  the  cause 
of  variation,  to  be  the  cause  of  similarity ' ' ;  but,  as  far  as  I  am 
aware,  this  alternative  mode  of  approach  has  not  been  employed 
in  dealing  with  the  main  problem  of  evolutionary  investigation. 


ss  T.  H.  Huxley,  Lay 'Sermons  (5th  ed.,  London,  1874),  pp.  215,  226. 

so  "Descent  with  modification"  he  speaks  of  as  "my  theory."     Cf. 
Samuel  Butler,  Luck  or  Cunning?  (London,  1887),  p.  236,  and  chs.  13-15. 

«o  Darwin,  as  cited,  p.  119. 


262          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

"The  fundamental  idea  in  the  theory  of  Natural  Selection  is  the 
persistence  of  those  types  of  life  which  are  adapted  to  their  surrounding 
conditions."  "The  study  of  stability  and  instability  furnishes  the  prob- 
lems which  the  physicist  and  biologist  alike  attempt  to  solve."  "Stabil- 
ity is  a  property  of  relationship  to  surrounding  conditions."61 

"It  is  probable  that  variability  is,  like  growth,  a  primary  quality 
of  living  things,  and  that  '  breeding  true '  has  arisen  secondarily  as  a 
restriction."  62 

"In  short,  it  is  evident  that  the  progress  of  the  backboned  land 
animals  during  the  successive  periods  of  geological  time  has  not  been 
uniform  and  gradual,  but  has  proceeded  in  a  rhythmic  manner.  There 
have  been  alternations  of  restless  periods  which  meant  real  advance,  with 
periods  of  comparative  stability,  during  which  the  predominant  animals 
merely  varied  in  response  to  their  surroundings,  or  degenerated,  or  grad- 
ually grew  to  a  large  size. ' '  63 

"The  problem  that  confronts  the  evolutionist  is  the  nature  of  the 
mechanism  which  rendered  possible  the  persistence  of  a  certain  com- 
pound or  of  certain  compounds  possessing  that  particular  constitution 
conferring  upon  them  that  stable  instability  known  as  life. ' '  64 

"Quand  je  parle  de  la  stabilite  d'une  espece  vivante,  je  pense  a  la 
stabilite  du  patrirnoine  hereditaire  de  cette  espece.  Ce  patrimoine 
hereditaire  definit  completement  1 'espece,  et  1 'espece  ne  peut  etre  definie 
que  par  lui.  .  .  .  Quand  je  parle  de  la  stabilite  du  patrimoine  specifique, 
je  fais  allusion  au  fait  que  ce  patrimoine  a  une  tendance  a  se  conserver 
a  travers  les  vicissitudes  de  la  vie.  ...  II  est  done  bien  evident  que 
1'heredite,  comme  1 'assimilation,  conservent  le  patrimoine  specifique. 
Si  cette  conservation  etait  parfaite,  il  n'y  aurait  pas  d 'evolution.  .  .  . 
En  realite,  cette  stabilite,  bien  que  remarquable,  n'est  pas  absolue;  quand 
les  conditions  changent,  il  y  a  lutte.  Les  individus  vaincus  par  le  milieu 
disparaissent;  ceux  qui  triomphent  se  conservent,  mais  ils  ne  triomphent 
pas  totalement;  ils  subissent  une  defaite  partielle  qui  est  1 'adaptation. " 
.  .  .  "La  loi  de  stabilite  progressive  dont  je  m'occupe  actuellement  peut 
s'enoncer  ainsi:  Quand,  sous  1 'influence  d'une  adaptation  prolongee  a 
des  conditions  nouvelles  d  'existence,  le  patrimoine  hereditaire  d  'une 
lignee  subit  une  variation  qualitative,  il  passe,  d'un  etat  stable,  a  un 
etat  plus  stable  que  le  precedent. ' '  65 


si  Sir  George  Darwin,  "President's  Address,"  British  Association, 
Report  of  the  75th  Meeting,  1905,  pp.  7,  9,  14. 

62  J.  A.  Thomson,  The  Bible  of  Nature  (New  York,  1908),  p.  160. 

63  A.   S.   Woodward,   "Presidential   Address"    (Section    C,    Geology), 
British  Association,  Report  of  the  79th  Meeting,  1909,  p.  464. 

6*  Eaphael  Meldola,  Evolution,  Darwinian  and  Spencerian  (Oxford, 
1910),  pp.  19-20. 

65  Felix  Le  Dantec,  "Stabilite  et  Mutation,"  Bulletin  de  la  Societe 
franc.aise  de  philosophic,  11  (1911),  121-22.  Cf.  his  La  stabilite  de  la  vie 
(Paris,  1910). 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  263 

The  case,  as  affecting  man,  may  be  stated  thus:  if,  in  con- 
sidering the  evolution  of  humanity,  we  allow  our  attention  to 
be  engrossed  by  the  details  of  documentary  history,  by  "history" 
as  it  is  written,  by  the  conditions  of  life  under  which  we  our- 
selves are  living,  then,  obviously,  "change"  will  appear  as  the 
very  essence  of  things.  So,  when  we  say  "that  the  general  idea 
of  organic  evolution  is  in  great  part  just  the  idea  of  human 
history  projected  upon  the  natural  world,"  we  are  applying  in 
biology  a  concept  derived  from  an  undue  preoccupation  with 
what  is,  after  all,  but  a  fraction  of  human  history ;  and  are  ignor- 
ing, like  all  historians,  the  less  mobile  parts  as  "unhistorical" 
and  negligible.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  we  endeavor  to  take  a 
broader  view  of  human  life,  the  element  of  "change"  loses  its 
preponderance,  and  that  of  "fixity" — to  use  Bagehot's  word — 
of  backwardness  or  barbarism,  comes  into  prominence;  for  the 
vast  majority  of  mankind,  in  the  past  as  in  the  present,  has  been 
and  still  is  relatively  immobile.  In  the  special  case  of  human 
evolution,  at  least,  the  element  of  "fixity"  may  well  become  the 
fundamental  problem  of  inquiry;  and  if  we  assume  with  the 
anthropologists  that  the  mind  of  man  is  everywhere  the  same, 
it  will  be  seen  that  the  stationary  character  of  backward  and 
barbarous  peoples  is  due  to  the  presence  of  continuously  oper- 
ative restraints,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  advancement  follows 
upon  the  loosening  of  these  restrictions  at  a  given  moment  of 
time — "most  of  the  peoples  who  have  played  a  great  part  in 
history,  have  as  a  matter  of  fact  started  their  'historical'  period 
with  something  of  a  crisis,  and  period  of  rapid  change."66 

"In  spite  of  overwhelming  evidence,  it  is  most  difficult  for  a  citizen 
of  Western  Europe  to  bring  thoroughly  home  to  himself  the  truth  that 
the  civilisation  which  surrounds  him  is  a  rare  exception  in  the  history 
of  the  world."  "The  truth  is  that  the  stable  part  of  our  mental,  moral, 
and  physical  constitution  is  the  largest  part  of  it,  and  the  resistance  it 
opposes  to  change  is  such  that,  though  the  variations  of  human  society 
in  a  portion  of  the  world  are  plain  enough,  they  are  neither  so  rapid 
nor  so  extensive  that  their  amount,  character,  and  general  direction  can- 
not be  ascertained."67 


GO  J.  L.  Myres,  The  Dawn  of  History  (New  York,  c.  1911),  p.  11. 
«7  Sir  Henry  Sumner  Maine,  Ancient  Law,  ed.  by  Sir  Frederick  Pollock 
(London,  1906),  p.  27,  126. 


264          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

"Our  habitual  instructors,  our  ordinary  conversation,  our  inevitable 
and  ineradicable  prejudices  tend  to  make  us  think  that  'Progress'  is 
the  normal  fact  in  human  society,  the  fact  which  we  should  expect  to 
see,  the  fact  which  we  should  be  surprised  if  we  did  not  see. "  .  .  .  "  But, 
in  fact,  any  progress  is  extremely  rare.  As  a  rule  ...  a  stationary 
state  is  by  far  the  most  frequent  condition  of  man,  as  far  as  history 
describes  that  condition;  the  progressive  state  is  only  a  rare  and  an 
occasional  exception. "  ' '  This  principle  will,  I  think,  help  us  in  trying 
to  solve  the  question  why  so  few  nations  have  progressed,  though  to  us 
progress  seems  so  natural — what  is  the  cause  or  set  of  causes  which 
have  prevented  that  progress  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  and  produced 
it  in  the  feeble  minority. "  ®8 

"It  does  not  follow  .  .  .  that  civilisation  is  always  on  the  move,  or 
that  its  movement  is  always  progress.  On  the  contrary,  .  .  .  it  remains 
stationary  for  long  periods,  and  often  falls  back. ' '  «» 

' '  There  can,  I  think,  be  little  doubt  that  .  .  .  most  savage  races  are 
in  large  measure  strictly  primitive,  survivals  from  early  conditions,  the 
development  of  their  ideas  having  from  various  causes  remained  prac- 
tically stationary  during  a  very  considerable  period  of  time. ' '  "» 

' '  I  have  confidence, ' '  Bateson  says  in  his  British  Association  address, 
"that  the  artistic  gifts  of  mankind  will  prove  to  be  due  not  to  some- 
thing added  to  the  make-up  of  an  ordinary  man,  but  to  the  absence  of 
factors  which  in  the  normal  person  inhibit  the  development  of  these 
gifts.  They  are  almost  beyond  doubt  to  be  looked  upon  as  releases  of 
powers  normally  suppressed. "  "  Among  the  civilized  races  of  Europe 
we  are  witnessing  an  emancipation  from  traditional  control  in  thought, 
in  art,  and  in  conduct  which  is  likely  to  have  prolonged  and  wonderful 
influences."  fi 

Darwin,  we  have,  seen,  accepted  Lyell  's  theory  of  ' '  gradual 
modification,"  and  ignored  Button's  warning  that  this  assump- 
tion of  regularity  is  to  be  regarded  solely  as  a  convenience  in 
research.  This  does  not  mean  that  Hutton  asserted,  and  Darwin 
denied,  arbitrary  interpositions  in  the  natural  order  of  things; 
on  the  contrary,  the  Scotch  geologist  held  to  the  opinion  that 
"the  system  of  nature  is  certainly  in  rule" — but  he  recognised 
that  this  "rule"  is  not  confined  to  the  one  strand  or  element 
which  the  scientist  may  have  taken  as  the  object  of  fiis  inquiry. 


es  Walter  Bagehot,  Physics  and  Politics  [1869]  (New  York,  1912), 
pp.  41,  211,  206. 

«»  Sir  E.  B.  Tylor,  Anthropology  (London,  1881),  p.  18. 

™  Henry  Balfour,  Presidential  Address,  (Section  H,  Anthropology), 
British  Association,  Eeport  of  the  74th  Meeting,  1904,  p.  697. 

"  Bateson,  as  cited,  pp.  19,  29. 


Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  265 

For  the  purposes  of  research  phenomena  must  be  isolated,  but 
the  investigator  must  not  be  betrayed  into  imagining  that  this 
isolation  ever  occurs  under  actual  conditions.  Every  ' '  change ' ' 
is  an  "event,"  but  it  is  not  on  that  account  to  be  regarded  as 
an  "accident."  To  the  individual  ignorant  of  the  conception 
of  natural  process,  everything  must  appear  "accidental";  to  the 
scientist,  however,  "accident"  is  natural  process  out  of  focus 
for  a  particular  investigator  at  a  given  time.  So,  while  "the 
system  of  nature  is  certainly  in  rule,"  it  admits  of  changes  tak- 
ing place,  and  "change  in  one  part  of  the  universe  involves  a 
change  throughout.  No  part  lives  unto  itself,  but  all  are  members 
one  of  another." 

It  is  apparent,  then,  that  there  are  two  ways  by  which  the 
study  of  an  evolution  may.  be  approached — we  may  begin  with 
the  isolation  and  description  either  of  the  processes  manifested 
in  "change,"  or  of  those  manifested  in  "fixity."  In  adopting 
the  first  course,  the  assumption  of  "uniformity"  requires  the 
further  assumption,  made  by  Lyell  and  Darwin,  of  unlimited 
time  for  the  operation  of  "gradual  modifications";  in  adopting 
the  second,  wre  must  follow  the  historical  record  in  order  to 
observe  the  actual  course  of  change.  In  the  first  instance,  evo- 
lution is  thought  of  as  a  flowing  stream  of  change  continuously 
moving  forward  in  a  direction  from  lowest  to  highest ;  in  the 
second,  it  is  conceived  as  a  series  of  experiments  in  adjustment 
or  adaptation,72  broken  in  upon,  from  time  to  time,  by  conflict- 
ing experiments  of  the  same  sort.  The  mode  of  thought  induced 
by  the  first  approach  tends  to  a  forgetfulness  of  the  essential  fact 
that  in  nature  no  process  appears  in  isolation ;  the  point  of 
view  of  the  second  demands  a  constant  vigilance  in  regard  to 
changes  occurring  outside  the  field  immediately  under  investi- 
gation. 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  this  alternative  mode  of  approach- 
ing the  study  of  evolution  is  brought  forward  as  a  contribution 


"2  C.  B.  Davenport,  Congress  of  Arts  and  Science,  St.  Louis,  1904 
(Boston,  1906),  V,  250,  says:  "Only  within  the  last  few  years  have  we 
come  to  recognize  that  every  organ  is  more  than  a  homologue:  it  is 
also  a  successful  experiment  with  the  environment." 


266          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

to  astronomical,  geological,  or  biological  theory,  or  as  applicable 
to  any  evolution  but  that  of  man.  It  is  introduced  here  merely 
to  emphasize  to  students  of  human  evolution,  first,  that  the  ob- 
jections urged  against  Darwin's  theory  of  natural  selection  may 
possibly  be  a  result  of  his  too  ready  acceptance  of  Lyell  's  author- 
ity; and,  second,  that  Darwin's  procedure  in  taking  "change" 
as  the  immediate  subject  of  inquiry  is  not  necessarily  the  only 
course  open  to  them.  Nor  should  this  conclusion  be  taken  as 
an  argument  against  Hutton's  principle  that  the  Present  is  the 
key  to  the  Past,  although  it  does  point  to  a  modification  of  the 
procedure  to  be  followed.  The  Present  that  lies  before  us  is 
not  even  mainly  "new,"  but  consists  for  the  greater  part  of 
things  carried  over  from  the  Past.  Hence,  in  attempting  to  dis- 
cover "how  things  have  come  to  be  as  they  are,"  it  is  possible 
that  the  processes  first  to  be  investigated  should  be  those  mani- 
fested everywhere  in  repression  and  fixity,  while  in  the  second 
place  would  follow  inquiry  into  the  processes  made  visible  in 
temporary  ' '  releases ' '  from  the  restrictions  of  habit,  custom,  and 
accepted  ideas. 

"The  system  of  nature  is  certainly  in  rule,"  but  "we  are 
not  to  limit  nature  with  the  uniformity  of  an  equable  progres- 
sion."  The  inquiry  into  present  or  "modern"  processes  of 
evolution  was  recognized  by  Hutton  as  an  expedient  in  the 
earlier  stages  of  investigation.  Darwin  saw  clearly  that  the  test 
of  his  theory  lay  in  its  applicability  to  the  past.  "He  who 
rejects  these  views  on  the  nature  of  the  geological  record,"  he 
remarked,  "will  rightly  reject  my  whole  theory."73  We  may 
study  the  present  in  order  to  throw  light  upon  the  past,  and 
we  may  begin  by  isolating  what  appear  to  be  the  existing 
processes,  but,  for  verification,  any  evolutionary  hypothesis  must 
be  shown  to  agree  with  what  we  know  to  have  taken  place  in 
the  course  of  time.  The  truth  is  that  the  discovery  of  a  valid 
hypothesis  necessitates  an  equal  consideration  of  all  the  evi- 
dence. For  any  evolution,  this  is  tripartite,  consisting  of  (1) 
the  existing  series  as  arranged  in  order  from  lowest  to  highest; 


73  Darwin,  as  cited,  p.  297. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  267 

(2)  the  ontogenetic  series,  represented  in  individual  develop- 
ment; and  (3)  the  historical  or  palaeontological  series.  A 
hypothesis  to  be  satisfactory  must  fit  each  of  these  classes  of 
facts,  and  hence  a  hypothesis  to  be  satisfactory  must  be  based 
upon  the  comparison  of  the  different  series  of  facts  regarded  as 
manifestations  of  the  same  processes.  When,  however,  the  prob- 
lem is  stated  in  this  way,  it  at  once  becomes  apparent  that  the 
method  of  investigation  to  be  followed  in  the  broad  subjects  of 
organic  and  human  evolution  is  just  the  application  to  a  more 
extended  content  of  that  ''Comparative  Method"  which  has 
proved  its  efficiency  in  a  wide  range  of  special  fields. 


5 

In  discussing  the  attitude  of  Logic  towards  History  it  was 
stated  that  English  logicians,  like  Mill  and  Fowler,  looking  for 
a  scientific  element  in  historical  work,  found  this  in  what  is 
known  as  the  "comparative  method,"  and  that  subsequently  in 
English  logic,  "historical"  and  "comparative,"  as  applied  to 
method,  are  synonymous  terms.  This  statement  may  now  be 
illustrated. 

"What  is  called  the  historical  or  comparative  method,"  one  of  the 
latest  representatives  of  this  school  says,  "has  in  the  last  few  genera- 
tions revolutionized  many  branches  of  enquiry.  It  is  but  an  application 
of  the  general  principle  of  varying  the  circumstances  in  order  the  better 
to  discover  the  cause  of  a  phenomenon.  But  of  old,  enquirers  into  mat- 
ters of  historical  growth,  such  as  language,  or  myth,  or  religion,  or  legal 
ideas,  were  content  to  attempt  an  explanation  of  the  facts  of  some  par- 
ticular age  or  country  by  observations  carried  on  within  that  age  or 
country  alone,  or  if  beyond  it,  only  in  adjacent  ages  or  countries  of 
the  same  type.  The  historic  method  looks  farther  afield.  It  compares 
the  institutions  of  widely  different  ages,  or  of  peoples  who  though  con- 
temporaneous stand  at  widely  different  levels  of  civilization  and  of 
thought.  In  the  light  of  such  a  comparison,  facts  may  take  on  quite 
a  new  appearance.  Legal  or  other  customs  for  which  a  later  age  had 
found  a  reason  in  some  supposed  meaning  or  utility  which  they  now 
possessed  are  seen  to  have  had  a  very  different  origin,  in  conditions  no 
longer  existing,  and  ideas  no  longer  entertained.  Folk-lore  is  full  of 


26.8          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL. 4 

such  surprises.  ...  It  is  the  same  with  myth;  .  .  .  Therefore  it  is  im- 
portant to  insist  upon  studying  the  present  in  the  light  of  history  and 
comparing  as  extensive  a  range  of  facts  as  can  be  gathered  together. ' '  1* 

That  this  description  may  be  taken  to  represent  the  view  of 
scholars  who  make  use  of  the  comparative  method  is  to  be  seen 
from  the  following: 

"I  think  I  may  venture  to  affirm,"  Sir  Henry  Maine  says,  "that  the 
Comparative  Method,  which  has  already  been  fruitful  of  such  wonderful 
results,  is  not  distinguishable  in  some  of  its  applications  from  the  His- 
torical Method.  We  take  a  number  of  contemporary  facts,  ideas,  and 
customs,  and  we  infer  the  past  form  of  those  facts,  ideas,  and  customs 
not  only  from  historical  records  of  that  past  form,  but  from  examples 
of  it  which  have  not  yet  died  out  of  the  world,  and  are  still  to  be  found 
in  it.  When  in  truth  .  .  .  we  gain  something  like  an  adequate  idea  of 
the  vastness  and  variety  of  the  phenomena  of  human  society;  when  in 
particular  we  have  learned  not  to  exclude  from  our  view  of  earth  and 
man  those  great  and  unexplored  regions  which  we  vaguely  term  the  East, 
we  find  it  to  be  not  wholly  a  conceit  or  a  paradox  to  say  that  the 
distinction  between  the  Present  and  the  Past  disappears.  Sometimes  the 
Past  is  the  Present;  much  more  often  it  is  removed  from  it  by  varying 
distances,  which,  however,  cannot  be  estimated  or  expressed  chrono- 
logically. Direct  observation  comes  thus  to  the  aid  of  historical  enquiry, 
and  historical  enquiry  to  the  help  of  direct  olfservation."  "5 

"Our  system,"  Andrew  Lang  said,  "is  but  one  aspect  of  the  theory 
of  evolution,  or  is  but  the  application  of  that  theory  to  the  topic  of 
mythology.  The  archaeologist  studies  human  life  in  its  material  remains; 
he  tracks  progress  (and  occasional  degeneration)  from  the  rudely  chipped 
flints  in  the  ancient  gravel  beds,  to  the  polished  stone  weapon,  and  thence 
to  the  ages  of  bronze  and  iron.  He  is  guided  by  material  'survivals' 
— ancient  arms,  implements,  and  ornaments.  The  student  of  Institutions 
has  a  similar  method.  He  finds  his  relics  of  the  uncivilised  past  in 
agricultural  usages,  in  archaic  methods  of  allotment  of  land,  in  odd 
marriage  customs,  things  rudimentary — fossil  relics,  as  it  were,  of  an 
early  social  and  political  condition.  The  archaeologist  and  the  student 
of  Institutions  compare  these  relics,  material  or  customary,  with  the 
weapons,  pottery,  implements,  or  again  with  the  habitual  law  and  usage 
of  existing  savage  or  barbaric  races,  and  demonstrate  that  our  weapons 
and  tools,  and  our  laws  and  manners,  have  been  slowly  evolved  out  of 
lower  conditions,  even  out  of  savage  conditions.  The  anthropological 
method  in  mythology  is  the  same.  .  .  . "  7e 


74  H.    W.    B.    Joseph,    An   Introduction    to    Logic    (Oxford,    3906),    pp. 
522-23. 

75  Village-Communities  in  the  East  and  West   (London,  1871),  pp.  6-7. 
TO  Modern  Mythology  (London,  1897),  p.  viii. 


19161  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  269 

"The  study  might  accordingly  be  described  as  the  embryology  of 
human  thought  and  institutions,  or,  to  be  more  precise,  as  that  enquiry 
which  seeks  to  ascertain,  first,  the  beliefs  and  customs  of  savages,  and, 
second,  the  relics  of  these  beliefs  and  customs  which  have  survived  like 
fossils  among  peoples  of  higher  culture. ' '  77 

"The  beliefs,  customs,  and  institutions  of  tribes  in  a  low  degree  of 
civilisation  are  our  only  clue  to  those  of  a  more  archaic  condition  no 
longer  extant.  They  are  evolved  from  them,  and  are  in  the  last  resort 
the  outgrowth  of  ideas  which  underlay  them.  When,  therefore,  we  find 
a  belief,  a  custom,  or  an  institution — still  more  when  we  find  a  connected 
series  of  beliefs,  customs,  and  institutions — overspreading  the  lower  cul- 
ture we  may  reasonably  infer  its  roots  in  ideas  common  to  mankind  and 
native  to  the  primitive  ancestral  soil.  The  inference  is  greatly  strength- 
ened if  vestigial  forms  are  also  found  embedded  in  the  culture  of  the 
higher  races.  It  is  raised  to  a  certainty  if  unambiguous  expression  of 
the  ideas  themselves  can  be  discovered  to-day  among  the  lower  races. 
The  advance  of  even  the  most  backward  from  primeval  savagery  has 
been  so  great  that  a  large  harvest  of  these  ideas  is  not  to  be  ex- 
pected. ...  78 

It  is  evident  that  the  method  here  described  is  made  possible 
bv  the  fact — which  is  characteristic  flj  ou/r  world-^lrat  the  Past  /  . 

J^fu.t^f''-^  C**-  ^iZLuAff^  -~l*£K)  *v~ /-t^i 

lives  on  into  the  Presentf  "When  in  the  process  of  time,"  Tylor 
says,  "there  has  come  general  change  in  the  condition  of  a 
people,  it  is  usual,  notwithstanding,  to  find  much  that  mani- 
festly had  not  its  origin  in  the  new  state  of  things,  but  has  simply 
lasted  on  into  it."  79  M'Lennan  was  of  opinion  that  "the  variety 
of  the  forms  of  life — of  domestic  and  civil  institution — is  ascrib- 
able  mainly  to  the  unequal  development  of  the  different  sections 
of  mankind. "  "  The  species  has  been  so  unequally  developed  that 
almost  every  phase  of  progress  may  be  studied  as  a  thing  some- 
where observed  and  recorded."80  That  is,  the  type  of  evidence 
available  for  the  study  of  human  evolution  is  identical  with  that 
utilized  in  geology  and  biology. 

Now,  broadly  speaking,  it  may  be  said  that  the  present  sit- 
uation of  the  studies  relating  to  Man  is  similar  to  that  of  the 


TT  Sir  J.  G.  Frazer,  "The  Scope  of  Social  Anthropology"   [1908],  in 
his  Psyche's  Task  (2d  ed.,  London,  1913),  p.  162. 

78  E.  S.  Hartland,  Primitive  Paternity  (London,  1909),  I,  v-vi. 

79  Sir  E.  B.  Tylor,  Primitive  Culture  (3d  ed.,  London,  1891),  I,  71. 

so  J.  F.  M'Lennan,  Studies  in  Ancient  History,  Second  Series  (London, 
1896),  pp.  9,  15. 


270          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

biological  sciences  when  Darwin  began  his  work.  At  that  time, 
as  has  been  pointed  out,  subjects  like  palaeontology,  comparative 
anatomy,  and  comparative  embryology  had  already  been  brought 
to  a  high  state  of  elaboration ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  general 
theories  of  evolution  were  entertained,  and  attempts,  notably 
that  of  Lamarck,  had  even  been  made  to  formulate  scientific 
hypotheses  in  regard  to  the  evolution  of  plant  and  animal  life. 
It  was  Darwin's  great  achievement  to  have  brought  into  the 
focus  of  a  hypothesis  the  knowledge  accumulated  in  the  separate 
"comparative"  fields,  and  to  have  "sorted  out,"  in  a  more  sat- 
isfactory manner  than  his  predecessors,  the  factors  of  biological 
evolution.  Similarly,  we  have  today  a  whole  series  of  specialized 
sciences  relating  to  man — of  which  linguistics,  mythology,  folk- 
lore, ethnology,  and  anthropology  by  no  means  exhaust  the  list ; 
and,  further,  though  vague  unverifiable  theories  of  "progress" 
continue  to  multiply,  there  have  not  been  wanting  hypotheses  of  a 
more  scientific  character  in  regard  to  the  factors  of  human  evo- 
lution. 

Yet,  notwithstanding  all  these  indications  of  activity,  it  must 
still  be  confessed  that  the  study  of  Human  Evolution  is  far  from 
showing  that  vitality  which  might  be  expected  in  a  subject  of 
such  evident  importance.  There  is  today  the  same  insistence 
on  the  value  of  "facts,"  and  the  same  resentment  of  "theory" 
that  characterized  the  biologists  and  geologists  of  a  century  ago ; 
but  now  the  fault  lies  with  the  "historian." 

Still  another  difficulty  needs  must  be  referred  to.  The  mod- 
ern historical  scholar  is  in  the  position  of  proclaiming  that  "the 
whole  evolution  of  human  society  is  the  province  of  history.  It 
embraces,"  he  says,  "not  political  evolution  alone,  but  the  his- 
tory of  religion  and  philosophy,  of  literature  and  art,  of  trade 
and  industry.  There  is  not  a  side  of  the  multifarious  activity 
of  man  which  the  historian  can  safely  neglect,  for  there  is  nothing 
that  man  thinks  or  does,  or  hopes  or  fears,  but  leaves  its  mark 
on  the  society  in  which  he  lives."81  The  historian  is,  however, 


si  G.  W.  Prothero,  Why  should  we  learn  History?   (Edinburgh,  1894), 
p.  8. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  271 

but  one  of  many  claimants  to  this  wide  domain.  Mr.  Andrew 
Lang,  a  quarter-century  ago,  was  engaging  his  enthusiasm  in  the 
cause  of  Comparative  Anthropology,  "a  new  science  which,"  he 
said,  "had  come  into  existence,  the  science  which  studies  man 
in  the  sum  of  all  his  works  and  thoughts,  as  evolved  through 
the  whole  process  of  his  development."82  Today,  "Anthro- 
pology," in  the  view  of  Professor  Myres,  "is  the  Science  of 
Man ;  its  full  task  is  nothing  less  than  this,  to  observe  and 
record,  to  classify  and  interpret,  all  the  activities  of  all  the 
varieties  of  this  species  of  living  being. ' ' 83  So,  too,  Mr.  Marett, 
with  promotive  ardor,  expresses  the  opinion  that  "Anthropology 
is  the  whole  history  of  man  as  fired  and  pervaded  by  the  idea 
of  evolution.  Man  in  evolution — that  is  the  subject  in  its  full 
reach.  Anthropology  studies  man  as  he  occurs  at  all  known 
times.  It  studies  him  as  he  occurs  in  all  known  parts  of  the 
world.  It  studies  him  body  and  soul  together — as  a  bodily  organ- 
ism, subject  to  conditions  operating  in  time  and  space,  which 
bodily  organism  is  in  intimate  relation  with  a  soul-life,  also 
subject  to  those  same  conditions.  Having  an  eye  to  such  con- 
ditions from  first  to  last,  it  seeks  to  plot  out  the  general  series 
of  the  changes,  bodily  and  mental  together,  undergone  by  man 
in  the  course  of  his  history. ' ' 84 

The  truth  is,  such  visions  are  inspiring,  are  even,  in  a  way, 
essential ;  but,  to  come  down  abruptly,  they  are  no  substitute 
for  method.  The  student  of  every  "human"  discipline  catches 
glimpses  at  times  of  the  results  that  would  accrue  from  the  foun- 
dation of  a  Science  of  Man,  and  promptly  lays  claim,  in  antici- 
pation, to  the  reward,  in  the  name  of  the  study  he  happens  to 
represent.  The  situation,  however,  does  not  admit  of  claims; 
and  "as  regards  the  word,"  let  us  agree  with  Mr.  Marett,  and 
' '  call  it  a  science,  or  history,  or  anthropology,  or  anything  else. ' ' 
Let  us  recognise  that  the  need  of  the  present  moment  is  not  the 


82  Myth,  Eitual  and  Religion  (new  impr.,  London,  1913),  I,  30. 

83  J.   L.   Myres,   ' '  The   Influence   of   Anthropology   on   the   Course   of 
Political  Science,"  British  Association,  Report  of  the  79th  Meeting,  1909 
(London,  1910),  p.  589. 

s*  K.  E.  Marett,  Anthropology  (New  York,  [1912]),  p.  7. 


272          University  of  California  Publications  in  History 


.  4 


logical  delimitation  of  spheres,  but  a  working  hypothesis  for  the 
evolution  of  mankind.  Let  us  follow  Darwin,  not,  however,  by 
trying  to  adapt  his  theory  to  an  evolution  for  which  it  was  not 
designed,  but  by  applying  to  our  own  problems,  as  he  did,  the 
method  of  James  Hutton.  Let  us  take  counsel  of  the  fact  that 
Darwin's  contribution  —  which  must  ever  elicit  our  highest  ad- 
miration —  was  made  possible  by  the  results  previously  achieved 
in  the  special  biological  sciences,  and  recognise  that,  for  our 
needs,  there  exists  the  great  body  of  knowledge  already  accumu- 
lated by  the  special  sciences  of  Man.  Let  us,  moreover,  find 
encouragement  in  the  known  effect  that  Darwin's  hypothesis 
produced  upon  the  different  branches  of  biological  study.  '"A 
still  more  important  consequence,  '  '  M.  Giard  says,  '  '  resulted  from 
these  new  conceptions.  The  theory  of  descent  introduced  into 
the  biological  sciences  a  unity  of  view,  a  community  of  end, 
which  established  among  them  the  closest  relations  of  mutual 
dependence  and  suppressed  all  futile  questions  of  supremacy 
or  of  precedence."85  So,  it  is  not  unwarrantable  to  infer,  the 
common  effort  to  define  the  processes  manifested  in  Human  Evo- 
lution would  tend,  in  like  manner,  to  bring  into  co-ordination  the 
separate  branches  of  inquiry  which  have  for  their  object  the 
study  of  the  distinguishing  activities  of  human  kind. 

6 

The  historical  scholar,  it  is  not  improbable,  may  feel  that 
the  present  discussion  has  run  far  beyond  the  scope  and  possi- 
bility of  his  own  inquiries;  hence  the  situation  that  confronts 
him  must^if  possible,  hp_marfc 


The  ideal  of  nineteenth  century  scholarship  was  that  the 
historian  should  tell  the  exact  truth  in  regard  to  what  had  hap- 
pened in  the  past  without  political  or  philosophical  prepos- 
sessions. 

Thus  Palacky,  in  1836,  prefaced  his  History  of  Bohemia  with  the 
notable  statement:  "As  regards  the  principles  and  intentions  which  have 


ss  A.  M.  Giard,  Congress  of  Arts  and  Science,  St.  Louis,  1904  (Boston, 
1906),  V,  261. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  273 

guided  me  while  working  at  this  history,  I  have  hardly  a  word  to  say. 
I  know  of  no  others,  except  those  that  proceed  naturally  from  the  supreme 
principle  of  regard  for  historical  truth  and  faith.  That  I  write  from 
the  standpoint  of  a  Bohemian  is  a  fact  for  which  I  could  only  be  blamed, 
if  it  rendered  me  unjust  either  to  the  Bohemians  or  to  their  opponents. 
I  hope,  however,  that  my  sincere  craving  for  truth,  my  respect  for  all 
laws,  divine  and  human,  my  zeal  for  order  and  legality,  my  sympathy 
with  the  weal  and  woe  of  all  mankind,  will  preserve  me  from  the  sin 
of  partiality.  With  God's  help,  these  principles  will  continue  to  guide 
me  in  my  task."  «6 

Of  late,  however,  historians,  like  Mandell  Creighton,  have 
come  to  see,  what  Bradley  pointed  out  thirty  years  ago,  that  "a 
history  without  so-called  prejudications  is  a  mere  delusion."87 
The  perception  of  this  fact  must  of  necessity  bring  the  historian 
to  inquire  anew,  and  with  a  more  open  mind,  into  the  nature 
and  office  of  historiography.  Now,  the  result  of  such  an  inquiry 
shows,  in  the  first  place,  that  historiography  stands  in  a  unique 
relation  to  the  spirit  of  nationality.  The  historian  is  memory's 
mouthpiece  for  his  countrymen;  and  history  is  the  inspiration 
of  the  patriot.  So  conceived,  history  (that  is,  historiography) 
is  a  form  of  literature,  a  genre  which  claims  a  high  seriousness 
in  its  devotees,  and  which  evokes  a  deep  response  in  the  hearts 
of  men.  Furthermore,  the  result  of  an  inquiry  into  the  nature 
of  historiography  reveals  it  as  standing  in  an  important  rela- 
tion to  the  highest  aspirations  of  the  human  spirit.  The  historian, 
from  considering  the  history  of  his  own  country,  passes  on  to 
describe  the  rise  and  decline  of  empires;  he  presents,  in  his 
ultimate  synthesis,  momentous  occurrences  that  have  affected 


ss  As  quoted  in  Count  Liitzow  's  Lectures  on  the  Historians  of  Bohemia 
(London,  1905),  p.  94. 

87  F.  H.  Bradley,  The  Presuppositions  of  Critical  History  (Oxford, 
1874),  pp.  5,  6.  "The  historian,"  he  says,  "is  not  and  cannot  be  merely 
receptive,  or  barely  reproductive.  It  is  true  that  he  may  not  actually 
add  any  new  material  of  his  own,  and  yet  his  action,  in  so  far  as  he 
realises  that  which  never  as  such  has  been  given  him,  implies  a  precon- 
ception, and  denotes  in  a  sense  a  foregone  conclusion.  The  straighten- 
ing of  the  crooked  rests  on  the  knowledge  of  the  straight,  and  the  exer- 
cise of  criticism  requires  a  canon.  This  is  not  the  only  difficulty  which 
historical  writing  in  its  practice  brings  to  the  theory  of  passivity.  .  .  . 
With  every  fresh  standing-ground  gained  by  the  growth  of  experience, 
with  every  rise  of  the  spirit  to  a  fuller  life  comes  another  view  of  the 
far-lying  past  from  a  higher  and  a  new  level,  and  a  fresh  and  correspond- 
ing change  in  the  features  of  the  object  recognised." 


274          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

the  destinies  of  the  entire  human  race,  and  inevitably  incorpo- 
rates in  his  construction  an  answer  of  some  sort  to  the  question, 
"What  does  it  all  mean?"  Thus  consciously  or  unconsciously 
he  arrives  at  the  standpoint  of  Philosophy,  and  wittingly  or 
unwittingly  essays  an  explanation  of  its  central  problem;  and 
Professory  Bury  quite  properly  reaches  the  conclusion  that,  as 
history- writers,  "our  apprehension  of  history  and  our  reason 
for  studying  it  must  be  ultimately  determined  by  the  view  we 
entertain  of  the  moles  et  machina  mundi  as  a  whole." 

Nevertheless,  high  as  we  may  rate  the  practice  of  historio- 
graphy, neither  as  art  nor  as  philosophy  does  it  set  problems 
for  research  or  provide  an  outlet  for  the  energies  and  ambitions 
of  modern  investigators.  The  work  of  art  or  the  philosophical 
explanation,  once  created,  lives  on  as  a  monument,  independent 
of  any  subsequent  extension  of  knowledge,  to  give  pleasure  or 
excite  admiration,  to  be  praised  or  condemned,  as  the  case  may 
be — but  as  an  obstacle,  not  as  an  incitement,  to  further  research. 
So  the  future  progress  of  historical  investigation  turns  upon  the 
possibility  of  scholars  being  able  to  free  their  work  from  the 
domination  of  historiography. 

But  the  aim  of  nineteenth  century  scholarship  to  investigate 
the  history  of  mankind  without  prepossessions  is  not  to  be  aban- 
doned merely  because  the  proper  mode  for  the  statement  of  its 
results  has  not  yet  been  achieved.  The  failure  of  "history"  to 
become  a  science  has  been  due  primarily  to  the  subordination 
of  investigation  to  history-writing,  and,  knowing  this,  the  failure 
may  be  retrieved  if  the  investigator  will  cease  merely  to  declare 
that  ' '  history  is  a  science, ' '  and  set  himself  consciously  to  apply 
scientific  methods  to  the  subject-matter  with  which  he  is  con- 
cerned. Science,  as  we  have  seen,  is  the  systematic  investigation 
of  the  processes  manifested  in  phenomena,  and  this  is  the  only 
method  that  can  satisfy  the  ambition,  or  provide  an  outlet  for 
the  activity  of  the  investigator. 

The  contrast  here  emphasised  has  long  been  recognized  in  at  least 
one  of  the  specialised  fields  of  historical  inquiry.  Speaking  of  the  course 
of  philological  study  in  the  nineteenth  century,  Hanns  Oertel  says:  "By 


19161  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  275 

far  the  greatest  part  of  all  investigations  in  the  historical  sciences  has 
been  borne  along  by  one  of  two  main  currents  of  thought.  Both  of  them 
have  their  beginnings  at  the  opening  of  the  century  which  has  just  closed, 
but  they  spring  from  different  sources,  they  pursue  different  ends,  they 
employ  different  methods.  These  two  chief  tendencies  may  perhaps  best 
be  called  the  one  synthetic,  the  other  analytic. 

The  synthetic  conception  of  Philology  has  its  first  and  foremost  rep- 
resentative in  Friedrich  August  Wolf  and  is  admirably  outlined  by  him 
in  an  essay  published  in  1807.  .  .  .  Wolf  conceived  of  Philology  as  the 
Biography  of  a  Nation.  .  .  .  The  chief  characteristics  of  his  conception 
of  philology  are  these.  First  and  foremost  its  synthetic  nature.  It 
examines  the  individual  remains  of  antiquity  as  to  their  genuineness, 
it  cleanses  them  from  blemishes  by  which,  in  the  course  of  time,  they 
have  become  defaced,  it  gives  to  each  an  adequate  interpretation.  .  .  . 
It  takes  them  as  they  are.  .  .  .  And  it  is  for  this  reason  that  Wolf's 
Philology  is  an  art,  in  the  Aristotelian  sense  of  TtXvr).  Aristotle,  in 
the  Poetics  (xxv,  1),  distinguishes  three  kinds  of  poetic  /U/ITJO-IS  namely, 
of  things  as  they  were  or  are,  of  things  as  they  are  said  to  be,  and  of 
an  unrealized  ideal.  The  philological  /AI'/A^O-IS  is  of  the  first  kind.  It 
differs  from  that  of  the  poet  in  that  the  latter  freely  constructs  from 
true  elements  an  imaginary  composite  whole,  be  it  characters  or  inci- 
dents, which  has  never  so  existed  and  may  therefore  ever  exist,  while 
the  Wolfian  philologist  carefully  reconstructs  from  their  elements  actual 
characters  and  events  as  they  have  really  existed.  Such  reconstruction 
requires  artistic  perspective,  a  well-planned  arrangement  of  parts  in 
order  to  produce  the  desired  effect,  a  proper  foreshortening.  .  .  .  Pro- 
portion is  the  very  essence  of  art,  and  only  by  a  constant  reference  to 
the  whole  can  the  proper  place  and  value  be  assigned  to  each  element.  .  .  . 
Wolf's  philology,  then,  has  two  sides:  the  one  turned  toward  the  spec- 
tator, the  other  turned  toward  the  artist-philologist.  .  .  .  He  who  would 
successfully  accomplish  Wolf 's  purpose  must  unite  two  distinct  qualities, 
namely,  the  critical  for  the  preliminary  preparation  of  his  material  and 
the  artistic  for  its  final  composition.  .  .  .  Neither  criticism  nor  herme- 
neutics  can  ever  be  an  end  in  itself.  They  are  the  necessary  substratum 
for  all  further  work;  they  are  not  sciences  by  themselves,  but  parts  of 
sciences,  initial  stages  which  are  intended  to  lead  up  to  something  else. 
Without  first  hewing  the  beams  no  building  can  be  erected;  but  who  would 
hew  beams  except  to  erect  a  building?" 

' '  This  same  material  may,  however,  be  viewed  from  another  point, 
and  this  is  the  second  aspect  in  which  historical  objects  have,  in  the 
century  past,  presented  themselves.  In  contradistinction  to  Wolf's  syn- 
thesis this  second  attitude  of  the  mind  may  be  termed  analytical.  The 
contrast  of  the  two  methods  is  sharply  marked.  The  central  figure  for 
Wolf  is  one  nation;  for  the  analytical  investigator  the  central  figure 
is  some  one  of  the  many  intellectual  manifestations  without  reference 
to  any  particular  nation,  non  quis  sed  quid.  These  homogeneous  facts 


276          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

he  sets  out  to  analyze  in  order  to  discover  the  laws  which  underlie  the 
development  of  the  phenomena  which  make  up  this  particular  group.  "88 

The  failure  of  nineteenth-century  historical  scholarship  has 
been  due  in  some  measure  also  to  the  arbitrary  limitation  of 
the  investigator's  outlook,  consequent  upon  his  preoccupation 
with  documentary  evidence.  By  insensible  degrees,  however,  the 
historian  has  come  to  see  that  there  is  no  hard  and  fast  boundary 
between  "historic"  and  "prehistoric"  times,  between  "his- 
torical" and  "unhistorical"  peoples;  the  history  of  Man  in- 
cludes man  everywhere  and  at  all  times.  Furthermore,  the  his- 
torian has  come  to  see  that  "history"  cannot  be  confined  to 
any  one  set  of  happenings  or  to  any  one  category  of  facts.  It 
must,  therefore,  be  admitted  that,  in  reality,  Anthropology 
and  History  differ  only  in  so  far  as  each  represents  the  use  of 
a  special  investigative  technique. 

The  widening  outlook  of  both  anthropologists  and  historians, 
then,  as  well  as  the  requirements  of  science,  demands  the  co- 
ordination of  these  two  phases  of  humanistic  inquiry ;  and  yet 
it  is  clear  that  the  technique  of  the  Abbe  Breuil  is  not  inter- 
changeable with  that  of  Mr.  Round.  In  this  dilemma,  it  becomes 
necessary  to  consider  the  relations  subsisting  between  specialists 
in  other  historical  fields,  such  as  Geology  and  Biology.  Differ- 
ences of  technique  in  these  subjects  interpose  no  obstacle  to  the 
orderly  prosecution  of  an  evolutionary  investigation ;  and  it 
requires  but  a  cursory  examination,  say  of  the  work  of  Charles 
Darwin,  to  realise  that  the  co-ordination  of  the  various  aspects 
of  biological  study  is  a  result  of  the  general  acceptance  of  a  com- 
mon aim,  namely,  the  discovery  of  the  processes  manifested  in 
biological  evolution. 

Here  in  our  progress  we  are  seemingly  at  fault,  for  while 
the  unity  of  aim  in  the  biological  sciences  was  created  by  Dar- 
win's theory  of  Natural  Selection,  in  the  humanistic  sciences  no 
equally  acceptable  hypothesis  has  yet  been  formulated. 80  If, 


ss  Lectures  on  the  Study  of  Language  (New  York,  1902),  pp.  5-24. 
8»  The  present  study  concerns   itself   only  with   questions   of  method, 
and   designedly   omits   all   criticism    or   discussion   of   the    many   general 


I916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  277 

however,  for  the  moment,  we  might  assume  that  a  working 
hypothesis  had  been  stated,  an  inference  may  be  drawn  as  to 
the  effect  of  this  upon  the  activities  of  the  historical  investigator : 
he  would  continue  to  employ  the  same  investigative  technique, 
and  would  confine  his  researches  to  the  same  area  as  before, 
but  the  aim  and  spirit  of  his  inquiries  would  have  undergone  a 
complete  change.  His  object  would  no  longer  be  the  creation 
of  an  aesthetic  or  philosophical  synthesis  of  a  complete  whole, 
but  the  isolation  and  determination  of  the  processes  manifested 
in  the  phenomena  with  which  he  deals;  he  would  continue  his 
critical  investigation  of  facts,  but  always  with  a  view  to  their 
bearing  upon  the  central  problem  of  Human  Evolution. 

We  have  learned,  of  late,  that  "impartiality"  in  historio- 
graphy is  a  mistaken  ideal.  We  may  now  see  that  through  the 
application  of  the  method  of  science  to  the  facts  of  history  preju- 
dice in  favor  of  one's  own  people  would  give  place  to  the  Stoic 
view  that  "all  men  living,  or  who, once  lived,  ^belong to  the_co 
mon  human  family, ' '  !)0""'arra  we  may  see  hmv  the  ambition  to 
contribute,  in  however  minor  a  degree,  to  the  solution  of  the 
well-nigh  insuperable  problem  that  confronts  mankind  would 
tend  to  supplant,  in  the  minds  of  scholars,  the  war-compelling 
spirit  of  nationality.  In  the  past,  the  historiographer  has  been 
a  chief  exponent  of  emotions  that  eventually  find  expression  in 
conflict ;  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  historical  investigator 
may  not,  in  the  future,  contribute  to  an  understanding  of  the 
processes  manifested  in  the  activities  of  mankind.  It  is  pre- 
eminently for  the  investigator  to  realise  that  "Upon  this  gen- 
eration of  students  is  laid  the  task  of  finding  for  history  its 
proper  place  both  in  science  and  in  education."  91 


theories  of  "progress"  and  of  the  meaning  of  history  which  have  been 
put  forward.  Similarly,  a  consideration  of  the  contributions  which  have 
been  made  towards  a  scientific  hypothesis  for  human  evolution  has  been 
deferred  to  a  later  occasion. 

90  The    widespread    existence    of    such    an    attitude    is    exemplified    in 
the  Papers  on  Inter-Racial  Problems  communicated  to  the  First   Universal 
Races  Congress,  London,  1911. 

91  Sir  J.  E.   Seeley,  Introduction  to  Political  Science   (London,   1896), 
p.  384. 


278          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 


I.     1.  The  Method  of  Science 

2.  The  Relation  of  Philosophy  to  Science 
II.  The  Problems  of  Historiography 

1.  Historical  Investigation   and   Historiography 

2.  a.  Greek   and   Roman   Historiography 
&.  Medieval  Historiography 

c.  Modern   Historiography 

3.  Histories  of  the  Philosophy  of  History 

4.  History  in  Current  Philosophical  Discussion 
III.     The  Comparative  Method 

The  bibliographical  memoranda  which  follow  are  not  presented  as  a 
conspectus  of  the  literature  of  the  subjects  referred  to,  but  are  offered 
as  a  selection  in  further  illustration  of  the  matters  dealt  with  in  the  text. 
The  titles  are  arranged  in  chronological  order. 


I 

THE  METHOD  OF  SCIENCE 

1 

Herschel,  Sir  John.  A  preliminary  discourse  on  the  study  of  natural 
philosophy.  London,  1830.  (Lardner's  cabinet  cyclopaedia.)  New  ed., 
1851. 

Whewell,  William.  History  of  the  inductive  sciences.  London,  1837. 
3d  ed.,  1857.  3  vols. 

Whewell,  William.  The  philosophy  of  the  inductive  sciences,  founded 
upon  their  history.  London,  1840.  2  vols.  3d  ed.,  Cambridge,  1858-1860. 
4  vols. 

Mill,  John  Stuart.  A  system  of  logic,  ratiocinative  and  inductive, 
being  a  connected  view  of  the  principles  of  evidence  and  the  methods 
of  scientific  investigation.  London,  1843.  2  vols.  9th  ed.,  1875.  2  vols. 

Lewes,  George  Henry.  Aristotle:  a  chapter  from  the  history  of  sci- 
ence. London,  1864. 

Bernard,  Claude.  Introduction  a  1 'etude  de  la  medicine  experimentale. 
Paris,  1865. 

Fowler,  Thomas.  The  elements  of  inductive  logic.  Oxford,  1869. 
6th  ed.,  1892. 

Bain,  Alexander.    Logic.     London,  1870. 

Tyndall,   John.      On   the   scientific   use   of   the   imagination.     London, 


1916J  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  279 

1870.    In  his  Fragments  of  science.    London,  1871.     7th  ed.,  1889.     2  vola. 

Jevons,  William  Stanley.  The  principles  of  science.  London,  1874. 
2  vols.  3d  ed.,  1879. 

Bernard,  Claude.     La  science  experimentale.     Paris,  1878. 

Gore,  George.     The  art  of  scientific  discovery. '  London,  1878. 

Clifford,  William  Kingdon.  Lectures  and  essays.  London,  1879.  2 
vols. 

Naville,  Ernest.     La  logique  de  Phypothese.     Paris,  1880. 

Wundt,  Wilhelm.  Logik:  eine  Untersuchung  der  Principien  der 
Erkenntniss  und  der  Methoden  wissenschaftlicher  Forschung.  Stuttgart, 
1880-83.  2  vols.  3.  Aufl.,  1906-1908.  3  vols. 

Stallo,  John  Bernhard.  The  concepts  and  theories  of  modern  physics. 
New  York,  1882.  (International  scientific  series,  38.) 

Mach,  Ernst.  Die  Mechanik,  in  ihrer  Entwickelung  historisch-kritisch 
dargestellt.  Leipzig,  1883.  (Internationale  wissenschaftliche  Bibliothek, 
59.)  6.  Aufl.,  1908. 

The  science  of  mechanics;  a  critical  and  historical  account 

of  its  development,  tr.  by  T.  J.  McCormack.  Chicago,  1893.  2d  ed.,  1902. 

Funck-Brentano,  Theophile.  Les  prineipes  de  la  decouverte.  Paris, 
1885. 

Bosanquet,  Bernard.  Logic.  Oxford,  1888.  2  vols.  2d  ed.,  1911. 
2  vols. 

Venn,  John.  Principles  of  empirical  or  inductive  logic.  London, 
1889. 

Chamberlin,  Thomas  Chrowder.  The  method  of  multiple  working 
hypotheses.  Science,  15  (1890),  92-96. 

Pearson,  Karl.  The  grammar  of  science.  London,  1892.  2d  ed.,  1900. 
3d  ed..  Part  1.  1911. 

Welton,  James.  A  manual  of  logic.  London,  1891-96.  2  vols.  (The 
university  tutorial  series.) 

Boutroux,  Emile.  De  1'idee  de  loi  naturelle  dans  la  science  et  la 
philosophic  contemporaines.  Paris,  1895. 

Natural  law  in  science  and  philosophy,  tr.  by  Fred  Eoth- 

well.  New  York,  1914. 

Muirhead,  John  Henry.  Hypothesis  [1895].  In  his  Philosophy  and 
life,  and  other  essays.  London,  1902.  pp.  230-263. 

Hibben,  John  Grier.     Inductive  logic.     Edinburgh,  1896. 

Merz,  John  Theodore.  A  history  of  European  thought  in  the  nine- 
teenth century.  Edinburgh,  1896-1914.  4  vols. 

Favre,  Louis.  Contribution  a  1 'etude  de  la  methode  dans  les  sciences 
experimentales.  Paris,  1898.  (Bibliotheque  des  methodes  dans  les  sci- 
ences experimentales.) 

Milhaud,  Gaston.  Le  rationnel.  Paris,  1898.  (Bibliotheque  de  philo- 
sophic contemporaine.) 

Mivart,  St.George.  The  groundwork  of  science.  New  York  and  London, 
1898.  (Progressive  science  series.) 

Favre,   Louis.     L  'organisation   de  la  science.     Paris,   1900.      (Biblio- 


280          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     I  VOL.  4 

theque  des  methodes  dans  les  sciences  experimentales.     2.) 

Hill,  Alexander.  Introduction  to  science.  London,  1900.  (Temple 
primers.) 

Poincare',  Henri.  La  science  et  1'hypothese.  Paris,  1902.  (Biblio- 
theque de  philosophic  scientifique.) 

Science  and  hypothesis,  tr.   by  G.  B.   Halsted.     New  York, 
1905. 

Same,  tr.  by  W.  J.  G.     London,  1905. 

Ashley,  Myron  Lucius.  The  nature  of  hypothesis.  In  Dewey,  John, 
ed.,  Studies  in  logical  theory.  Chicago,  1903.  pp.  143-183. 

Ostwald,  Wilhelm.  On  the  theory  of  science.  In  Rogers,  H.  J.,  ed., 
Congress  of  arts  and  science,  St.  Louis,  1904,  vol.  1.  Boston,  1905.  pp. 
333-352. 

Poincare,  Henri.  La  valeur  de  la  science.  Paris,  1905.  (Biblio- 
theque de  philosophie  scientifique.) 

The  value  of  science,  tr.  by  G.  B.  Halsted.     New  York,  1907. 

Enriques,  Federigo.     Problem!  della   scienza.     Bologna,   1906. 

Problems    of    science,    tr.    by    Katharine    Royce.      Chicago, 

1914. 

Picard,  Emile.  La  science  modern e  et  son  etat  actuel.  Paris,  [1906]. 
(Bibliotheque  de  philosophie  scientifique.) 

Santayana,  George.  The  life  of  reason,  or  The  phases  of  human 
progress.  Reason  in  science.  New  York,  1906. 

Strong,  Thomas  Banks,  ed.  Lectures  on  the  method  of  science.  Ox- 
ford, 1906. 

Becher,  Erich.  Philosophische  Yoraussetzungen  der  exakten  Natur- 
wissenschaften.  Leipzig,  1907. 

Nunn,  Thomas  Percy.  The  aim  and  achievements  of  scientific  method: 
an  epistemological  essay.  London,  1907. 

Bouasse,  Henri,  and  others.  De  la  methode  dans  les  sciences.  Paris, 
1909.  2e  6d.,  1910. 

Mauge,  Francis.  L'hypothese  rationaliste  et  la  methode  experimentale. 
Paris,  1909. 

Poincare,  Henri.  Science  et  methode.  Paris,  1909.  (Bibliotheque  de 
philosophie  scientifique.) 

Science  and  method,  tr.  by  G.  B.  Halsted.     New  York,  19 — . 

Same,  tr.  by  Francis  Maitland.     London,  [1914], 

Dannemann,   Friedrich.      Die   Naturwissenschaften    in    ihrer   Entwick- 

lung  und  in  ihrem  Zusammenhange.    Leipzig,  1910-1913.    4  vols. 

Dewey,  John.  Science  as  subject-matter  and  as  method.  Science, 
n.s.  31  (1910),  121-127. 

Lodge,  Sir  Oliver.  Reason  and  belief.  New  York,  1910.  Part  III: 
"The  scope  of  science,"  pp.  119-155. 

Gorland,  Albert.  Die  Hypothese;  ihre  Aufgabe  und  ihre  Stelle  in  der 
Arbeit  der  Naturwissenschaft.  Gottingen,  1911.  (Wege  zur  Philosophie. 
Nr.  4.) 


1916]  Teggart :  Prolegomena  to  History  281 

Thomson,  John  Arthur.  Introduction  to  science.  New  York,  London, 
e.  1911.  (Home  university  library.) 

Turner,  Herbert  Hall.  The  characteristics  of  the  observational  sci- 
ences. British  Association,  Report  of  the  SOth  meeting,  1911.  London, 
1912.  pp.  305-319. 

Le  Dantec,  Felix.  Qu'est-ce  que  la  science?  Definition  de  la  science. 
Les  appareils  de  mesure.  Paris,  c.  1910. 

Westaway,  F.  W.  Scientific  method:  its  philosophy  and  its  practice. 
London,  1912. 

Whetham,  William  Cecil  Dampier.  The  foundations  of  science.  Lon- 
don, [1912].  (The  people's  books.) 

Whetham,  W.  C.  D.,  and  Whetham,  Catherine  Durning.  Science  and 
the  human  mind:  a  critical  and  historical  account  of  the  development  of 
natural  knowledge.  London,  1912. 

Poincare,  Henri.  Dernieres  pensees.  Paris,  1913.  (Bibliotheque  de 
philosophic  scientifique.) 

Macintosh,  Douglas  Clyde.  The  problem  of  knowledge.  New  York, 
1915.  Chap.  XX.  "The  problem  of  scientific  method,"  pp.  459-496. 


THE  KELATION  OF  PHILOSOPHY  TO  SCIENCE 

Riehl,  Aloys.  The  principles  of  the  critical  philosophy.  Introduction 
to  the  theory  of  science  and  metaphysics  [1887],  tr.  by  Arthur  Fairbanks. 
London,  1894.  (The  English  and  foreign  philosophical  library.) 

Paulsen,  Friedrich.     Einleitung  in   die  Philosophic.     Berlin,   1892. 

Introduction  to  philosophy,  tr.  by  Frank  Thilly.     New  York, 
1895.     2d  ed.,  1906. 

Naville,  Ernest.  La  definition  de  la  philosophie.  Paris,  1894.  (Biblio- 
theque de  philosophie  contemporaine.) 

Kiilpe,  Oswald.  Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie.  Leipzig,  1895.  6. 
Aufl.,  1913. 

Introduction  to  philosophy,  tr.  by  W.  B.  Pillsbury  and  E.  B. 
Titchener.     London,  1897. 

Jerusalem,  Wilhelm.     Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie.     Wien,  1899. 

Introduction    to    philosophy,    tr.    by    C.    F.    Sanders.      New 
York,   1910. 

Wundt,  Wilhelm.     Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie.     Leipzig,   1901. 

Sidgwick,  Henry.     Philosophy,  its  scope  and  relations.     London,  1902. 

Mackenzie,  John  Stuart.     Outlines  of  metaphysics.     London,  1902. 

Marvin,  Walter  Taylor.  An  introduction  to  systematic  philosophy. 
New  York,  1903. 

Taylor,    Alfred    Edward.      Elements    of    metaphysics.      London,    1903. 

Arnold,  Robert  Brandon.  Scientific  fact  and  metaphysical  reality. 
London,  1904. 

Perry,   Ralph   Barton.      The   approach   to   philosophy.      London,    1905. 

Miinsterberg,  Hugo.     Science  and  idealism.     Boston,  1906. 


282          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

James,  William.     Pragmatism.     New  York,  1907. 

Eey,  Abel.  La  philosophic  moderne.  Paris,  1908.  (Bibliotheque  de 
philosophie  scientifique.) 

Delbet,  Pierre.  La  science  et  la  realite.  Paris,  1913.  (Bibliotheque 
de  philosophie  scientifique.) 

Eussell,  Bertrand.  The  problems  of  philosophy.  New  York,  [19 — ]. 
(Home  university  library.) 

Eussell,  Bertrand.  Our  knowledge  of  the  external  world  as  a  field 
for  scientific  method  in  philosophy.  Chicago,  London,  1914. 

Windelband,  Wilhelm.    Einleitung  in  die  Philosophie.    Tubingen,  1914. 


II 
THE  PEOBLEMS  OF  HISTOEIOGEAPHY 

1 

Lewis,  Sir  George  Cornewall.  A  treatise  on  the  methods  of  obser- 
vation and  reasoning  in  politics.  London,  1852.  2  vols. 

Droysen,  Johann  Gustav.  Grundriss  der  Historik.  Leipzig,  1868. 
3.  Aufl.,  1882. 

Outline  of  the  principles  of  history,  tr.  by  E.  B.   Andrews. 
Boston,  1893. 

Bradley,  Francis  Herbert.  The  presuppositions  of  critical  history. 
Oxford,  1874. 

Smedt,  Charles  de.     Principes  de  la  critique  historique.     Liege,  1883. 

Gebhardt,    Bruno.      Geschichtswerk    und    Kunstwerk.      Breslau,    1885. 

Freeman,  Edward  Augustus.  The  methods  of  historical  study.  Lon- 
don, 1886. 

Stubbs,  William.  Seventeen  lectures  on  the  study  of  medieval  and 
modern  history.  Oxford,  1887. 

Bourdeau,  Louis.  L'histoire  et  les  historiens;  essai  critique  sur 
1'histoire  consideree  comme  science  positive.  Paris,  1888. 

Letelier,  Valentin.  Por  que  se  rehace  la  historia?  Santiago  de  Chile, 
1888.  2a  ed.:  La  evolucion  de  la  historia.  Santiago  de  Chile,  1900.  2  vols. 

Tolstoi,  Leo.  Power  and  liberty,  tr.  by  Huntington  Smith.  New 
York,  c.  1888. 

Bernheim,  Ernst.  Lehrbuch  der  historischen  Methode  [und  der 
Geschichtsphilosophie].  Leipzig,  1889.  2.  Aufl.,  1894.  3.-4.  Aufl.,  1903. 
5.-6.  Aufl.,  1908. 

Altamira  y  Crevea,  Eafael.  La  esenanza  de  la  historia.  Madrid, 
1891.  2a  ed.,  1895. 

Villari,  Pasquale.  La  storia  e  una  scienza?  Nuova  antologia,  3  ser., 
31  (1891),  409-436;  32  (1891),  609-636;  34  (1891),  209-225. 

Is  history  a  science?     In  his  Studies,  historical  and  critical, 
tr.  by  Linda  Villari.     New  York,  1907.    pp.  1-115. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  283 

Gumplowicz,  Ludwig.     Sociologie  und  Politik.     Leipzig,  1892. 

—     Sociologie  et  politique.     Paris,   1898.      (Bibliotheque   sociolo- 
gique  internationale.     xii.)     A  translation,  with  additions. 

Lacombe,  Paul.     De  1'histoire  considered  comme  science.     Paris,  1894. 

Mortet,  Charles  &  Victor.  La  science  de  1'histoire.  Paris,  1894. 
"Extrait  de  la  Grande  Encyclopedic." 

Cian,  Vittorio.  L'estetica  della  storia  considerata  specialmente  nelle 
sue  manifestazioni  litterarie.  Messina,  1896. 

Croce,  Benedetto.  II  concetto  della  storia  nelle  sue  relazioni  col 
concetto  dell'arte.  2a  ed.  Roma,  1896. 

Lamprecht,  Karl.  Alte  und  neue  Richtungen  in  der  Geschichts- 
wissenschaft.  Berlin,  1896. 

Seeley,  Sir  John  Robert.  Introduction  to  political  science.  Lon- 
don, 1896. 

Barge,  Hermann.  Entwicklung  der  geschichtswissenschaftlichen  An- 
schauungen  in  Deutschland.  Leipzig,  1898. 

Langlois,   Charles  Victor,   and  Seignobos,   Charles.     Introduction   aux 
etudes  historiques.    Paris,  1898.    2e  ed.,  1899.    3e  ed.,  1905.    4"  ed.,  [1909]. 
Introduction   to   the   study   of   history,   tr.   by   G.    G.   Berry. 
London,   1898. 

Trojano,  Paolo  Raffaele.  La  storia  come  scienza  sociale.  Prolegomeni. 
Napoli,  1898. 

Fling,  Fred  Morrow.  Outline  of  historical  method.  Lincoln,  Neb., 
1899. 

Breysig,  Kurt.  Aufgaben  und  Massstabe  einer  allgemeinen  Geschichts- 
schreibung.  Berlin,  1900.  (Kulturgeschichte  der  Neuzeit.  I.  Bd.) 

Lamprecht,  Karl.     Die  kulturhistorische  Methode.     Berlin,   1900. 

Seignobos,  Charles.  Le  methode  historique  appliquee  aux  sciences 
sociales.  Paris,  1901.  (Bibliotheque  generale  des  sciences  sociales.) 

Helmolt,  Hans  Ferdinand,  ed.  The  history  of  the  world.  Vol.  1. 
New  York,  1902.  "Introductory  essay,"  by  Viscount  Bryce,  pp.  xv-lx. 
"The  idea,  universal  history,"  by  H.  F.  Helmolt,  pp.  1-19. 

Altamira  y  Crevea,  Rafael.    Cuestiones  modernas  de  historia.    Madrid, 

1904.  (Biblioteca  cientinco-filosofica.) 

Battaini,  Domenico.     Manuale  de  metodologia  storica.     Firenze,  1904. 
Bernheim,  Ernst.     Einleitung  in  die  Geschichtswissenschaft.     Leipzig, 

1905.  (Sammlung  Goschen,  [270].) 

Breysig,  Kurt.  Der  Stufen-Bau  und  die  Gesetze  der  Welt-Geschichte. 
Berlin,  1905. 

Lamprecht,  Karl.  What  is  history?  Five  lectures  on  the  modern 
science  of  history,  tr.  by  E.  A.  Andrews.  New  York,  1905. 

Stephens,  Henry  Morse.  Syllabus  of  a  course  of  twelve  lectures  on 
history  and  historians.  Berkeley,  1905. 

Congress  of  Arts  and  Science,  St.  Louis,  1904.  Vol.  2.  Boston,  1906. 
"The  variety  and  unity  of  history,"  Woodrow  Wilson,  pp.  3-20.  "The 
science  of  history  in  the  nineteenth  century,"  William  Milligan  Sloane, 


284          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

pp.  23-39.  "The  conception  and  methods  of  history,"  James  Harvey 
Robinson,  pp.  40-51.  "Historical  development  and  present  character  of 
the  science  of  history,"  Karl  Gotthart  Lamprecht,  pp.  111-124.  "The 
place  of  modern  history  in  the  perspective  of  knowledge,"  John  Bagnell 
Bury,  pp.  142-152.  ' '  Historical  synthesis, ' '  Charles  W.  Colby,  pp.  152-168. 

Meister,  Aloys,  ed.  Grundriss  der  Geschichtswissenschaft.  Leipzig, 
1906  ff.,  in  progress. 

Eibera,  Julian.     Lo  cientifico  en  la  historia.     Madrid,  1906. 

George,  Hereford  Brooke.     Historical  evidence.     Oxford,  1909. 

Meyer,  Eduard.  Die  Geschichte  und  die  Geschichtswissenschaft.  In 
his  Geschichte  des  Altertums.  3.  Aufl.  Stuttgart,  1910.  vol.  1,  pp.  184-245. 

Wolf,  Gustav.  Einfuhrung  in  das  Studium  der  Neueren  Geschichte. 
Berlin,  1910. 

Vincent,  John  Martin.  Historical  research;  an  outline  of  theory  and 
practice.  New  York,  1911. 

Beloch,  Karl  Julius.  Die  Personlichkeit  in  der  Geschichte.  In  his 
Griechische  Geschichte.  2.  Aufl.  Strassburg,  1912.  vol.  1,  pp.  1-16. 

Lamprecht,  Karl.  Einfiihrung  in  das  historische  Denken.  Leipzig, 
1912. 

Desdevises  du  Dezert,  Georges  Nicolas,  and  Brehier,  Louis.  Questions 
historiques.  Le  travail  historique.  Paris,  1913. 

Legendre,  Maurice.  L'histoire  comme  science  morale.  Annales  de 
philosophic  chretienne,  165  (1913),  561-603;  166  (1913),  211-250. 

Trevelyan,  George  Macaulay.  Clio,  a  muse;  and  other  essays.  London, 
1913.  "  Clio,  a  muse, "  pp.  1-55. 

Gretton,  Richard  Henry.  History.  London,  [1914].  (The  art  and 
craft  of  letters.) 

Morley,  John,  viscount.  Notes  on  politics  and  history:  a  university 
address.  New  York,  1914. 


2 
4»  A.  GREEK  AND  ROMAN  HISTORIOGRAPHY 

Ritter,  Moriz.  Studien  iiber  die  Entwickelung  der  Geschichtswissen- 
schaft. I.  Die  antike  Geschichtschreibung.  Historische  Zeitschrift, 
54  (1885),  1-41. 

Pais,  Ettore.  Delia  storiografia  e  della  filosofia  della  storia  presso 
i  Greei.  Livorno,  1889. 

Meyer,  Eduard.  Forschungen  zur  alten  Geschichte.  Halle  a.  S., 
1892-99.  2  vols. 

Biidinger,   Max.     Die  Universalhistorie  im   Alterthume.     Wien,   1895. 

Wachsmuth,  Curt.  Einleitung  in  das  Studium  der  alten  Geschichte. 
Leipzig,  1895. 

Bruns,  Ivo.  Das  literarische  Portrat  der  Griechen  im  fiinften  und 
vierten  Jahrhundert  vor  Christ!  Geburt.  Berlin,  1896. 

Peter,    Hermann.      Die    geschichtliche    Litteratur    iiber    die    romische 


1916J  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  285 

Kaiserzeit  bis  Theodosius  I.  und  ihre  Quellen.     Leipzig,  1897.     2  vols. 

Wachsmuth,  Curt.  Ueber  Ziele  und  Methoden  der  griechischen  Geschicht- 
schreibung.  Leipzig,  1897. 

Bruns,  Ivo.  Die  Personlichkeit  in  der  Geschichtsschreibung  der  Alten. 
Untersuchungen  zur  Technik  der  antiken  Historiographie.  Berlin,  1898. 

Norden,  Eduard.  Die  antike  Kunstprosa  vom  VI.  Jahrhundert  v. 
Chr.  bis  in  die  Zeit  der  Eenaissance.  Leipzig,  1898.  2  vols. 

Seeck,  Otto  Karl.  Die  Entwicklung  der  antiken  Geschichtschreibung, 
und  andere  populare  Sehriften.  Berlin,  1898. 

Leo,  Friedricli.  Die  griechisch-romische  Biographie  nach  ihrer  liter- 
arischen  Form.  Leipzig,  1901. 

Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,  Ulrich  von.  Greek  historical  writing,  and 
Apollo.  Two  lectures  delivered  before  the  University  of  Oxford.  Tr.  by 
Gilbert  Murray.  Oxford,  1908. 

Bury,  John  Bagnell.  The  ancient  Greek  historians.  Harvard  lectures. 
New  York,  1909. 

Soltau,  Wilhelm.  Die  Anfange  der  romischen  Geschichtschreibung. 
Leipzig,  1909. 

Neumann,  Karl  Johannes.  Entwicklung  und  Aufgaben  der  alten 
Geschichte.  Strassburg,  1910. 

Peter,  Hermann.  Wahrheit  and  Kunst,  Geschichtschreibung  und 
Plagiat  im  klassischen  Altertum.  Leipzig,  1911. 

Scheller,  Paul.  De  hellenistica  historiae  conscribendae  arte.  Leipzig, 
1911. 

Stemplinger,  Eduard.  Das  Plagiat  in  der  griechischen  Literatur. 
Leipzig,  1912. 

Hanotaux,  Gabriel.  De  1  'histoire  et  des  historiens.  Revue  des  deux 
rnondes,  6e  periode,  17  (1913),  305-326,  481-497,  721-737.  1.  De  1 'histoire. 
2.  Les  historiens  grecs.  3.  Les  historiens  latins. 

B.  MEDIEVAL  HISTORIOGRAPHY 

Ebert,  Adolf.  Allgemeine  Geschichte  der  Literatur  des  Mittelalters 
im  Abendlande.  Leipzig,  1874-87.  3  vols.  Bd.  I.  2.  Aufl.,  1889. 

Lasch,  Berthold.  Das  Erwachen  und  die  Entwickelung  der  historischen 
Kritik  im  Mittelalter  (vom  VI.-XII.  Jahrhundert).  Breslau,  1887. 

Krumbacher,  Karl.  Geschichte  der  byzantinischen  Litteratur  von 
Justinian  bis  zum  Ende  des  ostromischen  Eeiches  (527-1453).  Miinchen, 
1891.  2.  Aufl.,  1897.  (Handbuch  der  klassischen  Altertumswissenschaft, 
hrsg.  von  Iwan  von  Miiller.  9.  Bd.,  1.  Abt.) 

Grober,  Gustav.  Uebersicht  iiber  die  lateinische  Litteratur  von  der 
Mitte  des  6.  Jahrhunderts  bis  1350.  [1893].  In  liis  Grundriss  der 
romanischen  Philologie.  II.  Bd.,  1.  Abt.  Strassburg,  1902.  pp.  97-432. 

Biidinger,  Max.  Die  Universalhistorie  im  Mittelalter  [1898].  DenTc- 
schriften  der  Tc.  ATcademie  der  Wissenschaften.  Philosophisch-historische 
Classe.  46  (1900),  Abh.  I.  47  pp.;  Abh.  II.  43  pp. 

Schulz,    Marie.      Die    Lehre    von    der    historischen    Methode    bei    den 


286          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

Geschichtschreibern  des  Mittelalters  (VI.-XIII.  Jahrhundert.)  Berlin, 
1909.  (Abhandlungen  zur  Mittleren  und  Neueren  Geschichte,  13.) 

Manitius,  Max.  Geschichte  der  lateinischen  Literatur  des  Mittel- 
alters. I.  Teil:  Von  Justinian  bis  zur  Mitte  des  zehnten  Jahrhunderts. 
Miinchen,  1911.  (Handbuch  der  klassischen  Altertumswissenschaft,  hrsg. 
von  Iwan  von  Miiller.  9.  Bd.,  2  Abt.) 

Ritter,  Moriz.  Studien  iiber  die  Entwicklung  der  Geschichtswissen- 
schaft.  II.  Die  christlich-mittelalterliche  Geschichtschreibung.  Historische 
Zeitschrift,  107  (1911),  237-305. 


c.  MODERN  EUROPEAN  HISTORIOGRAPHY 

Simon,  Jules.     Thiers,  Guizot,  Remusat.     Paris,  1885. 

Wegele,  Franz  Xavier  von.  Geschichte  der  deutschen  .Historiographie 
seit  dem  Auftreten  des  Humanismus.  Miinchen,  1885.  (Geschichte  der 
Wissenschaften  in  Deutschland.  Neuere  Zeit.  Bd.  20.) 

Acton,  John  Emerich  Edward  Dalberg-,  baron.  German  schools  of 
history.  English  historical  review,  1  (1886),  7-42.  In  his  Historical  essays 
&  studies,  ed.  by  J.  N.  Figgis  and  R.  V.  Laurence.  London,  1908.  pp. 
344-392. 

Lorenz,  Ottokar.  Die  Geschichtswissenschaft  in  Hauptrichtungen 
und  Aufgaben.  Berlin,  1886-1891.  2  vols. 

Monod,  Gabriel.  Les  etudes  historiques  en  France.  Eevue  Inter- 
nationale de  I'enseignement,  18  (1889),  587-599. 

Jameson,  John  Franklin.  The  development  of  modern  European  his- 
toriography. Atlantic  monthly,  66  (1890),  322-333. 

Simon,  Jules.     Mignet,  Michelet,  Henri  Martin.     Paris,  1890. 

Jameson,  John  Franklin.  The  history  of  historical  writing  in  America. 
Boston,  1891. 

Meunier,  Georges.  Les  grands  historiens  du  dix-neuvieme  siecle. 
Etudes  et  extraits.  Paris,  1894. 

Monod,  Gabriel.  Les  maitres  de  1  'histoire.  Renan,  Taine,  Michelet. 
Paris,  1894.  3e  ed.,  1895. 

Wyss,  Georg  von.  Geschichte  der  Historiographie  in  der  Schweiz. 
Zurich,  1895. 

Jullian,  Camille.  Extraits  des  historiens  francjais  du  xixe  siecle,  .  .  . 
precedes  d'une  Introduction  sur  1 'histoire  en  France.  Paris,  1896.  6e  ed., 
1910. 

Maigron,  Louis.  Le  roman  historique  a  1  'epoque  romantique.  Essai 
sur  1 'influence  de  Walter  Scott.  Paris,  1898.  "Le  roman  historique  et 
1  'histoire  au  xixe  siecle, ' '  pp.  388-413. 

Guilland,  Antoine.  L  'Allemagne  nouvelle  et  ses  historiens.  Niebuhr, 
Ranke,  Mommsen,  Sybel,  Treitschke.  Paris,  1899. 

Modern  Germany  and  her  historians.     London,  1915. 

Caron,  Pierre,  and  Sagnac,  Philippe.  L  'etat  actuel  des  etudes  d  'histoire 
moderne  en  France.  Paris,  1902. 


19161  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  287 

Levrault,  Leon.  L'histoire.  Evolution  du  genre.  Paris  [1904].  (Les 
genres  litteraires.) 

Liitzow,  Franz,  graf  von.  Lectures  on  the  historians  of  Bohemia. 
London,  1905. 

Schaumkell,  Ernst.  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Kulturgeschicht- 
schreibung  von  der  Mitte  des  18.  Jahrhunderts  bis  zur  Romantik  im 
Zusammenhang  mit  der  allgemeinen  geistigen  Entwicklung.  Leipzig, 
1905. 

Grant,  Arthur  James.  English  historians,  with  an  Introduction.  Lon- 
don, 1906.  (The  Warwick  library.) 

Poetzsch,  Albert.  Studien  zur  friihromantischen  Politik  und 
Geschichtsauffassung.  Leipzig,  1907.  (Beitrage  zur  Kultur-  und  Univer- 
salgeschichte.  3.  Heft.) 

Gooch,  George  Peabody.  The  growth  of  historical  science.  In  The 
Cambridge  modern  history.  New  York,  1910.  XII,  816-850,  972-976. 

Joachimsen,  Paul.  Geschichtsauffassung  und  Geschichtschreibung  in 
Deutschland  unter  dem  Einfluss  des  Humanismus.  Leipzig,  1910.  (Bei- 
trage zur  Kulturgeschichte  des  Mittelalters  und  der  Renaissance.  Heft  6.) 

Fueter,  Eduard.  Geschichte  der  Neueren  Historiographie.  Miinchen, 
1911.  (Handbuch  der  Mittelalterlichen  und  Neueren  Geschichte,  hrsg. 
von  G.  v.  Below  und  F.  Meinecke.  Abt.  I.) 

Histoire   de   1  'historiographie   moderne.      Traduit   par   Emile 
Jeanmaire,  avec  notes  et  additions  de  1  'auteur.     Paris,  1914. 

Mencke-Gliickert,  Emil.  Die  Geschichtschreibung  der  Reformation 
und  Gegenreformation.  Leipzig,  1912. 

Ritter,  Moriz.  Studien  iiber  die  Entwicklung  der  Geschichtswissen- 
schaft.  3.  Artikel.  Das  Zeitalter  des  Humanismus,  der  Reformation 
und  Gegenreformation.  Historische  Zeitschrift,  109  (1912),  261-341.  4. 
Artikel.  Das  18.  Jahrhundert.  Same,  112  (1914),  29-131. 

Campolieti,  Garibaldi.  L  'evolution  du  genre  historique  au  xviie  siecle 
et  au  commencement  du  xviiie.  Citta  di  Castello,  1913. 

Gooch,  George  Peabody.  History  and  historians  in  the  nineteenth 
century.  London,  1913. 

Halphen,  Louis.    L  'histoire  en  France  depuis  cent  ans.    Paris,  1914. 

Langlois,  Charles  Victor.  Les  etudes  historiques.  In  La  science 
franchise.  Paris,  1915.  II,  73-96. 

3 

HISTORIES  OF  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HISTORY 

Flint,  Robert.  The  philosophy  of  history  in  France  and  Germany. 
Edinburgh  &  London,  1874.  (The  philosophy  of  history  in  Europe, 
vol.  1.) 

Rougemont,  Frederic  de.  Les  deux  cites.  La  philosophic  de  1  'histoire 
aux  differents  ages  de  1'humanite.  Paris,  1874.  2  vols. 

Mayr,  Richard.  Die  philosophische  Geschichtsauffassung  der  Neu- 
zeit.  1.  Abtheilung.  Bis  1700.  Wien,  1877. 


288          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

Rocholl,  Rudolf.  Die  Philosophic  der  Geschichte.  [I.]  Gottingen, 
1878. 

Bernheim,  Ernst.  Geschichtsforschung  und  Geschichtsphilosophie. 
Gottingen,  1880. 

Fester,  Richard.  Rousseau  und  die  deutsche  Geschichtsphilosophie. 
Ein  Beitrag  zur  Geschichte  des  deutschen  Idealismus.  Stuttgart,  1890. 

Lavollee,  Rene.  La  morale  dans  1  'histoire.  Etude  sur  les  principaux 
systemes  de  philosophic  de  1 'histoire  depuis  1 'antiquite  jusqu'a  nos  jours. 
Paris,  1892. 

Flint,  Robert.  Historical  philosophy  in  France  and  French  Belgium 
and  Switzerland.  London,  1893.  (History  of  the  philosophy  of  history, 

[I-]) 

Earth,  Paul.  Die  Philosophic  der  Geschichte  als  Sociologie.  I.  Teil: 
Einleitung  und  kritische  Uebersicht.  Leipzig,  1897.  2.  Aufl.,  1915. 

Goldfriedrich,  Johann.  Die  historische  Ideenlehre  in  Deutschland. 
Berlin,  1902. 

Giinther,  Felix.  Die  "\Vissenschaft  vom  Menschen.  Ein  Beitrag  .  .  . 
mit  besonderer  Riicksicht  auf  die  Entwickelung  der  deutschen  Geschichts- 
philosophie im  18.  Jahrhundert.  Gotha,  1906. 

Eucken,  Rudolf.  Philosophie  der  Geschichte.  In  Paul  Hinneberg, 
ed.,  Die  Kultur  der  Gegenwart.  Teil  I.  Abt.  6.:  Systematische  Philosophie. 
2.  Aufl.  Berlin,  1908.  pp.  248-282. 

Delvaille,  Jules.  Essai  sur  1  'histoire  de  1  'idee  de  progres  jusqu  'a 
la  fin  du  XVIIP  siecle.  Paris,  1910. 

Braun,  Otto.  Geschichtsphilosophie.  In  Aloys  Meister,  ed.,  Grundriss 
der  Geschichtswissenschaft.  Band  I.  Abt.  6.  Leipzig,  1913.  pp.  35-65. 

Eibl,  Hans.  Metaphysik  und  Geschichte.  Eine  Untersuchung  zur 
Entwicklung  der  Geschichtsphilosophie.  I.  Band.  Leipzig,  1913. 


HISTORY  IN  CURRENT  PHILOSOPHICAL  DISCUSSION 
Eucken,     Rudolf.       Geschichte    und     Kritik     der     Grundbegriffe     der 

Gegenwart.     Leipzig,  1878.     3.  Aufl.:   Geistige  Stromungen  der  Gegenwart. 

Leipzig,  1904.     4.  Aufl.,  1909. 

Main    currents   of   modern    thought,    tr.   by   Meyrick    Booth. 

London,   [1912].     "History,"  pp.  308-340. 

Dilthey,  Wilhelm.     Einleitung  in  die  Geisteswissenschaften.     Versuch 

einer  Grundlegung  fiir  das  Studium  der  Gesellschaft  und  der  Geschichte. 

1.  Bd.     Leipzig,  1883. 

Simmel,  Georg.  Die  Probleme  der  Geschichtsphilosophie.  Eine 
erkenntnistheoretische  Studie.  Leipzig,  1892.  2.  Aufl.,  1905.  3.  Aufl., 
1907. 

Windelband,  Wilhelm.  Geschichte  und  Naturwissenschaft.  Rectorats- 
Rede.  Strassburg,  1894.  2.  Aufl.,  1900.  3.  Aufl.,  1904.  In  his  Praludien. 

2.  Aufl.,  Tubingen,  1903.     3.  Aufl.,  1907. 


19161  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  289 

Eickert,  Heinrich.  Die  Grenzen  der  naturwissenschaftlichen  Begriffs- 
bildung.  Eine  logische  Einleitung  in  die  historischen  Wissenschaften. 
Freiburg  i.  B.,  Tiibingen,  1896-1902.  2  pts.  2.  Aufl.,  Tubingen,  1913. 

Fliigel,  Otto.  Idealismus  und  Materialismus  der  Geschichte.  Langeu- 
salza,  1898. 

Berr,  Henri.  L  'avenir  de  la  philosophie.  Esquisse  d  'une  synthese 
des  connaissances  fondee  sur  1'histoire.  Paris,  1899. 

Miinsterberg,  Hugo.  Psychology  and  history.  In  Ms  Psychology  and 
life.  Boston,  1899.  pp.  179-228. 

Eickert,  Heinrich.  Kulturwissenschaft  und  Naturwissenschaft.  Frei- 
burg i.  B.,  1899.  2.  Aufl.,  Tubingen,  1910. 

Xenopol,  A.  D.  Les  principes  fondamentaux  de  1'histoire.  Paris, 
1899.  2e  ed.:  La  theorie  de  1'histoire.  Paris,  1908. 

Lindner,  Theodor.  Geschichtsphilosophie.  Stuttgart,  1901.  2.  Aufl., 
1904.  3.  Aufl.,  1912. 

Meyer,  Eduard.  Zur  Theorie  und  Methodik  der  Geschichte. 
Geschichtsphilosophische  Untersuchungen.  Halle  a.  S.,  1902.  In  his 
Kleine  Schriften.  Halle  a.  S.,  1910.  pp.  1-67. 

Grotenfelt,  Arvid.  Die  Wertschatzung  in  der  Geschichte.  Leipzig, 
1903. 

Eichard,  Gaston.  L'idee  d 'evolution  dans  la  nature  et  1'histoire. 
Paris,  1903.  (Bibliotheque  de  philosophie  contemporaine.) 

Grotenfelt,  Arvid.  Geschichtliche  Wertmassstabe  in  der  Geschichts- 
philosophie bei  Historikern  und  im  Volksbewusstsein.  Leipzig,  1905. 

Bickert,  Heinrich.  Geschichtsphilosophie.  In  Wilhelm  Windelband, 
ed.,  Die  Philosophie  im  Beginn  des  zwanzigsten  .Tahrhunderts.  Fest- 
schrift fiir  Kuno  Fischer.  II.  Bd.  Heidelberg,  1905.  pp.  51-135. 

Spranger,  Eduard.  Die  Grundlagen  der  Geschichtswissenschaft.  Eine 
erkenntnistheoretisch-psychologische  Untersuchung.  Berlin,  1905. 

Lasson,  Adolf.  Geschichtswissenschaft  und  Philosophie.  In  Del- 
briick-Festschrift.  Berlin,  1908.  pp.  17-36. 

Stein,  Ludwig.  Philosophische  Stromungen  der  Gegenwart.  Stutt- 
gart, 1908.  "Das  Problem  der  Geschichte,"  pp.  422-445. 

Galloway,  George.  The  principles  of  religious  development.  London, 
1909.  "The  idea  of  development  and  its  application  to  history."  pp. 
1-41. 

Bava,  Adolfo.  II  valore  della  storia  di  fronte  alle  scienze  natural! 
e  per  la  concezione  del  mondo.  Eoma,  1909. 

Ferrero,  Guglielmo.  Storia  e  filosofia  della  storia.  Nuova  antologia, 
150  (1910),  85-99. 

Berr,  Henri.  La  synthese  en  histoire:  essai  critique  et  theorique. 
Paris,  1911.  (Bibliotheque  de  philosophie  contemporaine.) 

Elert,  Werner.    Prolegomena  der  Geschichtsphilosophie.    Leipzig,  1911. 

Andler,  Charles,  and  others.  La  philosophie  allemande  au  XIXe  siecle. 
Paris,  ]912.  "La  philosophie  des  sciences  historiques, "  par  Charles 
Andler,  pp.  205-254. 


290          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

Munch,  Fritz.  Das  Problem  der  Geschichtsphilosophie.  Eine  Ein- 
fiihrung  in  den  systematischen  Zusammenhang  ihre  Probleme.  Kant- 
studien,  17  (1912),  349-381. 

Riess,  Ludwig.  Historik.  Ein  Organon  geschichtlichen  Denkens  und 
Forschens.  Bd.  I.  Berlin,  1912. 

Ehrlich,  Otto.  Wie  ist  Geschichte  als  Wissenschaft  moglich?  Kritische 
Studien  iiber  Comte,  Marx,  Rickert,  Stammler,  "Simmel,  Bernheim,  W. 
Freitag,  Ed.  Meyer,  Gumplowicz,  Lamprecht,  Breysig  u.  a.  Berlin,  [1913]. 

Dewey,  John.  German  philosophy  and  polities.  New  York,  1915. 
"The  Germanic  philosophy  of  history."  pp.  91-132. 

Michelis,  Enrico  de.    II  problema  delle  scienze  storiche.     Torino,  1915. 


Ill 
THE  COMPARATIVE  METHOD 

Tylor,  Sir  Edward  Burnett.  Primitive  culture:  researches  into  the 
development  of  mythology,  philosophy,  religion,  language,  art,  and  cus- 
tom. London,  1871.  2  vols.  5th  ed.,  1913.  Chap.  1.  The  science  of 
culture.  2.  The  development  of  culture.  3  &  4.  Survival  in  culture. 

Freeman,  Edward  Augustus.  Comparative  politics.  London,  1873. 
2d  ed.,  1896.  Chap.  1.  The  range  of  the  comparative  sciences. 

Delbriick,  Berthold.  Einleitung  in  das  Sprachstudium.  Ein  Beitrag 
zur  Geschichte  und  Methodik  der  vergleichenden  Sprachforschung.  Leip- 
zig, 1880.  4.  Aufl. :  Einleitung  in  das  Studium  der  indogermanischen 
Sprachen.  Leipzig,  1904.  5.  Aufl.,  1908. 

Paul,  Hermann.  Prinzipien  der  Sprachgesehichte.  Halle,  1880.  3. 
Aufl.,  1898. 

Schrader,  Otto.  Sprachvergleichung  und  Urgeschichte.  Jena,  1883. 
3.  Aufl.,  1907. 

Lang,  Andrew.  Custom  and  myth.  London,  1884.  2d  ed.,  1885.  "The 
method  of  folklore,"  pp.  10-28. 

Folk-lore  journal,  vol.  3,  1885.  [Discussion:]  "The  science  of  folk- 
lore," by  G.  L.  Gomme,  pp.  1-16;  C.  S.  Burne,  pp.  97-103;  Antonio 
Machado  y  Alvarez,  pp.  104-115;  E.  S.  Hartland,  pp.  115-121.  Same, 
vol.  4,  1886,  by  R.  C.  Temple,  pp.  193-212. 

Eevue  de  I'histoire  des  religions,  vol.  13,  1886.  [Discussion:]  "Myth- 
ologie  et  f olklorisme, "  Ch.  Ploix,  pp.  1-46.  "De  la  complexite  des 
mythes  et  legendes  a  propos  des  recentes  controverses  sur  la  methode  en 
mythologie  comparee, "  Jean  ReVille,  pp.  169-196.  "Folk-lore  et 
mythologie, ' '  Andrew  Lang,  pp.  197-205. 

Lang,  Andrew.  Myth,  ritual  and  religion.  London,  1887.  Chap.  1. 
Systems  of  mythology.  2.  New  system  proposed. 

Smith,  William  Robertson.  Lectures  on  the  religion  of  the  Semites. 
First  series:  The  fundamental  institutions.  Edinburgh,  1889.  New  ed., 
1894.  Lect.  1.  The  subject  and  the  method  of  inquiry. 


1916]  Teggart:  Prolegomena  to  History  291 

Gomme,  Sir  George  Laurence.  Ethnology  in  folklore.  New  York, 
1892.  (Modern  science  series.)  Chap.  1.  Survival  and  development. 

M'Lennan,  John  Ferguson.  Studies  in  ancient  history.  Second  series. 
London,  1896.  Chap.  2.  On  the  method  of  inquiry  in  early  history. 
3.  The  mode  of  handling  evidence. 

Lang,   Andrew.      Modern    mythology.      London,    1897. 

Hardy,  Edmund.  Zur  Geschichte  der  vergleichenden  Religionsfor- 
schung.  Archiv  fur  Beligionswissenschaft,  4  (1901),  45-66,  97-135,  193-228. 

Jastrow,  Morris,  jr.  The  study  of  religion.  London,  1901.  (Contem- 
porary science  series.)  Chap.  1.  The  study  of  religion — its  history  and 
character. 

Kaindl,  Raimund  Friedrich.  Die  Volkskunde:  ihre  Bedeutung,  ihre 
Ziele  und  ihre  Methode.  Leipzig,  1903.  (Die  Erdkunde.  XVII.  Teil.) 

Meillet,  Antoine.  Introduction  a  1 'etude  comparative  des  langues  indo- 
europeennes.  Paris,  1903.  3e  ed.,  1912.  "Apercju  du  developpement  de  la 
grammaire  comparee, ' '  pp.  439-473. 

Congress  of  Arts  and  Science,  St.  Louis,  1904.  Boston,  1906. 
"The  history  of  religions  in  the  nineteenth  century,"  George  Foot  Moore, 
vol.  2,  pp.  432-442.  "The  progress  of  the  history  of  language  during 
the  last  century,"  Benjamin  Ide  Wheeler,  vol.  3,  pp.  17-28.  "The  re- 
lations of  comparative  grammar  to  other  branches  of  learning,"  Carl 
Darling  Buck,  vol.  3,  pp.  32-52.  "Ethnology:  its  scope  and  problems," 
Alfred  Cort  Haddon,  vol.  5,  pp.  549-570. 

Farnell,  Lewis  Richard.  The  evolution  of  religion:  an  anthropological 
study.  London,  1905.  Lects.  1  &  2:  The  comparative  study  of  religions: 
its  method  and  problems. 

Jordan,  Louis  Henry.  Comparative  religion:  its  genesis  and  growth. 
Edinburgh,  1905. 

Fox  Pitt-Eivers,  Augustus  Lane-.  The  evolution  of  culture,  and 
other  essays:  ed.  by  J.  L.  Myres.  Oxford,  1906.  Note  "Introduction," 
by  Henry  Balfour,  pp.  v-xx. 

Wodon,  Louis.  Sur  quelques  erreurs  de  methode  dans  1 'etude  de 
1'homme  primitif.  Bruxelles,  1906.  (Instituts  Solvay.  Institut  de 
sociologie.  Notes  &  memoires.  4.) 

Gomme,  Sir  George  Laurence.  Folklore  as  an  historical  science. 
London,  1908.  (The  antiquary's  books.)  Chap.  1.  History  and  folk- 
lore. 2.  Materials  and  methods. 

Frazer,  Sir  James  George.  The  scope  of  social  anthropology:  a  lec- 
ture. London,  1908.  In  his  Psyche's  task.  2d  ed.  London,  1913.  pp. 
157-176. 

Lessmann,  Heinrich.  Aufgaben  und  Ziele  der  vergleichenden  Mythen- 
forschung.  Leipzig,  1908.  (Mythologische  Bibliothek.  I.  4.) 

Foucart,  George.  La  methode  comparative  dans  1'histoire  des  re- 
ligions. Paris,  1909. 

Eeville,  Jean.  Les  phases  successives  de  1'histoire  des  religions. 
Paris,  1909.  (Annales  du  Musee  Guimet.  Bibliotheque  de  vulgarisation. 
XXXIII.) 


292          University  of  California  Publications  in  History     [VOL.  4 

Ha<ldon,  Alfred  Cort,  and  Quiggin,  A.  H.  History  of  Anthropology. 
London,  1910. 

Levy-Bruhl,  Lucien.  Les  fonctions  mentales  dans  les  societes  in- 
ferieures.  Paris,  1910.  (Bibliotheque  de  philosophic  contemporaine.) 
"Introduction,"  pp.  1-24. 

Myres,  John  Linton.  The  influence  of  Anthropology  on  the  course 
of  Political  Science.  British  Association,  Report  of  the  79th  meeting, 
1909.  London,  1910.  pp.  589-617.  2d  ed.,  revised.  Berkeley,  1916.  (Uni- 
versity of  California  publications  in  history,  vol.  4,  no.  1.) 

Goblet  d'Alviella,  Eugene,  comte.  Croyances,  rites,  institutions. 
Paris,  1911.  3  vols.  "De  la  methode  comparative  dans  1'histoire  des 
religions,"  vol.  2,  [chap.]  5.  "Sur  1'histoire  de  la  science  des  religions," 
vol.  3,  appendix. 

Graebner,  Fritz.  Methode  der  Ethnologic.  Heidelberg,  1911.  (Kul- 
turgeschichtliche  Bibliothek.  1.  Eeihe.  1.) 

Masson-Oursel,  P.  Objet  et  methode  de  la  philosophic  comparee. 
Revue  de  metaphysique  et  de  morale,  19  (1911),  541-48. 

Foucart,  George.  Histoire  des  religions  et  methode  conrrjaraTiveT 
Paris,  1912.  (Bibliotheque  d'histoire  religieuse.) 

Rivers,  William  TTalse  Rivers.  The  ethnological  analysis  of  culture. 
British  Association,  Report  of  the  80th  [81st]  meeting,  1911.  London, 
1912.  pp.  490-499. 

Piper,  Otto.     Bedenken  zur  Vorgeschichtsforschung.     Miinchen,  1913. 

Gennep,  Arnold  van.  Contributions  a  1'histoire  de  la  methode  ethno- 
graphique.  Revue  de  1'histoire  des  religions,  67  (1913),  320-338;  68  (1913), 
32-61. 

Read,  Carveth.  The  comparative  method  in  psychology.  British 
journal  of  psychology,  6  (1913),  44-59. 

Sikes,  Edward  Ernest.  The  anthropology  of  the  Greeks.  London, 
1914.  Chap.  1.  The  method  of  Greek  anthropology. 

Cook,  Stanley  Arthur.     The  study  of  religions.     London,  1914. 


^ 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


aim  &  i*50 

t)CT  1      1958 

•MIRL    NOV    419E 

8 

,'r 

^  Li 

^ 

(|P!       rlfrfn    O   f 
*w<-      ^fjvP    b    \ 

97? 
'^/& 

'         ^K^_ 

DRH 

* 

FPCJ^  W- 

'*'»!? 

unu 

Ir 

I 

Form  L9-42m-8,'49(B5573)444 


UC  SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    000860657    6 

ffANCH 

LIFORNIA 


IP 


